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INTRODUCTION
I.  THE  BACKGROUND  OF  THE PULLMAN DOCTRINE
The eleventh amendment  to the  United States Constitution
provides:
The Judicial  power  of the  United  States  shall  not  be
construed  to  extend  to any  suit  in law or equity,  com-
menced  or prosecuted  against one of the United  States
by Citizens  of another State,  or by  Citizens  or Subjects
of any Foreign State....
Though the amendment  does  not in terms  so state,  it has  been
established  that  states  are  similarly  protected  against  suits  by
their  own  citizens.'  Moreover  the  protection  extends  beyond
suits  against  states  as  such  to  cover  actions  in  which  persons
acting  as  state  officials  are  named  as  defendants.2  Thus  it
would  appear  that  individual  litigants  may  never  sue  a  state
without its consent.
In  1908,  however,  in Ex  parte Young,3  the Supreme  Court
severely  qualified  this protection 4 by  holding that a suit against
a  state  officer  alleged  to  be  acting  unconstitutionally. is  not  a
suit  against  the  state.  Its  "reasoning"  was  that  a  state  official
cannot be acting  on behalf of the  state  when he  acts  unconsti-
tutionally.5  The  same  rationale  would  seem  to  exempt  the
I Hans v. Louisiana,  134  U.S.  1 (1890).
2 Governor  of  Ga.  v.  Madrazo,  26  U.S.  (1  Pet.)  110,  122-23  (1828)  (Marshall,
C.J.).  Chief Justice  Marshall  had  earlier  held  that  the  eleventh  amendment  protects
the  state  only  when  the  state  is  the named  defendant,  Osborn  v.  Bank of the  United
States,  22  U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  738,  846,  857  (1824),  but  his  position  in  Madrazo, appar-
ently  altering  that  aspect  of  Osborn,  has  since  been  settled  doctrine.  The  amend-
ment  would  be  of  little  avail  if it  did  not  apply  to  suits  against  state  officials.  The
case  law  is  less  than  clear,  however,  on  when  an  individual  acts  as  a  state  official
and  when  he acts  in  his private  capacity.  See,  e.g.,  Georgia  R.R.  v.  Redwine,  342  U.S.
299 (1952);  In re Ayers,  123 U.S.  443 (1887).
3 209 U.S.  123 (1908).
" Although  Young  is  the  case that  has come  to  symbolize  the doctrine,  there were
earlier  cases  tending  in  the  same  direction.  See,  e.g.,  Prout  v.  Starr,  188  U.S.  537
(1-903);  Smyth  v.  Ames,  169  U.S.  466  (1898);  Reagan  v.  Farmers'  Loan  & Trust Co.,
154 U.S.  362 (1894).
5 In Ex parte Young the Court said:
[T]he  use  of the name  of the  State to  enforce  an  unconstitutional  act  to  the
injury  of complainants  is  a  proceeding  without  the  authority  of and  one
which  does  not  affect  the  State in  its  sovereign  or  governmental  capacity.  It
is  simply  an  illegal  act  upon  the part  of a  state  official  in  attempting by  the
use  of  the  name  of  the  State  to  enforce  a  legislative  enactment  which  is
void  because  unconstitutional.  If the  act  which  the  state  Attorney  General
seeks  to  enforce  be  a  violation  of the  Federal  Constitution,  the  officer  inABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
states  from  the prohibitions  of the fourteenth  amendment  and
other  constitutional  provisions  regulating  only  state  action.6
Nevertheless,  the  Court  has  held  that  acts  of  state  officials
can  violate  those  constitutional  provisions  as  acts  of the  state.7
The  tw6  doctrines  in  combination  enabled  individual  lit-
igants  to  question  the  constitutionality  of state  actions  in  fed-
eral  court,  even  where  the  state  had  not  consented  to  suit.
They  thereby significantly  facilitated enforcing state compliance
with  federal  constitutional  standardsA  At  the  same  time,  the
proceeding  under  such  enactment  comes  into  conflict  with  the  superior  au-
thority  of  that Constitution,  and  he is  in that  case  stripped of  his  official  or
representative  character  and  is  subjected  in  his  person  to  the  consequences
of  his  individual  conduct.  The  State  has  no  power  to  impart  to  him  any
immunity  from  responsibility  to  the  supreme  authority  of  the  United
States....
209  U.S. at 159-160.
6 Another  difficulty  with  the  rationale  is  how,  given  the  usual  principles  for
construing  the  statutory  federal  question  jurisdiction,  see  Louisville  &  N.R.R.  v.
Mottley,  211  U.S.  149  (1908),  these  cases  are  deemed  to  "arise  under"  the  Consti-
tution  when  the  official  character  of  the  action  is  raised  only  as  justification  and
the invalidity of the statutory authority only by reply to that justification.
7 Home  Tel.  &  Tel.  Co.  v.  Los  Angeles,  227  U.S.  278  (1913).  The  Court  there
said:
[I]t  may  not  be  doubted  that  where  a  state  officer  under  an  assertion  of
power  from  the  State  is  doing  an  act  which  could  only  be  done  upon  the
predicate  that  there  was  such  power,  the  inquiry  as  to  the  repugnancy  of
the  act  to  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  cannot  be  avoided  by  insisting  that
there  is  a  want  of  power. That  is  to  say,  a  state  officer  cannot  on  the  one
hand  as  a  means  of doing a  wrong  forbidden  by  the  Amendment  proceed
upon  the  assumption  of the  possession  of state  power  and  at  the  same  time
for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  the  application  of  the  Amendment,  deny  the
power  and  thus  accomplish  the  wrong.  To  repeat,  for  the  purpose  of en-
forcing  the  rights  guaranteed  by  the  Amendment  when  it  is  alleged  that
a  state  officer  in  virtue  of state  power  is  doing  an  act  which  if  permitted
to  be  done  prima faie would  violate  the  Amendment,  the  subject  must  be
tested  by  assuming  that the  officer  possessed  power  if the  act be  one  which
there  would  not  be opportunity  to  perform  but  for  the  possession  of some
state authority.
227  U.S.  at  288-89.  Home  Tel.  &  Tel.  thus  goes  beyond  contradicting  the  Young
rationale-which  seemingly  would  exempt  states  from  the  fourteenth  amendment
even  when  the  state  instigates  or  directs  the  unconstitutional  action  and  its  courts
expressly  approve  it-and  deems  even  actions  that  the  state  apparently  prohibits
to  be  state  action  within  the  fourteenth  amendment.  Some  actions  on  the  part  of
officials,  however,  are  considered  individual  rather  than  state  conduct.  See  note  2
supra. See  also  United  States  v.  Raines,  362  U.S.  17,  25-26  (1960);  Mosher  v.  City  of
Phoenix, 287 U.S. 29  (1932).
8 If  one  were  not  permitted  to  sue  state  officers  for  violating  the  Constitution,
the  most  obvious  way  to  raise  constituti6nal  issues  would  be in  defense  of a criminal
prosecution.  For  a  discussion  of that  and  other  possible  methods  of  enforcing  the
Constitution  against  the  states,  see  H.  HART  &  H.  WECHSLER,  THE  FEDERAL  COURTS
AND  THE  FEDERAL  SYSTEM  936-37  (2d  ed.  1973)  and  C.A.  WRIGHT,  FEDERAL  COURTS,
185-86  (2d  ed.  1970).  See  also  Louisiana  v.  Jumel,  107  U.S.  711,  750-52  (1883)
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doctrines  made  possible  substantial  federal  court  interference
with  state  programs  by making  every  program, whether  it was
longstanding  or  newly  enacted  and  not  yet  launched,  subject
to  constitutional  attack  in  the  federal  courts  and  to  issuance
of  an  injunction  against  its  execution  or  continuation.  Even
if  the  federal  system  ultimately  sustained  the  validity  of  the
program,  interlocutory  orders  delaying  its  enforcement  could
cause irreparable  damage to state policy.9
Congress  rejected  legislative  proposals  to  overturn  entire-
ly  the  new  federal jurisdiction.'0  But over  a period  of years  it
passed  a number  of bills  designed  to cut down  on the -adverse
effects  on  the  execution  of state  policy  that  Ex  parte  Young
had  made  possible.  The  most  significant  of  these  bills  took
from  the  federal  courts  all  power  to  enjoin  state  rate  orders
and  tax  collections  so  long  as  "a  plain,  speedy  and  efficient
remedy"  is  available  in  the  courts  of the  state;"  and  required
a district court of three judges to pass  upon  attempts to enjoin
state statutes or administrative orders on constitutional  grounds,
with direct  Supreme Court review of their decisions. 12
The  courts  joined  with  Congress  in  imposing  limitations
upon  the  situations  and  the  manner  in  which  injunctions
against  state  officials  should  issue.  One  of the  most important
court-imposed  limitations  has  come  to  be  known  as  "the Pull-
man doctrine"  from  the  case  in  which  it  was  first fully  articu-
lated.' 3  The  doctrine  concerns  the  federal  courts'  abstention
in  certain  constitutional  cases  from the  exercise  of jurisdiction
that  Young  and  ensuing  congressional  statutes  would  seem
to allow  to them.
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  Professor  Wright  concludes  that  -in  perspective  the doctrine
of  Ex parte  Young seems  indispensable  to the  establishment  of constitutional  govern-
ment and the rule of law." C.A. WRIGHT, supra at 186.
9  In  an  era  when  state  economic  regulation  was  often  found  vulnerable  to  due
process attack, the  new federal jurisdiction was  especially disruptive.
is See,  e.g.,  45  CONG.  R  c.  7256  (1910)  (remarks of Senator  Overman);  42  CONG.
REc.  4848-49  (1908);  F.  FRANKFURTER  &  J.  LANDIS,  THE  BUSINESS  OF  THE  SUPREME
COURT  143 (1928).
"Johnson  Act,  28  U.S.C.  §  1342  (1970);  Tax  Injunction  Act,  28  U.S.C.  §  1341
(1970).
12 The  original  three-judge  court  act  applied  only  to  state  statutes  and  not  ad-
ministrative  orders.  36  Stat.  557  (1910).  It  was  codified  as  §  266  of the  1911  Judi-
cial  Code.  The provision  has been  modified  in several  respects  over a  period of years.
See  H.  HART  &  H.  WECHSLER,  supra  note  8  at  967-68.  The  current  version  is  28
U.S.C.  § 2281  (1970).
13  Railroad  Comm'n  v.  Pullman  Co.,  312  U.S.  496  (1941).  Cases  that  might  be
deemed  precursors  to Pullman can  be  found in  H.  HART  &  H.  WECHSLER,  supra  note
8 at 988-89.
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II.  THE PULLMAN CASE
Railroad Commission  of  Texas  v.  Pullman  Co.14  involved  a
challenge  to  an  order  of the  Texas  Railroad  Commission  that
all  sleeping  cars  operated  by  railroads  in  Texas  must  be  in
the  charge  of a  Pullman  conductor.  Prior to  the  Commission's
order, trains with only one sleeping car had been in the charge
of  a  porter  instead  of a  conductor.  Porters  were  black,  con-
ductors  white.  The  order  was  attacked 15  on  the  grounds  that
it  violated  the  commerce,  due  process  and  equal  protection
clauses' 6  of  the  Federal  Constitution  and  that  it  was  invalid
under  Texas  law.  A  three-judge  district  court  held  that  the
Texas  statute  which  gave  the  Commission  power  over  rail-
roads  and which  made it "the duty of the said  Commission...
to  correct  abuses  and  prevent  unjust  discrimination  in  the
rates,  charges  and  tolls  of such  railroads  . . . and  to  prevent
any and all other abuses  in the conduct of their business...,u1
did  not  authorize  the  Commission  to  issue  the  order  as  the
correction  of an  "abuse,"  and  the  court enjoined  enforcement
of the  Commission's  order  on that  ground.'8  On  direct review
the Supreme  Court held, in  an opinion by Justice Frankfurter,
that  the  district  court  should  have  abstained  from  deciding
the case.
Although Pullman was  within the  original  federal jurisdic-
tion  as  a  federal  question  case, jurisdiction  also  extended  to
the ancillary  state issue.' 9  In fact, the Supreme  Court had  sug-
gested  that  in  such  cases  federal  courts  should  decide  the
state  questions  first if, as  in Pullman, doing  so  might  avoid  a
federal  constitutional  decision. 2 0  The  difficulty  in Pullman was
that,  according  to  Justice  Frankfurter,  Texas  law  was  "far
from  clear.''2'  It is  true that the language  of the Texas statute
did  not  permit a  confident  determination  whether  or  not  the
14  312 U.S. 496 (1941).
15  The  complainants  were  the Pullman  Company  and  the  affected  railroads. The
porters  intervened  as  complainants  and  the  conductors  intervened  in  support  of
the order. Id. at 498.
16  The  fourteenth  amendment  challenges  were  both  that  the  order  was  unjust
and arbitrary and that it discriminated  against Blacks.
1  312  U.S. at 499 n.1.
18  Pullman Co. v. Railroad  Comm'n,  33 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Tex.  1940).
19See  Siler v. Louisville  & N.R.R.,  213 U.S.  175,  191  (1909).
20See.  e.g.,  Cincinnati  v.  Vester,  281  U.S.  439  (1930);  Greene  v.  Louisville  &
Interurban  R.R.,  244  U.S.  499,  508,  519  (1917);  Siler  v.  Louisville  &  N.R.R.,  213
U.S.  175,  193 (1909).
21  312  U.S. at 499.
1974]1078  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  122:1071
Commission's  order  was  within  its  purview.2 2  Justice  Frank-
furter  said  as  well  that Texas  decisions  interpreting  the  statu-
tory  language  did not  clarify  the issue.2 3  On  that  assumption,
a  federal  court  that  follows  the  policy  of deciding  state  issues
first  runs  a  high risk  of deciding  those  questions  erroneously.
If  it  erroneously  holds  the  order  authorized,  it  will  needlessly
reach  the  federal  constitutional  questions.2 4  If  it  erroneously
holds  that the  order  is  unauthorized,  it will  avoid  for the  mo-
ment  deciding  the  constitutional  questions,  but  only  at  the
risk  of  improvidently  enjoining  an  ostensibly  valid  state  pro-
gram.  Moreover,  if  the  state  courts  subsequently  expose  the
error  by  deciding  the  state  question  differently,  the  federal
decision  will  be  subject  to  reopening. 25  If  it  is  reopened,  the
federal  constitutional  questions  may  then  have  to  be  litigated.
Therefore,  although  the  Supreme  Court  in  Pullman  did  not
find  the  district  court's  "forecast  of Texas  law"  unreasonable,
it concluded  that only  the  course  of abstaining  in favor  of the
state judicial system could  "avoid  [both]  the waste  of a tentative
decision  [and]  . . . the  friction  of a  premature  constitutional
adjudication.
26
III.  THE ENGLAND PROCEDURE
The  Pullman  Court  indicated  its  belief  that  abstention
would  not  prejudice  the  complainants'  federal  constitutional
claims,27  but  it  did  not  make  explicit  whether  those  claims
would  ultimately  be  decided  in  state  or  in  federal  court.28
22 The  statutory  language  provides  little  guidance  concerning  the  limits  of  the
Commission's  power  to  correct  "abuses."  Justice  Frankfurter  also  raised  the  pos-
sibility  that  the  order  might  be  authorized  under  the  Commission's  power  to  cor-
rect  "discrimination."  It  seems  plain  on  the  face  of  the  statute,  however,  that  the
power  to  prevent  "unjust  discrimination"  is  limited  to  railroads'  "rates,  charges
and  tolls"-although  in  quoting  from  the  statute  in  the  body  of  the  opinion  the
Justice omitted  the reference  to "rates, charges, and tolls."  312 U.S.  at 498 & n.1,  499.
23  In  fact  such  decisions,  which  the  district court  had  relied upon,  were  relatively
unambiguous,  indicating  that  to  be  correctible  by  the  Commission  an  "abuse"  must
be  defined  as  such  by  law.  Pullman  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commission,  33  F.  Supp.  675,
676-77  (W.D. Tex.  1940).
24  If  the  court  then  held  the  order  constitutional,  the  ultimate  disposition  of
the controversy  would  also be erroneous.
22See,  e.g.,  Lee  v.  Bickell,  292  U.S.  415  (1934);  Glenn  v.  Field  Packing  Co.,
290  U.S.  177 (1933).
26  312  U.S. at 500.
27 Id. at 501.
28 There  are  suggestions  in  the  opinion,  however,  that  a  return  to  the  federal
forum  was  contemplated.  Justice  Frankfurter  speaks  of the  state  settling  "the  issueABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
For  a  period  after the Pullman decision,  it remained  unsettled
whether  the  parties  remanded  to  a  state  court  should  submit
their federal  as  well  as their  state claims  for the  determination
of that  tribunal  or  whether  they  could  reserve  their  federal
claims  for  initial  determination  by  the  federal  district  court
in  case  the  state  law  questions  did  not  in  fact  dispose  of the
controversy. 29  In  1964  in  England v.  Louisiana State  Board of
Medical Examiners, 3"  the  Supreme  Court  settled  most  questions
about the  procedure  to be  followed when Pullman abstention  is
ordered.  It held  that a litigant  remanded  to  state court under
that doctrine  cannot  be  compelled  to  submit his  federal  claims
for state  court  disposition;  abstention  may  not  be  used  to  de-
prive  him  of the  benefits  of  an  initial  federal  determination
of the  federal  issues  and  of the  facts  on which  disposition  of
those  issues depends.31 Although  the litigant must inform  state
courts  of  the  nature  of  his  federal  claims  so  that  they  may
construe  state  law  in  light  of them,  he  need  not  litigate  the
issues  in  state  court.32  While  prior  to  1964  it  was  not  clear
whether  the  original  federal  forum  was  preserved  for the  liti-
gants,  and  while  that  uncertainty  may  possibly  have  affected
the  disposition  of  some  pre-1964  cases,  the  evaluation  of the
Pullman  doctrine  that  follows,  and  the  discussion  of  which
cases  require  abstention,  will  proceed  on  the  assumption  that
the England procedure  is and was the rule.33
of state  law."  Id. at  501.  Moreover,  he directs  the  district  court  to  retain jurisdiction
over the controversy pending the state adjudication. Id. at 501-02. 29  See,  e.g.,  Wechsler,  Federal Jurisdiction and  the  Revision  of  the Judicial Code,  13
LAw  &  CONTEMP.  PROB.  216,  229  (1948).  The  later case  of  Government  Employees
v.  Windsor,  353  U.S.  364  (1957),  which  held  that  litigants  remitted  to  state  courts
must  present  their  federal  constitutional  contentions  so  that  state  courts  can  inter-
pret  their  law  in  the  light of  the  constitutional  claims,  contributed  to  an  impression
that  once  the  federal  court  has  abstained,  the  state  court  to  which  the  issue  is  dele-
gated  has jurisdiction of the whole controversy.
30  375 U.S.  411  (1964).
31  375  U.S.  at  416-17.  Accordingly,  the  federal  district  court  should  retain
jurisdiction  rather  than  dismiss  when  it  orders  abstention.  See  American  Trial  Law-
yers Ass'n v. New Jersey  S. Ct., 409  U.S.  467 (1973).
32  A  litigant  may,  however,  submit  his  federal  along  with  his  state  claims  for
decision  in  the  state  courts.  If  he does  that,  he  is- bound by  the  state  court's decision
and  can  have  it  overturned  only  by  seeking  review  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the
United States. 375 U.S. at 417-19.  See NAACP v. Button, 371  U.S. 415, 427 (1963).
33  One  cannot  sensibly  discuss  the  proper  scope  for  an abstention  doctrine  with-
out  making  an  explicit  assumption  concerning  the  abstention  procedure,  for  the
scope  of  the  doctrine  should  vary  with  the  procedure  contemplated.  Abstention
for  state  court  adjudication  of  federal  as  well  as  state  claims,  for  example,  might
well  be  invoked  in  fewer  or  in  different  cases  than  abstention  for state  court  deter-
mination  of state  issues  alone.  Under  the  American  Law  Institute's  proposal  regard-
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PART  ONE:  THE  CASES  IN  WHICH  PULLMAN
ABSTENTION  IS  PROPER
I.  ALLOWING  STATE  COURTS  TO  RULE  ON  FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL  ISSUES-AN  IMPROPER
PURPOSE  FOR  ABSTENTION
An  abstention  policy  could  serve  several  different  pur-
poses  in  cases  involving  the  federal  constitutionality  of state
enactments;  the  purpose  intended  will  define  the  range  of
cases  appropriate  for abstention.  One  possible  approach  would
allow  state  courts  to  rule  on  the  validity  of state  enactments
even  when  the  only  issues  at  stake  were  federal.  The Pullman
doctrine  rather  clearly  does  not  adopt  this  approach.3 4  None-
theless,  it is  necessary  to examine  its validity  in order  to deter-
ing  abstention,  for  example,  a  case  in  which  abstention  is  ordered  will  not,  in  the
normal  course,  return  to  federal  court,  but  instead  will  be  fully  decided  within  the
state  system  subject  only  to  possible  review  in  the  United  States  Supreme  Court.
The  Institute  recognizes  that  this  fact  makes  abstention  appropriate  only  when  the
district judge  finds,  inter alia, "that  the  parties'  claims  of federal  right,  if  any,  in-
cluding  [any]  issues  of fact  material  [thereto],  can  be adequately  protected  by  review
in  the  Supreme  Court  of the  United  States."  AMERICAN  LAW  INSTITUTE,  STUDY  OF
THE  DivIsIoN  OF  JURISDICTION  BETWEEN  STATE  AND  FEDERAL  COURTS  289  (1969)
[hereinafter  cited  as  ALI  STUDY].  This  limitation,  according  to the  ALI  commentary,
will  "ordinarily"  bar  abstention  "[i]f  there  is  a  genuine  issue  of  fact  material  to  the
federal  contentions  in  the  case." Id. 290.  The  conception  then  of the  ALI  procedure
is  to  allow  courts  to  remove  entirely  from  the  original  federal  jurisdiction  cases
that,  though  falling  within  a  category  of  cases  for  which  Congress  has  deemed  fed-
eral  jurisdiction  necessary,  do  not  on  their  facts  show  any  need  for  federal  juris-
diction.  That  conception  is  sufficiently  different  from  the  Pullman-England one,
which  allows  each  forum  to  adjudicate  its  own  legal  issues,  that  the  ALI  approach
could supplement the current concept  as readily as  it could  replace it.
Another  change  in  procedures  which  would  affect  the  proper  scope  of absten-
tion  would  be  the  removal  of some  of  the burdens  abstention  presently  imposes  on
parties  wishing  to  invoke  federal  jurisdiction.  If,  for  example,  a  procedure  were
available  for  certification  of  a  disputed  state  issue  to  the  highest  state  court  and
if  that  procedure  adequately  met  the  needs  for  state  court  input  in  the  particular
case,  then  abstention  might  be  more  readily  ordered  than  under  the  more  cumber-
some  England procedure  of requiring  the  plaintiff  to  initiate  an  action  at the  lowest
state  court  level  and  to  appeal  the  result  through  the  state  system  before  returning
to  the  federal  forum.  Cf.  Lehman  Bros.  v.  Schein,  42  U.S.L.W.  4603  (U.S.  Apr.
29,  1974).
11 The  Court  has  stated  that  "abstention  cannot  be  ordered  simply  to  give  state
courts  the  first  opportunity  to  vindicate  the  federal  claim."  Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389
U.S.  241,  251  (1967).  See also  id. at 247,  (quoting  F.  FRANKFURTER  & J.  LANDIS,  THE
BUSINESS  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT  65  (1928));  McNeese  v.  Board  of Educ.  373  U.S.
668,  672,  674  (1963).  Cf  England  v.  Louisiana  State  Bd.  of  Medical  Examiners,
375  U.S.  411,  415-16  (1964).  Moreover,  the England holding  that parties  may  with-
hold  federal  issues  from  state  tribunals  when  abstention  is  ordered  clearly  demon-
strates  that  the  purpose  of  abstention  cannot  be  state  decision  of  federal  issues.
That  will  nonetheless  be  an  effect  of  abstention  when  the  remanded  party  chooses
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mine  whether  Pullman is  undesirably  narrow  in  this  respect,
especially  since  some  members  of the  present  Supreme  Court
appear  to  favor  abstaining  in  some  instances  for  state  court
determination of federal issues.35
A  policy of abstaining for state  adjudication of federal con-
stitutional  challenges  to  state  action  would  be  grounded  in  a
concern  both  to  relieve  federal  courts  of  congestion3 6  and
to  "steer  around  head-on  collisions  with  the  States  by  avoid-
ing  unnecessary  constitutional  decisions. '3 7  It  would  rest  on
the  propositions  that  state  courts  are  as  capable  of  deciding
these  controversies  as  are  federal  courts, 38  and  that  Supreme
Court review would adequately protect federal rights.
Such  a  policy  would  undoubtedly  reduce  the  workoad  of
the  lower federal  courts.  It is less  clear  that federal-state  com-
ity  would  be  promoted  to  any  significant  degree,  since  the
premise  of the  policy  is  that  transferring jurisdiction  to  state
tribunals  for  decision  of federal  issues  would  not  change  the
result  of litigation.  If  federal,  instead  of state,  tribunals  void
state  legislation,  doing  simply  what  state  tribunals  would  have
been  required  to  do  had  they  heard  the  case,  the  harm  to
state  interests,  if any,  is  not  any  tangible  damage  but rather
a  harm  to  state  pride. 39  Certainly  any  friction  a  federal  court
might  create  by  properly  deciding  an  issue  of federal  law  is
3r  In Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau,  400  U.S.  433  (1971),  Chief Justice  Burger,  in
a  dissenting  opinion  that  Justice  Blackmun  joined,  objected  to  the  Court  declaring
a  state  statute  unconstitutional  without  giving  the  Wisconsin  courts  the  first  oppor-
tunity  to  invalidate  it  under  the  state  or federal  constitutions.  Id.  at  440.  But  see
Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n  v.  MacMullan,  406  U.S.  498  (1972)  (Burger,  C.J.,  dissenting).
See note 167 infra.
36 See  Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau,  400  U.S.  433,  443  (1971)  (Burger,  C.J.,  dis-
senting).
37  Id. at 442 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
38  In Constantineau the Chief Justice said:
[N]o one  could  reasonably  think  that  the  judges  of  Wisconsin  have  less
fidelity  to  due  process  requirements  of the  Federal  Constitution  than  we
do ....
Id. at 440.
39 And  it  is  not  in  keeping  with  the  current  legal  environment  to  expect  a  great
blow  to  state  pride  from  federal  courts  instead  of  state  ones  telling  the  states  of
the  limitations  the  Federal  Constitution  imposes.  It  is  true  that there  was  an  outcry
in  1908  when  Ex  parte  Young  was  decided.  See  2  C.  WARREN,  THE  SUPREME  COURT
IN  UNITED  STATES  HISTORY  717  (1926).  Today,  however,  people  are  accustomed
to  the  notion  that  the  federal  government  places  limits  upon  the  states.  Moreover
Young  did  more  than  say  that  federal  courts  rather  than  state  ones  could  enjoin
state  officials'  actions:  Without  its'doctrine,  state  action  often could  not  be invalidated
at  all (for  the  exceptions,  see  note  8 supra), for  the  eleventh  amendment  would  pro-
tect  the  state  from  suit  in  both  state  and  federal  court.  Young  therefore  affected
tangible state interests, not solely state pride.
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far  less  serious  than  the  friction  that  would  result  from  it
mistakenly  deciding  an  issue of state  law  and,  as  a result,  pos-
sibly  voiding  a  state  program  that  did  not  in  fact  transgress
either state or federal bounds.
Moreover,  using  abstention  to  allow  state  courts  to  rule
first on  federal  constitutional  issues  seems  directly  inconsistent
with  the  general  federal  question jurisdiction 4 0  and  with  Con-
gress'  rejection  of proposals  to  delete  from  it  suits challenging
state  enactments  after  it  became  clear  that  such  suits  were
deemed  within  the jurisdiction.41  The  subject  under discussion
is  not whether  it would  be  wise  for  Congress  to  alter jurisdic-
tional  statutes42  but rather  how courts  should  apply  the judge-
made  abstention  doctrine.  Congress'  withdrawal  from  the  fed-
eral jurisdiction  of limited  classes  of suits  against  the  state-
those  to  enjoin  state  rate  orders  and  tax  collections,  given  "a
plain,  speedy  and  efficient  remedy"  in  state  court43-supports
the  argument  that  using  abstention  to  enlarge  the  exception
would impinge upon Congress'  domain.
A  more  limited  extension  of the  congressionally  enacted
exceptions  would  call  for deferral  to  a state  system  only  when
it had  never  passed  on  the constitutionality  of the state statute
at issue.44  While  that  use  of abstention  may  seem  a  less  direct
repudiation  of Congress'  jurisdictional  scheme  than  deferring
to  state  courts  for  all  constitutional  challenges  to  state  enact-
ments,  it  would  still  remove  some  cases  within  congressional
jurisdictional  grants  and  would  rest  upon  premises  contrary
to those underlying current federal question jurisdiction.45
40  Under  the  operative  statutes  the  jurisdiction  is  concurrent  with  state  juris-
diction,  and  either  the  plaintiff  or  the  defendant  may  opt  for  the  federal  forum.
See 28  U.S.C.  §§  1331  &  1441(b) (1970).
41See  note  10 supra & accompanying  text.
42 Some  commentators  have  suggested  that  Congress  confine  challenges  to  state
enactments  to  state  fora.  See,  e.g.,  Wechsler,  supra note  29,  at  229.  One  reason  that
course  may  have  once  seemed  unsatisfactory  lacks  validity  today.  Earlier  in  the
century  it  was  often  impossible  to  challenge  state  enactments  in  state  court  without
violating  them,  and  irreparable  damage  often  resulted  from  the  violation  that  was
necessary  in  order  to  test  the  law.  See,  e.g.,  Ex  parte  Young,  209  U.S.  123,  131,
144-48  (1908).  Now,  however,  the  vast  majority  of states  have  adopted  the  federally
enacted  declaratory judgment procedure.
4 3Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970); Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
4  Such  a  procedure  appears  to  be  the one  advocated  by  Chief Justice  Burger  in
his  dissent  in  Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau, 400  U.S.  at  440,  though  there  is  some indi-
cation  that  the  Chief  Justice  would  require  abstention  only  in  cases  considered
"non-urgent." See id. at 443. But cf. id.  at 442 n.2.
'5 Chief Justice  Burger  appeared  to  recognize  a  conflict  between  this  approach,
which  he  advocated  in  Constantineau, see  note  44  supra, and  the  congressional  juris-
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Congress'  grant  of  original  federal  question  jurisdiction
allows  for  federal  factfinding  and  federal  determination  of
legal  issues  on  the  hypotheses  that  federal  judges  are  more
capable  of  deciding  questions  of  federal  law  and  are  more
sympathetic  to  federal  constitutional  claims  than  are  state
court judges.46  Federal  judges  are  primarily  responsible  for
mastering  federal  law,  while  state judges  concentrate  on  state
law. And it has been argued that federal courts, trial and appel-
late,  accord  greater  deference  to  Supreme  Court  pronounce-
ments, produce  a more unified  system  of national  law,  and  are
more  independent  of  local  pressures  than  state  tribunals  on
issues  of fact  as  well  as  of  law.47  Bias  against  federal  claims
may  not be  widespread  among  state court judges, but  the ease
with which  the judge who finds  the facts  can alter  the ultimate
result  in  a  case 48  makes  such  a  bias  particularly  difficult  to
guard  against  without  original  federal  jurisdiction.  Since  bias
may be  especially  likely  when  state  law  provisions  are claimed
to  transgress  federal  constitutional  bounds,49  the  fact that  the
state  interest  is  particularly  great  in  this  group  of  cases  can
cut  in favor  of original  federal jurisdiction  rather  than cutting
in favor  of original  state jurisdiction.  Nor  would  the  possibility
of  Supreme  Court  review  as  the  sole  federal  input  in  these
cases  adequately  protect  the  federal  interests  embodied  in  the
jurisdictional  statute.  That  tribunal  has  a  limited  capacity
which  is  already  overtaxed.50  It  is by  no  means  certain  that it
could  or  would  hear  every  case  in  which  it would  ultimately
determine  the  federal  claim  to  be  a  deserving  one.51  More-
dictional  arrangement  when  he  called  that  arrangement  "unwise"  and  "unwar-
ranted."  400  U.S.  at  443  (Burger,  C.J.,  dissenting).  The  quoted  adjectives  were
directed  toward  the  use  of  three-judge  courts  and  direct  Supreme  Court  review
of their  decisions,  rather  than  to  the  existence  of  federal jurisdiction  as  such,  and
the  Chief Justice's  comments  in  general  seem  influenced  by  a  distaste  for  the  three-
judge  court  procedure,  which  is  applicable  to  many  Pullman  challenges.  See  28
U.S.C.  §  2281  (1970).  If  the  procedure  is  unwise,  Congress  should  remedy  its  short-
comings  rather than the judiciary using abstention to sidestep it.
46 Mishkin,  The  Federal "Question" in  the  District Courts, 53  COLUM.  L.  Rtv.  157,
158-59  (1953) [hereinafter  cited as Mishkin].
47id.  158-59,  175.
48 See,  e.g.,  England  v.  Louisiana  State  Bd. of  Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S.  411,
416-17  (1964);  Townsend  v.  Sain,  372  U.S.  293,  312  (1963);  Prentis  v.  Atlantic  Coast
Line  Co.,  211  U.S.  210,  228  (1908);  Osborn  v.  Bank  of the  United  States,  22  U.S.
(9  Wheat.) 738, 822  (1824).
4  See ALI STUDY,  supra note 33, at 282.
50  Burger, Report on the FederalJudicial  Branch, 94 S.Ct. 3,  11-12 (1973).
" See  C.A.  WRIGHT,  supra  note  8,  at  494.  Though  appeals  of  right  inhere  in
the  defeat  in  state  court  of  constitutional  challenges  to  state  statutes,  28  U.S.C.  §
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over,  when the  Court  does  grant a  full  hearing  it typically  will
not  review  the  factual  determinations  that  state  courts  have
made, 52  even  though  such  determinations  dictate  the  resolu-
tion of the federal  constitutional claims.
II.  ALLOWING  STATE  COURTS  TO  DECIDE  STATE
ISSUES-A  PROPER  PURPOSE  IN  SOME  INSTANCES
A.  The Advantages of Abstaining  for State Court
Decision of State Issues and Its Costs
The  Court  has  consistently  used  the  abstention  doctrine
as  a  means  of allowing  state  courts  to  resolve  state  law  issues
in particular  types  of cases.53  This use  of the Pullman doctrine,
in  combination  with  the England procedure,  would  appear  an
effective  solution  to  some  central  problems  of federalism.  In
a  system  in  which  federal  courts  are -the  final  authority  on
questions  of federal  law  and state  courts  are  final  on  questions
of state  law,54  but where  the two legal  systems  are  often inter-
twined  in  a  particular  case,55  prior  allocation  to  the  state  or
federal  forum  would  logically  (except  where  there  is  some
competing  interest at stake)56  be  made  according  to  the  prob-
1257(2)  (1970),  the  same  is  not  true  of challenges  to  other  state  action.  Moreover,
the  Court  disposes  of  many  appeals  on  the  basis  of  the  jurisdictional  statement,
without  a  full  hearing.  While  those  dispositions  are  technically  on  the  merits,  they
seem  as  similar  to  discretionary  certiorari  dispositions  as  to  adjudication  on  the
merits  after  full  briefs  and  oral  argument.  See  A.  BICKEL,  THE  LEAST  DANGEROUS
BRANCH  126  (1962);  address  of Chief Justice Warren,  ALI  Annual  Meeting,  May  19,
1954  (quoted  in  Weiner,  The  Supreme  Court's New  Rules,  68  HARV.  L.  REV.  20,  51
(1954).  But see  Gunther,  The  Subtle  Vices  of the  "Passive Virtues"-A  Comment  on Prin-
ciple and Expediency in Judicial  Review, 64  COLUM.  L. REV.  1, 11  (1964).
" See,  e.g.,  Watts  v.  Indiana,  338  U.S.  49,  50-51  (1949)  (citing  Norris  v.  Ala-
bama,  294  U.S.  587,  589-90  (1935)).  This  is  not  to  intimate  that  the  Court  has  no
power  to  review  such  factual  determinations,  but simply  to suggest  that as  a  practical
matter it  is rarely  exercised.  For a  discussion  of the  Court's  power  in that regard  see
Mishkin, supra note 46, at 173-74.
" See,  e.g.,  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n  v.  MacMullan,  406  U.S.  498,  510-12  (1972);
Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389  U.S.  241,  249  (1967);  Harman  v.  Forssenius,  380  U.S.  528,
534-35  (1965);  Davis  v.  Mann,  377  U.S.  678,  690-91  (1964);  England  v.  Louisiana
State Bd.  of  Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S.  411,  416  n.7  (1964);  Harrison  v.  NAACP,
360 U.S.  167,  176-78  (1959).
54  Murdock  v.  City of Memphis,  87  U.S. (20 Wall.)  590, 618-33  (1875).
s5 See H.  HART  & H. WECHSLER,  supra  note  8, at 470-71.
56  The  most  obvious  example  is  diversity  jurisdiction.  See  28  U.S.C.  §  1332
(1970).  Its  purpose  is  often  deemed  to  be  protecting  out-of-staters  from  state  court
discrimination,  actual  or  feared.  See  Guaranty  Trust  Co.  v.  York,  326  U.S.  99,  111
(1945);  Erie  R.R.  v.  Tompkins,  304  U.S.  64,  74  (1938);  Bank  of  United  States  v.
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ability that a particular  forum's law  will be the more  important
to  the  disposition  of  the  controversy.57  The  probability  obvi-
ously  is  not always  fulfilled.  If  state  courts  are  left with  a case
that turns,  either  entirely  or in  part,  upon  a federal -question,
state  courts  are  under  a  duty,  imposed  by  the  supremacy
clause,  to  decide  the  case  in  accordance  with  Supreme  Court
decisions.5 8  Similarly,  if a  case  within  the  federal jurisdiction
requires  resolution  of  a  question  of state  law,  federal judges
are  under  a  duty  to  decide  that  question  as  they  believe  the
highest court of the state would decide it.59
Despite  its  limitations,60  the  availability  of Supreme  Court
review  does  afford  some  protection  against  error or bias  when
state  courts  decide  federal  issues.  When  federal  courts  decide
questions  of state  law,  however,  there  is  no  possibility  of any
review  within  the  authoritative  state  judicial  system  of  their
prediction  of  how  state  tribunals  would  rule.  The  abstention
doctrine,  by  contrast,  allows  a  case  to  be  divided  so  that  fed-
eral tribunals  can  make  the final  decision  on the federal  issues
and  the  facts  on  which  they  are  based,  while  state  tribunals
have  the final  decision  on state  issues, thereby  apparently  pro-
viding  a  means  of securing  the  most  correct  possible  decision
on every  issue.  If  it were  costless,  one  would wonder  why  that
approach  would  not be  embraced  in every  case involving  both
state  and federal issues.
The  advantages  of abstention,  however,  are obtained  only
at a  high  price.  Parties  who  have  chosen  to  litigate  in  federal
court  are  shuttled  into  state  court  for prior  determination  of
a  state  law  issue,  involving  them  in  considerable  delay  and
expense.61  The  England  case,  for  example,  was  decided  on
Deveaux,  9  U.S.  (5  Cranch)  61,  87  (1809).  Cf  Friendly,  The  Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction,  41  HARV.  L. REv. 483, 495-97,  510 (1928).
57 Mishkin,  supra note  46,  at  164-65.  See  Iowa-Des  Moines  Bank  v.  Bennett,  284
U.S.  239  (1931);  Ward  v.  Love  County,  253  U.S.  17  (1920);  Hart,  The  Relations
Between  State and Federal Law,  54  CoLUM.  L.  REv.  489,  507  & n.56  (1954);  Comment
The State Courts and the Federal Common Law, 27 ALBANY  L. Rmv.  73  (1963).
"
8 See  Free  v.  Bland,  369  U.S.  663  (1962);  Local  174  v.  Lucas  Flour  Co.,  369
U.S.  95,  102-104  (1962).
59  Erie  R.R.  v.  Tompkins,  304  U.S.  64,  78  (1938).  See  Hart,  supra  note  57,  at
510;  Kurland,  Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the  Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diver-
sity  Cases, 67  YALE  L.J.  187,  204-218  (1957).  See  also  C.A.  WRIGHT,  supra  note  8  at
236-41.
60 See  notes 50-52 supra & accompanying text.
61  E.g.,  Harrison  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167,  180  (1959)  (Douglas, J.,  dissenting);
see Clay v.  Sun Ins.  Office, 363  U.S.  207, 228 (1960)  (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the  merits  only  after  nine  years  of  litigation;  final  decision
came  five  years  after  abstention  was  ordered.6 2  The  decision
in  Spector  Motor Service,  Inc.  v.  O'Connor, which  followed  the
procedure  England  later  endorsed,  was  rendered  nine  years
after  the  action  began  and  seven  years  after  abstention  was
ordered.63  And  an order  of abstention  may cause  a case  never
to reach  final  decision;  the added  delay  may moot  the contro-
versy,64  or  the  plaintiff  out  of  frustration  may  abandon  the
suit.
65
The  burden  that  abstention  places  on  the  litigants  raises
the  question  whether  transferring  jurisdiction  from  federal
to  state  court  is  consistent  with  federal jurisdictional  statutes.
Abstention  for  state  decision  of state  law issues  is  less  trouble-
some  in  this  regard  than  abstention  for state  decision  of fed-
eral  questions.  A traditional justification  for Pullman abstention
is  that even  if federal courts  should  not decline  congressionally
accorded  jurisdiction,66  this  kind  of abstention  "does  not  . ..
62 England  v.  Louisiana  State  Bd.  of  Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S.  411  (1964).
Suit  was  brought  in  1957.  Id.  at  413  &  n.1.  Abstention  was  ordered  in  1960.  180
F.  Supp.  121  (E.D.  La.  1960).  Final  decision  came  in  1965.  246  F.  Supp.  993  (E.D.
La.  1965).
1 63 Suit  was  apparently  brought  in  1942.  See  Spector  Motor  Service,  Inc.  v.  Mc-
Laughlin,  47  F.  Supp.  671,  673  (D.  Conn.  1942).  Abstention  was  ordered  in  1944.
323  U.S.  101  (1944).  Final decision came in  1951. 340  U.S.  602  (1951).
64See  United  States  v.  Leiter  Minerals,  Inc.,  381  U.S.  413  (1965),  which  was
dismissed  as  moot  11  years  after  the  litigation  commenced  and  8  years  after  absten-
tion  was  ordered.  See  Leiter  Minerals,  Inc.  v.  U.S.,  352  U.S.  220  (1957);  Leiter
Minerals  Inc. v. U.S.,  329 F. 2d 85  (5th Cir. 1964).
65  See  Government  &  Civic  Employees  Organizing  Comm'n, CIO v.  Windsor,  353
U.S.  364  (1957),  remanding  a  case  to  state  court  a  second  time,  after  which  the
plaintiff  abandoned  suit,  having  failed  to  obtain  a  decision  on  the  merits  after  four
years  of  litigation,  including  one  trip  to  the  Alabama  Supreme  Court  and  two  to
the  United  States  Supreme  Court.  Abstention  was  ordered  in  1953.  116  F.  Supp.
354 (N.D.  Ala.  1953). See 353  U.S. at 365-66.
66See  Cohens  v.  Virginia,  19  U.S.  (6  Wheat.)  264,  404  (1821)  (Marshall,  C.J.).
See  also Willcox  v.  Consolidated  Gas  Co.,  212  U.S.  19,  39-40  (1909).  In  Pullman Jus-
tice  Frankfurter  found  authority  for  abstaining  in  the  equitable  discretion  of  the
chancellor  and  in  the  policy  of  avoiding  "needless  friction  with  state  policies."
312  U.S.  at 500.  Yet  there  is  no statutory  basis  for declining jurisdiction  in  this situ-
ation  out of a  "regard for public  consequences,"  as there  is under  the Tax  Injunction
Act  and  the  Johnson  Act.  28  U.S.C.  §§  1341-42  (1970).  Moreover,  at  the  time  of
the Pullman decision,  the  federal  question  statute  provided  that federal  courts  should
have jurisdiction  over  "all  civil  actions,  at  law  and  in  equity,  wherein  the  matter  in
controversy  exceeds  the  sum  or  value  of $3,000,  exclusive  of interest and  costs,  and
arises  under  the  Constitution,  laws,  or  treaties  of the  United  States,"  with  no  indi-
cation  that  in  equity  cases  the courts  were  free  in  their  discretion  to refuse  to  exer-
cise  the jurisdiction thus granted.  Act  of March 3,  1911,  ch.  231,  § 24,  par. 1, 36  Stat.
1091,  as amended,  28  U.S.C.  §  1331(a)  (1970).  And  in  another  context Justice  Frank-
furter  has  denied  that courts'  equitable  discretion  allows  them  to remand  to the  statesABSTENTION IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
involve  the  abdication  of  federal  jurisdiction,  but  only  the
postponement  of  its  exercise. 67   Under  the  England  proce-
dures,  federal  questions  can  eventually  be  resolved  by  federal
tribunals.68  The  postponement  that  abstention  entails  and  its
requirement  that the  parties  undergo  two  trials  may,  however,
effectively  deter  litigants  from  exercising  their  right  to  fed-
eral jurisdiction.69  One possible  rationale for the rules the  fed-
eral  courts  have  formulated  delimiting  pendent  jurisdiction
over state  claims70  is  that  the  right to  choose  a federal  forum
should  not be  burdened  by  the necessity  of either abandoning
related  state  law  claims  or vindicating  them  in  a separate  law-
suit. The  practical  effect  of abstention  seems  inconsistent  with
that rationale.
Nevertheless  the  courts  have deemed  it within  their  power
to  "restrain  their  authority  because  of 'scrupulous  regard  for
the  rightful  independence  of the  state  governments'  and  for
the  smooth  working  of  the  federal  judiciary".7'  Even  if  one
can  accept  federal  court power  to  abstain  for state court  deci-
sion  of state  issues,  there  remains  the  difficulty  of  deciding
how  the  competing  interests  should  be  reconciled.  In  view  of
the  costs of abstention, it should  be strictly limited  to situations
cases  Congress  has  placed  within  federal jurisdiction.  Alabama  Public  Serv.  Comm'n.
v.  Southern  Ry.,  341  U.S.  341,  355  (1951)  (Frankfurter,  J.,  concurring  in  result).
But  see  id.  at  345-51;  Burford  v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  319  U.S.  315,  317-18  (1943);  Great
Lakes  Dredge  &  Dock  Co.  v.  Huffman,  319  U.S.  293,  297-98  (1943);  Pennsylvania
v. Williams,  294 U.S.  176,  185 (1935).
67  Harrison  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167,  177  (1959),  quoted with approval in England
v.  Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,  416  (1964).
11 The  assumption  is  that  federal  decision  of  the  federal  issues  in  a  case  is  a
sufficient  exercise  of jurisdiction.  The  federal  question  statute  is  not  explicit  in
conferring  jurisdiction  to  decide  state  issues,  though  the  Supreme  Court  has  con-
sistently  so  interpreted  the  federal  question  power.  See  UMW  v.  Gibbs,  383  U.S.  715
(1966);  Osborn  v.  Bank  of  the  United  States,  22  U.S.  (9  Wheat.)  738  (1824).  And
federal  courts'  renunciation  of decision  of state  issues  theoretically  should  not  affect
the  substance  of the .ultimate  decision  since  they  are  bound  to  follow  state  courts'
reading  of  state  law.  Abstaining  can  therefore  be  viewed  as  a  means  for  allowing
federal  courts  better  to  decide  cases  rather  than  as  a  renunciation  of  their  power
to decide.
69 There  are  two .levels  on  which  the  deterrent  effect  may  operate.  The  possibil-
ity  of being  remanded  to  state  court  may  cause  the  litigants  at  the  outset  to  forego
their  right  to  a  federal  forum.  Or  litigants  remanded  to  state  court  may  decide  to
present  all  of their  claims,  state  and  federal,  to  that  court  rather  than  undergo  the
additional delay and expense of a subsequent  hearing on the federal issues.
7' Pendent jurisdiction  exists  if  "'considered  without  regard  to  their  federal  or
state  character,  a  plaintiff's  claims  are  such  that  he  would  ordinarily  be  expected  to
try them all in one judicial  proceeding  ..  "  UMW  v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
71 Railroad  Comm'n.  v.  Pullman  Co.,  312  U.S.  496,  501  (1941)  (citing  DiGiovani
v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n. 296 U.S. 64,  73 (1935)).
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in  which  real  harms  are  likely  to  result  from  federal  exercise
of jurisdiction  and  in  which  deferring  to  state  adjudication  is
likely  to  avert  those  harms.  The  Supreme  Court  has  made
clear  that  state  courts  should  not  be  given  an  opportunity  to
rule  on  state  issues  in every  case,72  or  even  in all  cases  involv-
ing challenges  to state enactments  they  have never construed.7 3
The  standards  the  Supreme  Court  has  adopted  for  limiting
the situations  in  which Pullman abstention  can be  ordered  are
that state law  must be unclear  and that it must be subject to an
interpretation  that  will  avoid  the  federal  constitutional  ques-
tion.7 4  There is  little judicial  analysis,  however,  of how unclear
state  law  must  be,7 5  though  without  resolving  that  question
we  know little indeed  about the scope  of abstention.7 6  If  a state
72  See,  e.g.,  Reetz  v.  Bozanich,  397  U.S.  82,  86  (1970);  Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389
U.S.  241,  248  (1967);  Harman  v.  Forssenius,  380  U.S.  528,  534-35  (1965);  Propper
v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492 (1949).
'3 See note  78 infra.
71 See,  e.g.,  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n  v.  MacMullan,  406  U.S.  498,  510  (1972);  Reetz
v.  Bozanich,  397  U.S.  82,  86  (1970);  Harman  v.  Forssenius,  380  U.S.  528,  534-35
(1965).  Though  cases  applying  the  Pullman  doctrine  consistently  enunciate  these
requirements,  the  Chief Justice's  .dissent in Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau,  400  U.S.  433
(1971),  indicated  that  he  and Justice  Blackmun  may  wish  to  depart  from  current
standards  for  abstention,  not  only  in  allowing  it  so  that  state  courts  can  pass  first
on  federal  issues,  see  note  35  supra &  accompanying  text,  but  also  by  not  requiring
ambiguity  in  state  law;  the  Chief  Justice  referred  with  approval  to  the  abstention
in  Reetz  v.  Bozanich,  397  U.S.  82  (1910),  although  he thought  that the  state  provi-
sions  there  "could  not  have  been  more  plain,  or  less  susceptible  of a  limiting  con-
struction."  400 U.S.  at 442.
In  addition  to  the  requirement  of an  unclear  state  law  on  which  a  federal  con-
stitutional  issue  depends,  there  must  be  available  an  adequate  state  remedy  for  ob-
.taining a  resolution  of the  state  law  issue.  See  Railroad  Comm'n  v.  Pullman  Co.,  312
U.S.  496,  501  (1941).  That  requirement  is  discussed  infra, text  accompanying  notes
199-204.  For  other  possible  requirements,  see  text  accompanying  notes  155-66,
177-98 infra.
11  Similarly  there  is  little  analysis  of  how  great  the  likelihood  of  avoidirlg  the
federal  constitutional  question  must  be. The  likelihood  of avoiding  the constitutional
issue in  these  cases  will,  however,  turn on  the  clarity  of state  law;  there  is  more  like-
lihood  in  Pullman cases  of avoiding  the  constitutional  question  if a state  issue  is  very
ambiguous than  if the state issue is less ambiguous.
7'6  The  indications  of  the  necessary  probabilities  in  the  cases  range  from  the
totally  uninformative  formulations  of the  recent  decision  in  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n  v.
MacMullan,  406  U.S.  498  (1972),  ordering  abstention  because  the  unconstrued  state
provisions  at  issue  were  "susceptible  of  'a  construction  . . . that  would  avoid  or
modify  the  . . . constitutional  question,' "  id.  at 510,  and because  the Court was  "satis-
fied that authoritative  resolution of the  ambiguities  in  the  [state]  law is sufficiently  likely
to  avoid  or  significantly  modify  the  federal  questions  . . . to  warrant  abstention,'
id. at 512  (emphasis  added);  to  the statement  in Harman  v.  Forssenius.  380  U.S.  528,
534-35  (1965),  that  "[i]f  the  state  statute  in  question,  although  never  interpreted  by
a state  tribunal,  is  not  fairly subject to an  interpretation  which  will  render  unnecessary
or  substantially  modify  the federal  constitutional  question,  it  is  the  duty  of the  fed-ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
issue  were  considered  "unclear"  whenever  there  was  any  pos-
sibility  that  the'  state  judiciary  might  resolve  the  issue  in  a
way  other  than  that which  appeared  most likely  to the  federal
court,  that  requirement  could  allow  abstention  almost  auto-
matically  in  cases  containing  a  federal  constitutional  claim  that
is  dependent  upon  the  resolution  of  state  law.77  Or,  at  the
opposite  extreme,  the  requirement  could  limit  abstention  to
cases  in  which  the  state  law  issue  is  utterly  ambiguous.78  To
eral  court  to  exercise  its  properly  invoked  jurisdiction"  (emphasis  added);  to  the
statement  in  Reetz  v.  Bozanich,  397  U.S.  82,  86-87  (1970),  that  the  federal  court
should  abstain  because  "a  state  court  decision  here  . . . could  conceivably"  avoid  the
necessity  for  the  federal  courts  to  decide  the  federal  constitutional  issues  (emphasis
added).
77 The  verbal  formulations  of  the  abstention  prerequisites  that  the  Court  uses
would,  in  fact,  most often  indicate  that the amount  of state  law  unclarity  needed  is
slight  indeed.  In  Fornaris  v.  Ridge  Tool  Co.,  400  U.S.  41,  44  (1970),  the  Court  or-
dered  abstention  because  it  was  "conceivable"  that the Puerto  Rican  statute  "might be
judicially  confined  to  a  more  narrow  ambit  which  would avoid  all  constitutional  ques-
tions"  (emphasis  added);  and in  Harrison  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167,  177  (1959),  the
Court  abstained because  it was  "unable to  agree that the  terms of  these  three statutes
leave  no  reasonable room  for  a  construction  by  the  [state]  courts  which might  avoid  in
whole  or  in  part  the  necessity  for  federal  constitutional  adjudication,  or  at  least
materially  change  the  nature  of the problem"  (emphasis  added).  See also cases  quoted
in note 76 supra. Since there  is  almost always  a possibility that a state  court in a Pullman-
type  case  might  construe  state  law  to  affect  or avoid  the  federal  constitutional  issue,
the  above  language  could be deemed  to impose  a rule of exhaustion of state  remedies
on state law issues.
For  stricter  formulations  of  the  degree  of  unclarity  required,  see  Chicago  v.
Atchison,  T.  &  S.F. Ry.,  357 U.S.  77,  84  (1958);  Burford  v. Sun  Oil Co.,  319 U.S.  315,
339 (1943)  (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
71 Favoring  such  a  reading  are  statements  that  abstention  is  proper  "only  in
narrowly  limited  'special  circumstances,'"  Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389  U.S.  241,  248  (1967),
cited with approval in Reetz  v.  Bozanich,  397  U.S.  82,  86  (1970),  and  the many Supreme
Court  cases  not ordering  abstention  despite  the  presence  of  state  law  issues  that  the
state  judiciary  could  resolve,  see,  e.g.,  Harman  v.  Forssenius,  380  U.S.  528  (1965);
Davis v. Mann,  377 U.S. 678, 690 (1964).
The  abstention  doctrine  could  also  be  applied  so  that enactments  that the  state
courts  have  never  construed  are  deemed  necessarily  "unclear."  Such  a  rule  could
explain  cases  like  Reetz  v.  Bozanich,  397  U.S.  82  (1970),  and  Harrison  v.  NAACP,
360  U.S.  167,  178  (1959),  in which  unconstrued  enactments  seemed  relatively  unam-
biguous.  See  Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau,  400  U.S.  433,  442  (1971)  (Burger,  C.J.,
dissenting) (discussing the  clarity of the state  provisions in Reetz). See also Lake  Carriers'
Ass'n  v.  MacMullan,  406  U.S.  498,  512  (1972).  Other  cases,  however,  make  clear  that
there  is  no  special  rule  for  unconstrued  enactments.  In  Harman  v.  Forssenius,  380
U.S.  528,  534-35  (1965),  the  Court  said,  "The  [Pullman] doctrine  . . . contemplates
that  deference  to  state  court  adjudication  only  be  made  where  the  issue  of  state
law  is  uncertain.  If the  state  statute  in  question,  although never interpreted by  a  state
tribunal, is  not  fairly  subject  to  an  interpretation  which  will  render  unnecessary  or
substantially  modify  the  federal  constitutional  question,  it  is  the  duty  of  the federal
court  to  exercise  its  properly  invoked  jurisdiction."  (Emphasis  added).  See  also  Chi-
cago  v.  Atchison,  T.  &  S.F.  Ry.,  357  U.S.  77  (1958);  Doud  v.  Hodge,  350  U.S. 485,
487  (1956);  Toomer  v.  Witsell,  334  U.S.  385  (1948).  In  any  event,  it  would  appear
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be functionally justifiable, the prerequisites  to abstention should
reflect  a  special  need  for  state  court  input  on  the  state  issues
involved.  Properly  applied,  the  requirements  the  Court  has
adopted can, in large part,7 9 accord with that rationale.
B.  The Proper  Application of Existing Requirements That
State Law Be Unclear and Be Susceptible to an Interpretation
That Will Avoid a Federal  Constitutional  Question
1.  The Importance of a Significant Lack of
Clarity in the State Law Issue
The  Pullman  doctrine  is  impelled  by  a  fear  that  federal
court decision  of some  state  law  issues  risks improvident  inter-
ference  with  a  valid  state  program  or  unnecessary  decision
of  a  federal  constitutional  question,  or  both.  It  is  important
to  notice that such  risks  can  arise  only  when the  federal  court
would  err  in deciding  a state  issue  in the  sense  that the  high-
est  state  court  would  contradict  its  holding.80  Consequently,
a  federal  court  should  abstain  only  when  the  chance  of error
is  reasonably  great. Even  then, it should  order abstention  only
if  that  course  significantly  reduces  the  likelihood  of  error
occurring.
It  is  usually  the  case  that  the  federal judiciary  is  capable
of determining  state law  with accuracy.  If  there are precedents,
the  court  can  read  and construe  them.  If  there  are  none, but
there  are  analogous  decisions,  it  may  be  able  to  determine
more  in  keeping  with  the Pullman standard  to  differentiate  between  issues  according
to  whether  they  have  passed  through  the  state judicial  system  than  to  differentiate
between  enactments  that state  courts  have  or  have  not construed,  since  a state  court
may have  considered  an  enactment without  reaching  the  specific issue  facing a federal
court.
79 The  exception  is  treated  in  my  proposal  to  abandon  the  requirement  of  a
federal constitutional issue in cetain cases. See text accompanying  notes  169-76 infra.
80 In  fact,  not  even  every  case  in  which  the  federal  court  makes  such  an  error
will  result  in  one  of these  two  consequences.  In  a  case,  like  Pullman, in  which  the
state  law  contention  is  that  a  particular  provision  is  not  authorized,  one  abstention
policy-avoiding  unnecessary  constitutional  decisionmaking-is  transgressed  if  the
federal  court  holds  the  provision  authorized  when  the  state  courts  would  disagree.
And  if  the  federal  court  mistakenly  holds  that  state  law  does  not authorize  the  pro-
vision  in question  in  a  case  in which,  if  the  federal  court did  reach  the constitutional
issue,  it  would  hold  the  provision  constitutionally  valid,  it  violates  the  other  absten-
tion  policy  by  unjustifiably  interfering  with  a  legitimate  state  program.  If,  however,
in  the  latter  instance  the  federal  court  would  in  any  event  hold  the  state  program
violative  of  the  Federal  Constitution,  the  result  it  reaches,  though  the  grounds  are
erroneous,  is  the  proper  one,  and  the  federal  mistake  has  not  caused  the  court  to
transgress either policy behind the abstention doctrine.ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
from them the way  a state court  is likely  to rule.8'  Even if there
is  no  case  law  to  guide  the  court,  the  wording  of an  uncon-
strued statute may be sufficiently  clear on the point at issue.82
Of  course,  there  is  always  a  possibility  that  the  federal
court  will err in  deciding the  state  law  issue.  Even  if the  issue
is  referred  to  the  state court  system,  however,  there  is  a  pos-
sibility  of error. The  tone of abstention  discussions  seems  fre-
quently  to  reflect  an  assumption  that  if  a  state  issue  is  re-
manded  to  the  state  courts,  their  disposition  will  necessarily
be the correct one. 83 This attitude  is  supported by the fact that
the  "correct"  disposition  in  this  context  means  the  one  that
the state judiciary would  make. The  standard,  however, refers
to  the highest court  of the state.84  And  many lower  state  court
decisions  will not be reviewed by the state's highest court. Since
that  tribunal  alone  has  "the  last  word"85  on  state  law,  such
decisions  will  be  tentative  in  much  the  same  way  that federal
determinations  are.86  If  in  Pullman,  for  example,  the  lower
81  Cf  Mason  y.  American  Emery  Wheel  Works,  241  F.2d  906  (1st  Cir.  1957)
(state court indicated its intent in dictum).
82 See  Harman  v.  Forssenius,  380  U.S.  528,  534-35  (1965).  But see  Harrison  v.
NAACP, 360  U.S.  167,  178  (1959).
83 See,  e.g.,  Louisiana  Power  & Light  Co.  v.  City  of Thibodaux,  360  U.S.  25,  30
(1959);  Spector  Motor Service,  Inc. v. McLaughlin,  323  U.S.  101,  105 (1944);  Meredith
v.  Winter Haven,  320  U.S. 228,  236 (1943)  (dictum);  Chicago  v. Fieldcrest  Dairies, 316
U.S. 168,  172 (1942).
84 See  Vandenbark  v.  Owens-Illinois  Co.,  311  U.S.  538,  543  (1941);  West  v.
American Tel.  & Tel.  Co.,  311  U.S.  223  (1940);  IA  MooRE,  FEDERAL  PRACTICE  0.309,
at  3327  &  n.5  (1965);  cf.  Bernhardt  v.  Polygraphic  Co.  of  America,  350  U.S.  198,
211  (1956)  (Frankfurter, J., concurring);  Union  Bank & Trust Co. v.  First  Nat'l Bank,
362 F.2d 311  (5th Cir.  1966).
85 Railroad Comm'n  v. Pullman  Co.,  312  U.S. 496,  499 (1941).
86  Even  apart  from  the  possibility  of  review  by  the  highest  state  tribunal,  state
courts  are  arguably  more  likely  than  federal  courts to  decide  state  law. in  accordance
with  what the highest tribunal  would  rule. Federal judges  may be  less adept with  state
precedent  and  practice  than  are  members  of the  state judiciary,  since  a  lesser  part
of their work  concerns  state  law and  a greater  familiarity  with  federal  law is  expected
of them than  of state  court judges. Cf. text accompanying  note  46 supra. In some state
systems  an offsetting  factor may  be  that  the holders  of positions  on  the highest state
court  are  more  like  federal judges  in  background  and  training, than  they  are  like
lower  state  court judges.  Cf.  Mishkin,  supra note 46,  at  158-59.  Moreover,  most  fed-
eral  district judges  are  drawn  from  the  local  bar  of  the  area  in  which  they  usually
sit,  a  factor noted  by Justice  Frankfurter  in Pullman. 312  U.S. at 499. See also  Propper
v. Clark, 337  U.S. 472,  486-87,  489 (1949);  Clay v.  Sun Ins.  Office, 363  U.S.  207,  227-
28  (1960)  (Douglas,  J.,  dissenting).  This  factor  is  also  responsible  for  frequent  def-
erence  in  federal  appellate  decisions  to  the experience  of the  district judge  on  local
matters.  See,  e.g.,  Bernhardt  v.  Polygraphic  Co. of America,  350  U.S.  198,  204  (1956);
Huddleston  v.  Dwyer, 322  U.S.  232,  237  (1944);  MacGregor  v.  State  Mut.  Life Assur.
Co.,  315  U.S.  280,  281  (1942).  Nevertheless  abstention  was  ordered  in Pullman  and
in  Reetz v.  Bozanich, 397 U.S.  82  (1970),  where  two members  of the three-judge  panel
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Texas  courts  held  the  Commission's  order authorized  and  the
highest  state  court  did  not  review  the  decision,  but  several
years  later  in  another  case  held  the  order  unauthorized,  its
determination  would  control,  and  the federal  court in Pullman
would  have  had  needlessly  to decide  the  federal  constitutional
question.
87
Even  if a remand  to  state  tribunals  does  increase  the like-
lihood  of correct  disposition  of state  issues,  there  is  no  sharp
dichotomy  between  the  state  and  federal  systems  in  this  re-
gard;  both  systems  face  the  possibility  of error, and  both  are
capable  of arriving  at  "correct"  decisions  in  most  cases.  One
might  conclude  that  the  increment  in  the  likelihood  of arriv-
ing  at  a  correct  conclusion  by  abstaining  is  simply  not  great
enough  to  justify  abstention's  costs.  That  conclusion  would
be  correct,  I  submit,  if  the  abstention  doctrine  were  applied
indiscriminately  to  obtain  the  state  courts'  state  law  solutions
in all  cases  in which state  enactments  were attacked  as  violative
of  the  Federal  Constitution.  One  can,  however,  narrow  the
pool  of cases  for abstention  in  such  a  way  that  the  difference
in likelihood  of correct adjudication  between  state  and  federal
judicial systems  increases.
Limiting  abstention  to  cases  in  which  the  state  law  issue
is  extremely  unclear  accomplishes  that  result.  The  more  un-
clear  the  state  issue  is,  the  more  likely  federal  error  would
appear  to  be. Of course,  the same  ambiguity  would  contribute
to  a likelihood  of error  on  the  part of the  lower  courts  in  the
state  judicial  system.  And  theoretically  the  relevant  criterion
for abstention  should  not be  the  intrinsic likelihood  of federal
error  but the likelihood  of federal  error in relation  to  the like-
lihood  of state  error.  The  chances  of state  error  are  related
in large  part, however,  to  the chances  of review  by the highest
state  court,  which  normally  will  be  incalculable  at the  time the
federal  court  is  deciding  whether  to  abstain.  The  authoritative
state  tribunal  may  be  more  likely  to  exercise  its  discretion  to
review  "important"  cases,  if  they  can  be  selected  out,  than
others.  But  the  decisions  that  the  lower  state  courts  render
will  also  be  influential;  when  an  important  state  program  is
which  decided  the  case  under  state  law  "feeling  sure  of  its  grounds  on  the  merits"
were  former Alaska lawyers. Id. at 86.
87 Indeed,  there may be some uncertainty whether  a ruling is definitive even when
the  highest  state  court  does  speak,  especially  if the  court  is  closely  divided  or if  the
area of law  is a rapidly  evolving one.
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held  invalid,  the  chances  of review  are  probably  greater  than
when it is upheld.
When  the  likelihood  of  review  by  the  highest  state  tri-
bunal  is  not calculable,  the  federal court should  decide  wheth-
er  to  abstain  on  the  assumption  that  the  likelihood  of  state
review  is  constant,  and  should  base  its  decision  solely  on  the
likelihood  of  federal  error  in  the  particular  case.  This  ap-
proach  is  justifiable  because  the  factors  that  maximize  the
chances  of federal  and  lower  state  court  error-that  the  state
law  is  unclear  and  has  never  been  construed  by  the  highest
state  tribunal,  for  example-probably  do  not  decrease  the
chances  of  full  state  review.  Consequently,  it  is  justifiable  to
assume  that  the  ambiguity  of state  law  increases  not  only  the
intrinsic  likelihood  of  federal  error  but  also  the  degree  to
which  the state judicial  system  is more  likely  to reach  a correct
result than  are  the  federal  courts.  The  greater  the  ambiguity,
the  greater  is  the  difference  in  the  capacities  of the  state  and
federal  systems  to  reach  the  "correct"  result,  and  the  more
warranted  is abstention.
Even  if  abstention  is  limited  to  instances  in  which  state
law  is  extremely  unclear,  the  question  must be  faced  whether
increasing  the  chances  of obtaining  the  correct  state  law  re-
sult  is  worth  abstention's  costs.  The  answer  is  a  function  not
only  of the likelihood  of federal  error but also  of the  serious-
ness  of its  two  possible  consequences-interference  with  a  le-
gitimate  state  program  and  unnecessary  federal  constitutional
adjudication.
2.  An Analysis  of the Reasons for Abstaining for
State Court Decision of Unclear State  Issues
a.  Avoiding Interference With a Legitimate State Program
It  may  be  argued  that  when  state  enactments  are  chal-
lenged  as  federally  unconstitutional,  federal  error  in  deciding
a  state  law  issue  cannot  lead  to  serious  interference  with  a
state  program.  If  a  federal court  holds  that state  law  does  not
authorize  the  state  statute  or order  under  attack,  or if it  con-
strues a state  enactment  differently than the highest state court
would,  state  officials  who  believe  that the  federal  court's  state
law  decision  is  erroneous  can  usually88  correct  the  federal
88  In  situations  in  which  no  state  ruling  is  available,  the  absence  of  abstention
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holding by obtaining a state  ruling on the question in dispute.89
Despite  principles  of res judicata,  a  federal  court  will  reopen
the  controversy  and modify  the decree  in  accordance  with  the
state  court's  decision.90  Such  a  procedure  bears  a  marked
will  harm  the  state  most  conspicuously,  for  the  federal  courts  will  have  not only  the
preliminary but also the permanent  decision on questions  of state law.
89 If  the  issue  is  the  validity  of  a  particular  statute  or  order  on  its  face,  as  it
was  in  Pullman, but  the  federal  court  has  enjoined  its  enforcement  only  against  the
party  who  brought  the  action  challenging  it  in  federal  court,  the  state  attorney  gen-
eral  can  obtain  a  state  ruling  on  the  issue  by  bringing  an  enforcement  proceeding
against  another  party  in  state  court.  It is  not settled  whether  a  federal judge  should
confine  an  injunction  to  the  named  plaintiff-whether  an  individual  or  a  class-or
should  derive  the  scope  of an  injunction  from  the  substantive  issues  in  a  case  and
allow  it  to  apply  to  parties  other  than  plaintiffs.  Compare Martin  v.  Creasy,  360  U.S.
219,  223  n.4  (1959)  with  Potts  v.  Flax,  313  F.2d  284,  288-90  (5th  Cir.  1963).  See
generally  0.  Fiss,  INJUNCTIONS  484-509  (1972).  If  a  federal  judge  follows  the  latter
approach  and  issues  an  injunction  against  enforcement  of  the  statute  generally,  the
attorney  general  would  seem  to  risk  contempt  of court by  bringing  an  enforcement
proceeding.  He  should,  however,  be  able  to  proceed  under  a  state  declaratory judg-
ment procedure,  naming  as defendant  any  person against  whom  he wishes  to  enforce
the statute.
The  most  problematic  situation  arises  when  the  disputed  federal  ruling  applies
peculiarly  to  the  plaintiffs  in  the  federal  suit. If, for  example,  the  federal  holding is
not  that the  statute  is  generally  void  but  instead  that  it  should  be  construed  as  inap-
plicable  to the  particular  plaintiffs,  there  may  be no  similarly  situated  person  against
whom  the  attorney  general  can  bring  a  proceeding  to  test the  issue.  In  that situation
the  federal  court,  in  order  to  avoid  assuming  for  itself  the  final  authority, to  decide
the  state  law  issue,  should  permit  the  attorney  general  to  name  as  defendant,  in  a
state  declaratory  judgment  proceeding,  the  successful  plaintiff  in  the  federal  suit.
Such  a  procedure  does  force  a  party  to  face  two lawsuits  because  he  has  chosen  to
litigate  in federal  court;  therefore  it  should  be  permitted  only  when  no  other  means
of  obtaining  a  state  forum  are  available  to  the  attorney  general.  In  that  situation,
however,  the  burden  on  the  litigant  may  be  justifiable.  He  is  less  prejudiced  than
when  abstention  is  ordered:  Though  he  must  bear  the  cost  of  a  subsequent  state
proceeding,  he does  not  suffer  the  delay  involved  in  abstention,  for he obtains  a  fed-
eral  ruling pending the state determination of its law.
Similar  reasoning  might  support  allowing  an  enforcement  proceeding  against
the  same  party  involved  in the  federal  action  in those  few  states  lacking  a declaratory
judgment  procedure  or  a  procedure  for  issuing  advisory  opinions,  in  situations  in
which  no other  means  of obtaining a  state ruling  exists.  But  such a  procedure  should
not  be  allowed,  since  it  would  fully  deprive  the  party  of  the  benefits  of  his  federal
court  victory.  It  seems  preferable  to  require  states  to  provide  a  declaratory  judg-
ment  procedure  as  the  price  of  correcting  federal  errors  on  state  issues  in  cases  in
which  there  is  no  appropriate  defendant  other  than  the  person  who  was  plaintiff  in
the federal suit. Cf. text accompanying  notes  143,  202-04 infra.
90  When  a  federal  court rests  its  decision  on  a state  question  and  thereby  avoids
a  federal  constitutional  question,  the  decree  will  often  include  a  provision  expressly
authorizing  reopening  in  the  event  that  the  question  of  state  law  is  subsequently
decided  differently  in  the  state  court.  See  Lee  v.  Bickell,  292  U.S.  415  (1934);  Wald
Transfer  &  Storage  Co.  v.  Smith,  290  U.S.  602  (1933);  Glenn  v.  Field  Packing  Co.,
290  U.S.  177  (1933).  Even  if  the  federal judge  neglects  to, insert  such  a  provision,
the  decree  can  be  modified  when  the state  court  has  authoritatively  spoken.  It is  this
possibility  of  modification  that  led Justice  Frankfurter  to  fear  in Pullman that  a  fed-
eral ruling on the  state issue  would be "tentative."  See 312  U.S. at 500.
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resemblance  to  abstention.  There  are  two  law  suits,  possibly
between  the  same  parties,  and  each  forum  speaks  with  final
authority  on  its  own  law.  It may  involve  as  much delay  as  ab-
stention  before  the  controversy  is  ultimately  resolved,  but
nonetheless  it  should  be  preferable  to  the  claimants.  Under
such  a  procedure,  the  federal  court  will  rule  on  the  validity
of the challenged state enactment before any state court ruling,
and  any  relief  may  issue  immediately,  to  be  disturbed  only
after  a  corrective  state  judgment.  Under  the  abstention  pro-
cedure, relief cannot issue until the state court has ruled.91
For  precisely  that  reason,  however,  a  refusal  to  abstain
can  be  much  more  harmful  to  state  interests  than  is  absten-
tion,  even though  the state  can ultimately correct an  erroneous
federal  ruling  on  state  law.  Depending  upon  the  speed  of the
state  judicial  system,  it  may  take  several  years  to  correct  an
erroneous  federal  interference  with  a state  program.  The  de-
lay will  be exacerbated  if the federal court is  unwilling to mod-
ify  its  decree  until  the  state's  highest  court  has  passed  upon
the  issue.92  During  this  period  the  state  will  lose  the  benefit
of the  program  it  enacted,  and,  depending  on  the  nature  of
the  program,  the  damage  to  state  interests  may  not  be  com-
pensable- if  the  program  is  ultimately  ruled  valid.93  Indeed,
the state  program  may  be such that the postponement involved
effectively  defeats  the interests  that  the program  was  designed
to  protect.  A program  limiting fishing rights  with  the  purpose
of preventing  a  particular  species  from  becoming  extinct,  for
91  Another  reason  the  claimants  should  prefer  this  procedure  is  that  in  many
circumstances  they  will  not have  to  be  party to  the  lawsuit  that  the  state  commences.
See note 89 supra.
92 The  Court's  disposition  in  Fornaris  v.  Ridge  Tool  Co.,  400  U.S.  41  (1970),
suggests  that  federal  courts  may  so  act.  Lower  Puerto  Rican  courts  had  spoken  on
the  state  law  question  at  issue but  the  United  States  Supreme  Court ordered  absten-
tion  because  the  Supreme  Court  of Puerto  Rico  had  not  authoritatively  construed
the statute.
93 See  generally  Lockwood,  Maw  &  Rosenberry,  The  Use  of  the  Federal Injunction
in  Constitutional Litigation, 43  HARV.  L.  REV.  426  (1929).  A  procedure  whereby  the
federal  court  at  the outset  of the  case  grants  interlocutory  relief  to  a  party  it  feels
will  ultimately  prevail  on  the  merits  can  have  the  same  effect.  As  in  abstention  cases
and  those  involving  erroneous  federal  decision  of  state  issues,  the  potential  harm
is  the  damage  that  is  done  to  the  claimants  or  to  the  state  pending  ultimate  resolu-
tion  of  the  issue.  If  the  interlocutory  relief  is  issued  in  favor  of the  party  who  ul-
timately  prevails,  no  harm  is  done.  But  if  the  interlocutory  relief  is  later  held  to
have  been  erroneous,  state  programs  might  already  have  suffered  irreparably.  See
generally  Hutcheson,  A  Case for Three Judges, 47  HARv.  L.  REv.  795,  803-05  (1934);
Note,  The  Three-Judge District Court: Scope and Procedure Under Section 2281,  77  HARV.
L. REV. 299  (1963).
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example,  may  have  its  object  defeated  by  a  few  years'  delay.
A lake may become  polluted beyond  the possibility  of a recrea-
tional  use  while  the  federal  court  postpones  enforcement  of
a  state's  anti-pollution  program  designed  to  preserve  the lake
for recreational  purposes.
The  interference  with  state  programs  that  an  erroneous
federal  decision  can  cause  therefore  usually  takes  the  form
of  delaying  the  state  program,  not  ultimately  forbidding  it.
A  court  should  take  special  care  to  avoid  such  interference
when  dealing  with  a  program  that  is  of some  importance  to
the  state and  that serves  purposes  which  are  especially  vulner-
able  to  delay.  Conversely,  if  the  program  is  of minimal  im-
portance  or  if  the  delay  an  erroneous  decision  would  cause
would  be  compensable  after  the  fact,  the  interests  in  making
certain  that  the  federal  court  does  not  erroneously  void  it
sharply decrease.
b.  Avoiding Unnecessary  Decision of Federal Constitutional  Issues
If  the  only  consequence  feared  from  failure  to  abstain
were  improper  interference  with  state  programs,  abstention
would  seem  unnecessary  in  cases  in  which  state  law  appeared
to  validate  the challenged  state  action.  Indeed,  a  federal court
could  abstain in  fewer  cases  still by  simply  presuming  in favor
of the  state  on  the  state  law  issue  and  proceeding  directly  to
the  federal  constitutional  question.94  In  cases  in  which  the
federal  constitutional  issue  was  dispositive-where  the  state
action  presumed  valid  under, state  law  would  be  federally  un-
constitutional-the  issue  of  abstention  would  not  need  to  be
reached,  and  the  parties  would  enjoy  immediate  relief.  In
cases  in  which  the  federal  court  held  it  was  not  dispositive,
the court could then decide whether it should abstain or should
itself rule on the state law issue.95
Neither  approach  has  been  utilized  because  either  would
94 The  suggested  approach  would reduce  significantly  the  occasions  for  abstention
although  it  could operate  in  far  fewer  cases  in  which  the  meaning  of  the  challenged
state  enactment  is  at  issue  than  it  could  in  those  in  which  the  state  issue  is  whether
state  law  authorizes  the  challenged  state  action.  See  text  accompanying  notes  129-31
infra.
95 Continued  presumption  in  favor  of the  state  on  the  state  issue  in  lieu  of ab-
stention  would  seem  undesirable.  It  would  deprive  the  private  litigants  of the  usual
rules  of  pendent jurisdiction,  allowing  them  to  have  their  state  as  well  as  federal
claims  decided  in  federal  court,  and  would  thereby  deter  some  from  invoking  fed-
eral jurisdiction.
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transgress  the  other  policy  that  underlies  the  abstention  doc-
trine-that  of  avoiding  unnecessary  decision  of  federal  con-
stitutional questions. That long-standing  federal policy 96  affects
the  disposition  of Pullman abstention  cases  in  two  ways.  First,
it  prevents  a  federal  court  from  presuming  initially  in  favor
of the  state  in  order  to avoid  a  possibility  of erroneous  inter-
ference  with  a  state  program  and  instead  encourages  it  first
to decide  the state  law  question. Second,  the policy  encourages
a federal court  that would  decide  the state  issue in  such  a way
that  the  federal  constitutional  issue  would  remain  to  abstain
in order  to  ensure  the  correctness  of its view  of state  law;97  if
abstention  would  alter  its  state  law  ruling,  the  constitutional
question might not have to be reached.
The  policy  of  avoiding  unnecessary  constitutional  deci-
sions  is  not,  however,  absolute;  while  "usually"  pursued,  a
court  can  depart  from  it  for  "important  reasons."98  It  might
therefore  be  argued  that  the  policy  does  not  sanction Pullman
abstention  at all  on the ground that the burden that abstention
places  on  the  parties  constitutes  an  "important  reason"Y  for
not  applying  the  rule  of avoidance.  But  even  if one  believes
that  it  sometimes  can  be  more  important  to  avoid  the  consti-
tutional  issue  than  to  respect  the  parties'  interests,  it  should
be recognized  that the balance  does not always  favor avoidance
and  that it is  more  important to avoid unnecessary  pronounce-
ments  concerning  some  constitutional  issues  than others.  Some
of the  Court's  language  in Pullman suggests  the  propriety  of
abstaining  to  avoid  only  "sensitive"  constitutional  issues,99  but
96 See  Ashwander  v.  Tennessee  Valley  Authority,  297  U.S.  288,  346-47  (1936)
(Brandeis, J.,  concurring).  The  purpose  of avoiding  unnecessary  constitutional  adju-
dication,  while  less  self-evident  than  the  purpose  of  not  striking  down  valid  state
enactments,  derives  from  the  doctrine  of Marbury v.  Madison and  the  essentially  anti-
democratic  nature of judicial  review.  See generally A.  BICKEL,  supra note 51,  at  111-33.
In  its classic  form at least,  the  policy  of avoiding  constitutional  decisionmaking  speaks
only  to  the  desirability  of  avoiding  that  basis  for  decision  when  other  grounds  for
decision  exist;  it  does  not  support  avoiding  decision  of  the  case  itself. See  Gunther,
supra note 51,  at 16-17,  & 22. But see A.  BICKEL, supra at 69-72,  127-33,  &  174.
97  The  first  effect  of  the  policy,  but  not  the  second  effect,  has  little  operation
when  the  state  law  issue is  the  challenged  enactment's  meaning  instead  of its validity.
See text accompanying  notes  129-31 infra.
9s  Siler  v.  Louisville  &  N.R.R.,  213  U.S.  175,  193  (1909).  But  see  A.  BICKEL,
supra note 51  at 127-33.
99  Although  the  case  involved  several  constitutional  challenges,  Justice  Frank-
furter's  explanation  of  why  the  district  court  should  not  have  acted  referred  to  the
need  for  avoiding  only  one  issue,  that  involving  racial  discrimination,  which  Frank-
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other  decisions  have  not  articulated  any  such  limitation. 1 00  It
is  difficult,  of course,  to  ascertain  with  any  confidence  which
constitutional  issues  are  "sensitive,"  but  one  can  imagine  fac-
tors  that  might  be  relevant: 101  the  question  might  be  suffi-
ciently  novel  that the court is  uncertain  of the answer  it would
give;  the  issue  might  have  particularly  far-reaching  conse-
quences,  not  all  of which  the  court  is  satisfied  it foresees;  the
decision  might be  one that congressional  action will  soon  make
unnecessary;  or  the  court  might not  be  satisifed  that the  par-
ticular  controversy  presents  the  issues  in a  realistic  light.  Con-
versely,  if  a  constitutional  issue  is  a  particulary  easy  one  that
does  not  involve  any  of  the  above  factors,  the  interests  in
avoiding  its  decision  may  be  sufficiently  minimal  to  warrant
relief  to  the  parties  from  the  delay  and  expense  that  absten-
tion entails.
Although  the  Supreme  Court  did  not  articulate  this  rea-
soning  in  its  recent  decision  in  Wisconsin v.  Constantineau,'
0 2
that case might be  explained  in terms of the absence of reason
to  avoid  the  particular  constitutional  issue  involved.  The  case
concerned  the  constitutionality  of  a  Wisconsin  statute  that
provided  for a  one-year  prohibition  of the  sale  or  gift of in-
toxicating  liquor  to  any  person  who  by  "excessive  drinking"
had exposed  himself or his family "to  want," injured his health,
endangered  the  safety  or  property  of  another,  or  become
"dangerous to the  peace of any community."'1 3 The local  chief
of police  applied  the  statute  to  Ms.  Constantineau  by  posting
a notice  in all retail liquor  stores in  her community  forbidding
all  persons  to sell  or  give  her liquor  for one year.  The  statute
contained  no  provision for notice  or hearing  prior  to the  post-
ing,  and  Ms.  Constantineau  had  not  in  fact  been  given  those
procedural  protections. 0 4  A  three-judge  court  enjoined  en-
forcement  of the  statute  on the  ground  that it violates  federal
due  process  so  to  expose  an  individual  to  "public  embarrass-
ment  and  ridicule"  without  giving  him  "notice  of the  intent
furter  said  "touches  a  sensitive  area  of social  policy  upon  which  the  federal  courts
ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication  is open." 312  U.S. at 498.
"I See,  e.g.,  Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389  U.S.  241,  249  (1967);  Harrison  v.  NAACP,
360 U.S:  167,  177 (1959);  Chicago  v. Fieldcrest  Dairies, 316  U.S. 168,  173 (1942).
101  For  a  thorough  discussion  of  possible  factors,  see  A.  BICKEL,  supra  note  51,
at 345-48.
102 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
103 See Wis. STAT.  §§  176.26 & 176.28 (1967)  (repealed  1971).
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to post and an opportunity to present his side of the matter."'1 0 5
The  Supreme  Court  affirmed,  ruling  that  the  Wisconsin
statute  was  unambiguous  in  its  failure  to  provide  for  notice
and hearing,  and that "abstention should  not be ordered mere-
ly to await an attempt to vindicate  the claim in a state  court."'06
It did not address  the  dissenting assertion  of the  Chief Justice
that  a  provision  of the  Wisconsin  constitution  might  be  suffi-
cient  to dispose of the case.107  Instead, it ruled  on the  disposi-
tive  federal  constitutional  issue  without  invoking  the  policy
in favor  of avoiding  such  issues,  which  would  have encouraged
it  first  either  to  decide  the  state  issue  itself  or  to  refer  it  to
state courts by abstaining.
The  opinions  did  not  discuss  whether  the  state  constitu-
tional  provision  invoked  by  the  Chief Justice  was  sufficiently
clear,  or  the  case  law  respecting  it sufficiently  developed,  that
the  federal  court  could  itself have  applied  it;  or  whether,  in-
stead,  the state  issue  would have  required  abstention. 0 8 When
105  Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861,  864 (E.D. Wis.  1969).
106 400 U.S.  at 439.
107 400  U.S.  at  440-43.  There  was  another  abstention  issue  as  well  in  the  case,
which is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 128-43.
108 The  majority  simply  ignored  the  state  constitutional  provision.  The  Chief
Justice  did  not  have  to  address  whether  abstention  would  be  proper  on  the  basis
of  the  classic  Pullman requirements  because  it  was  his  view  that  the  state  courts
should  necessarily  have  the  first opportunity  to  pass  on  state  law. See  note  107 supra
& accompanying text.
It  would  not  in  any  event  have  been  proper  to  abstain  for  state  court  decision
of the  state  issue  the  Chief Justice  found  in  Constantineau  because  of  the  reason  the
Chief  Justice  gave  for  believing  the  Wisconsin  constitution  would  invalidate  the
challenged  enactment.  This  ground  for  abstention  was  not  mentioned  by the  parties
but  was  raised  by  the  Chief Justice  on  his  own  initiative  because  he  discovered  a
state  constitutional  provision  that  had  "been  held  by  the  Wisconsin  Supreme  Court
to  be  substantially  equivalent  to  the  limitation  on  state  action  contained  in  the  Due
Process  and  Equal  Protection  Clauses  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment."  400  U.S.  at
440  n.l.  If  the  Chief Justice  was  correct  in believing  that the  Wisconsin  courts would
invalidate  the  challenged  enactment  under  their  constitution  because  it  was  the
equivalent  of federal  constitutional  guarantees,  that  fact  should  not  support  absten-
tion.  As a general  rule, a  federal court should  not abstain to let  state courts  determine
whether  a  challenged  enactment  is  authorized  under  state  law  when  the  state  law
provision  that  is  claimed  to  invalidate  the  enactment  is  identic with a  federal  counter-
part.  An  identic  state  law  provision  in  this  context  may  or  may  not  be  identical  in
its  wording  to the  federal  counterpart.  Its  important  characteristic  is  that state  courts
interpreting  it  are  motivated  primarily  by  a  desire  that  it  conform  to  the  federal
counterpart. Cf. Minnesota  v. National Tea  Co., 309 U.S. 551  (1940).
It  may  be  difficult for  a  federal  court  to determine  when  a  state  provision  is  in
fact  identic  in  this  sense.  When  it  appears  probable  that  it  is,  however,  the  federal
court  should  not  abstain  so  that  the  challenged  state  enactment  can  be  invalidated
under  the  state  provision,  since  by  hypothesis  the  federal  court  will  be  more  adept
at  arriving  at  the  correct  result  than  a  state  court  would  be.  Moreover,  when  the
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state  law  is  truly clear and  when ruling on it would  dispose  of
the  case,  it  would  seem  appropriate  for  the  federal  court  to
rule  on  the  state  issue  even  if the  federal  constitutional  ques-
tion  also  is  clear and  nonsensitive.  But if the  state  issue  is  not
so  clear  that  federal  courts  deciding  it  can  be  confident  of
their  result,  or  if it  is  less  clear  than  the federal  constitutional
issue,  or if the  state  law  ruling  the  federal  court would  make
would  not  be  dispositive,  then  a  federal  court  is justified  in
proceeding  directly  to  a  decision  of the  federal  constitutional
issue  if that  issue  is  nonsensitive,  clear,  and  dispositive. 1 0 9  In
that  situation,  the  interests  in  favor  of  avoiding  the  federal
constitutional  issue  are  minimal;  they  do  not  warrant  either
making  the  parties  suffer  the  costs  of abstention  or  taking  a
risk  that the  federal court through  a state  law ruling will erro-
neously interfere with a state  program.
The  Court  apparently  considered  the  dispositive  federal
constitutional  issue  in  Constantineau a  clear  and  nonsensitive
one. 10  On  that  hypothesis,  as  long  as  the  state  issue  was  not
more clear  than  the federal  one, the  Court's failure  to consider
the state  constitutional  provision  was justified."'  But the great-
state  enactment  in  question  is  a  constitutional  provision  that the  federal  court  deems
identic  to  a  federal  constitutional  provision,  the  court  should  -decide  the  federal
question  before  the  state  question,  since  an  initial  decision  on  the  state  issue  is  neces-
sarily  a  decision  on  the  federal  issue,  and  thus  will  not  avoid  federal  constitutional
decisionmaking.
It  is  true that  the  Wisconsin  Supreme  Court  had  termed  the  state  provision  the
Chief Justice  invoked  only  "substantially,"  but  not  precisely,  equivalent  to  the  due
process  and  equal  protection  clauses  of the  fourteenth  amendment.  400  U.S.  at  440
n.1  (Burger,  C.J.,  dissenting).  But that  does  not  support  abstention  because  the  only
reason  the  Chief Justice  gave  for  believing  the  state  provision  might  be  relevant  at
all was  that holding on  the  part of the  Wisconsin  court;  there was  nothing  to indicate
that  any  nonidentic  aspect  of  the  state  provision  might  invalidate  the  challenged
ordinance.  Moreover,  one  might  argue  that  federal  application  of  a  "substantially
equivalent"  state  provision  raises  no  greater  risk  of  federal  error  than  the  applica-
tion of any state enactment  which is substantially  unambiguous.
109  The  proper  treatment  of  cases  involving  federal  constitutional  issues  that  are
clear  and  nonsensitive  but  not  dispositive  is  discussed  infra  at  text  accompanying
notes  121-24.
110  Every  member of the  Court agreed  that notice  and  hearing must be provided
in  the  circumstances  involved,  and  no  Justice  appeared  to  regard  that  federal  deci-
sion as groundbreaking or as one that there was any  special need to avoid.
111 The  clarity  of  a  dispositive  federal  constitutional  question  could,  however,
support  an  argument  in  favor  of abstention,  for  it  may  increase  the  likelihood  that
state  tribunals,  if  given  an  opportunity  to  pass  on  state  issues,  will  dispose  of  them
in  a  manner  that  will  avoid  the  constitutional  infirmity;  if abstention  had  been  or-
dered  in  Constantineau, the  very  clarity  of  the  federal  constitutional  issue  would  in-
crease  the  likelihood  that  Wisconsin  courts  would  prohibit  the  challenged  procedure
under  their  law,  thereby  making  decision  of the  federal  issue  ultimately  unnecessaryABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
er the  sensitivity  of a federal  constitutional  question, the  more
important it is first to decide  a state  issue that might be dispos-
itive,  and  the  more  justifiable  it  is  to  abstain  to  ensure  the
accuracy  of an  uncertain  reading  of state  law  that  leaves  the
federal issue to be decided.'
1 2
3.  The Operation of These  Policies in "Authorization Cases"
Since each  of the foregoing  reasons for abstention  is  oper-
ative  only  in some  situations,  a court should  ascertain  whether
the reasons  can  operate  before  it  abstains  in  a particular  case.
Otherwise  the parties  may  needlessly  be  subjected  to the  delay
and expense  of a  second  lawsuit. There  are differences  in  the
ways  the  abstention  policies  operate  between  cases  in  which
the  state  issue  is  whether  state  law  authorizes  the  challenged
state  enactment  and  those  in  which  the  state  issue  is,  instead,
the  meaning  of  the  challenged  state  enactment.  I  will  refer
to  the  case.  Even  so,  that  fact  should  not  encourage  abstention.  Abstaining  out  of
confidence  of thereby  avoiding  a  federal  constitutional  decision  when  the  reason  for
that confidence  is  that the  outcome  of  the  federal  decision  is  clear  to  all  is  hardly
a  wise  allocation  of the  resources  of either  the  parties  or  the  courts,  at  least  when
no  affirmative  reason  appears  for  avoiding  the  particular  federal  constitutional  deci-
sion.  In  a  situation  like  Constantineau in  which  the  outcome  of  the  case  was  certain,
it  would  seem  unreasonable  to  require  the  institution  of  a  second  lawsuit  when  the
most  that  abstention  could  accomplish  is  that  the  challenged  enactment  would  be
stricken  under  state  law  instead  of  under  settled  federal  doctrine.  Cf  text  accom-
panying notes 135-39 infra. But cf. text accompanying  notes 140-43 infra.
12  Arguably,  a  federal  court  should  abstain  in  cases  involving  extremely  sensi-
tive  constitutional  questions,  even  if  it  is  relatively  certain  that the  question  will  have
to  be  reached.  It  is  always  possible  that  the  state  court  will  dispose  of the  case  on
state  law  grounds,  or  that  the  case  will  be  mooted  or  settled  before  it  returns  to
federal  court;  and  even  if  the federal  question  must ultimately  be reached,  the post-
ponement  of sensitive  adjudication  can  serve  the  same  delaying  function  as  avoiding
it altogether in a particular case.
The  argument  that  it ,would  be  proper  to  abstain  to  postpone  federal  constitu-
tional  adjudication  though  it  appears  ultimately  unavoidable  in  the  particular  case
is  distinct  from  the  two  reasons  for  abstaining  discussed  in  the  text  and  states  a
third  rationale  which  departs  from  the  premise  that abstention  is  a  device  to  guard
against  federal  error  on  state  law  issues;  that reason  would  apply  though the  federal
court  views state  law just as  the highest  court  of the  state  would.  But abstaining  for
the  purpose  of  delaying  adjudication  of  the  particular  case  seems  unfair  and  im-
proper.  If  delay  is  the  purpose,  a  federal  court  could  effect  it  with  less  cost  to  the
parties  merely  by  postponing  its  decision.  The  inappropriateness  of the  abstention
device  is  made apparent,  moreover, by  the arbitrariness  of delaying  because  of sensi-
tive  constitutional  issues  only  in  those  cases  which  happen  to  embrace  as  well  issues
of state  law.  If delay  in  constitutional  decisionmaking  is  ever  by  itself  a valid judicial
objective,  see  Wechsler,  Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,  73  HARV.  L.
Rav.  1,  7-8  (1959),  it  should  be  limited  in  cases  containing  state  issues,  as  in  other
cases,  to  doctrines  such  as  standing,  ripeness,  and  political  question,' which  isolate
particular  deficiencies  in  the  constitutional  questions  at  issue  or  in  the  pleadings  of
the parties. See generally A.  BICKEL, supra note 51,  111-98.
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to  the  first  category  as  "authorization  cases"  and  to  the  latter
as "construction  cases"  and will discuss separately  the operation
of the abstention policies in each category. 1 " 3
a.  The Importance of Identifying the Policy That Abstention
Will Serve in the Particular  Case
In  cases  in  which  the  state  issue  is  the  validity  of a  chal-
lenged  enactment,  an order  of abstention  will  serve  only  one
of  the  two  policies  behind  the  abstention  doctrine.  When  a
state  statute  is  challenged  as  invalid  under both  the  state  and
federal  constitutions,  for  example,1 4  and  the  federal  court
considers  the  state  issue  unclear,  the  policy  that  abstaining
furthers  necessarily  depends  upon  the  nature  of the state  law
error  the  federal  court  seeks  to  avoid.  If,  in  the  absence  of
abstention,  the  federal  court  would  hold  that state  law  autho-
rizes  the  statute,  it  would  reach  the  issue  of the  statute's  con-
stitutionality  under  federal  law,  and  if  its  state  law  holding
were  erroneous,  the  federal  constitutional  decision  would  be
unnecessary.  Whenever  a  federal  court  abstains,  instead  of
itself  upholding  the  state  law  validity  of a  challenged  enact-
ment,  it  therefore  does  so  in  service  of  the  policy  to  avoid
unnecessary  federal  constitutional  adjudication.  But  if  the
federal  court,  in  the  absence  of  abstention,  would  rule  that
the  enactment  were  not  authorized,  abstention  serves  instead
113 Of  course  a  case  can  contain  issues  concerning  both  the  state  law  validity  of
a  challenged  enactment  and  its  meaning. And a  case  can contain  several  authorization
issues  or  several  construction  issues.  But  each  authorization  or  construction  issue
should  be  analyzed  separately  to see  whether  a  federal  court  is  warranted  in abstain-
ing for state court decision of that issue.
114  It  need  not be  a  state  statute  that  is  challenged  for  a  case  to  be  an  authori-
zation  case;  the  same  analysis  applies  when  any  state  enactment  is  challenged  on
grounds  that  some  provision  of  state  law-whether  or  not  it  is  the  state  constitution
-renders  it  invalid.  Moreover,  this  Article  takes  the  position  that  the  analysis  of
attacks  on  state  action  other  than  enactments  should  be  similar.  See  text  accompany-
ing  notes  146-51  infra. Pullman is  an  authorization  case;  the  state  issue  was  whether
the  Commission's  order  was  within  its statutory  powers;  the  issue  was  not  the  mean-
ing of the enactment  being  attacked  but  rather  the  meaning  of the  provision  claimed
to  invalidate  it. See  notes  14-23  supra &  accompanying  text.  And  the  issue  the  Chief
Justice  raised  in  Constantineau, see  notes  107-08  supra &  accompanying  text,  was  an
authorization  issue,  though  the  case  contained  a  construction  issue  as  well,  see  text
accompanying  notes  128-29  infra. The  Chief Justice's  authorization  issue  should  not
in  any  event  warrant  abstention,  however,  because  the  state  constitutional  provision
that  might  possibly  have  invalidated  the  challenged  statute  was  deemed  to  derive
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to  avoid  erroneous  interference  with  a  state  program. 15  In
this  situation,  the  court  would  not reach  the  federal  constitu-
tional question  even if it were in error;  but if in error, it would
invalidate  the  statute  though it is  in  fact  valid under  state  law,
and the state program might suffer without justification.
In  any given  authorization  case,  then, a judge who  knows
how  he  would  rule  on  the  state  law  issue  can  identify  which
of  the  policies  behind  abstention  he  would  serve  if  he  ab-
stained.  Such  a  determination  can  prevent  pointless  absten-
tion.  For  example,  a  case  may  arise  in  which  it  is  crucial  not
to  interrupt  the  state  program  erroneously," 6  but  only  mini-
mally  important  to  avoid  a  pronouncement  on  the  federal
constitutional  issue  at  stake.  If the  federal judge  would  hold
that  the  state  law  program  were  authorized,  so  that the  inter-
est  abstention  served  would  be  avoidance  of the  constitutional
issue,  abstention  would  not  seem  worth  its  costs;  but  if  the
federal  court  would  hold  the  program  unauthorized,  absten-
tion  might  be  justifiable  to  avoid  erroneous  interruption  of
the state program.1
7
The  advantages  of  first  determining  what  policy  absten-
tion  would  serve  in  a  particular  case  are  thus  evident.  But
difficulties  arguably  exist in  a rule  requiring the  federal courts
to  determine before  abstaining  which  way  they  would  rule  on
questionable  state  law  issues. The  propriety  of such  a  require-
ment  will  be  discussed  shortly,"1 8  but  the  extent  of the  diffi-
culties  it  imposes  can  be  better  evaluated  after  analyzing  pre-
cisely  how  the factors  thus  far articulated  would  interact  if the
federal  court  did  prejudge  each  abstention  decision  in  the
functional manner suggested.
115 This  in  fact  was  the  only  policy  abstention  could  serve  in  Pullman itself, for
the  district court  had  held  that the  Commission  lacked  power  to  issue the  challenged
order  and  the  Supreme  Court,  pointing  out  that  the  district court  included  "an  able
and  experienced  circuit judge  of the  circuit  which  includes  Texas  and  . . . two  ca-
pable  district judges  trained  in Texas  law,"  said  that  if there  were "no  choice  in  the
matter  but  to  decide  what  is  the  law  of  the  state,  [the  Court]  should  hesitate  long
before  rejecting their forecast of Texas  laiv."  312 U.S. at 499.
116  See examples given,  text accompanying note 93 supra.
117 Conversely,  a  case  might  involve  sensitive  constitutional  issues  concerning  a
state  program  that  interruption  would  not  irreparably  harm;  if  so,  there  would  be
more justification  for  abstention  if  the  federal  court  would  otherwise  hold  the  stat-
ute authorized.
"' See text accompanying  notes  125-27 infra.
1974]1104  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  122:1071
b.  Cases in Which Abstention Serves to Avoid Disrupting  a
Legitimate State Program
If  the  federal  court  would  otherwise  hold  that  state  law
does  not  authorize  a  challenged  state  program,  abstention
should  not be  ordered  unless  the  state  program  could  be  ex-
pected  to  suffer  irreparable  harm  from  delay.  That  rule  does
not  furnish  precise  guidance  for  the  decision  of most  cases,
however,  for  delay  will  often  involve  at  least  some  degree  of
irreparable  harm,  and  the  amount  of  damage  caused  by  an
erroneous  interruption  of  a  state  program  will  vary  with  the
facts  of each  case.  Moreover,  the  amount of threatened  harm
that  is  required  for  abstention  should  vary  with the  degree  of
ambiguity  of the  state  issue and,  thus,  with the likelihood  that
a  federal  court  deciding  the  issue  would  err. A  federal  court
might  not be  willing  to  run  even  a  fairly  slight  risk  of erro-
neously  holding  that  state  law  does  not  authorize  a  program
if the  error  would  seriously  frustrate  important  state  policy;
it  might  abstain  in  that  situation  even  though  the  state  law
were  clear  enough  not  to  warrant  abstention  if  the  conse-
quences of error were  slighter.
Conversely,  if the  amount  of harm  from  error  is  not tre-
mendous,  but  is  of  some  consequence,  and  the  chances  of
error  are  very  great,  a  court  might justly  abstain.  It  may  ab-
stain  even  though  it would  not  do  so  in  a  case  in  which  the
same  amount of harm could  be caused  by an erroneous  ruling
but  the  chance  of  error  were  slighter.  It  should  be  noted,
however,  that  if  a  federal  judge  is  in  good  faith  attempting
to  decide  state  issues  as  he  believes  the  highest  state  court
would, then  the chances of error as the federal judge perceives
them  cannot  exceed  fifty  percent.  If  the  federal judge  sees
the  state  law  as  absolutely  ambiguous,  so  that it  is  wholly  un-
clear  to  him  whether  the  state judiciary  would  hold  the  chal-
lenged enactment  authorized or not, he runs a fifty-fifty  chance
of  deciding  the  question  correctly.  If  state  law  is  not  wholly
ambiguous,  so the  federal judge  sees  some  indication  that the
highest  state  court  would  agree  with  his  holding,  the  chances
of error  decrease.  Since  the  chances  of  federal  error  cannot
exceed  fifty percent, and since  even when federal error is most
likely  it  is  also  possible  that  the  state  system  will  erroneously
dispose of the state  issue,119 the potential  error  must threaten
"19  See notes 83-87 supra & accompanying  text.ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
significant harm to the state  program  for abstention  to warrant
its costs.
c.  Cases in Which Abstention  Serves to  Avoid  Unnecessary Federal
Constitutional  Adjudication
Similarly when,  absent abstention,  the  federal court would
hold the  challenged  enactment  authorized,  so  that the  interest
abstention  serves  is  avoiding  federal  constitutional  adjudica-
tion,  a  significantly  sensitive  federal  constitutional  question
should  be  requisite  to  abstention,  and  the  more  sensitive  the
constitutional  question  to  be  avoided,  the  more  likely  absten-
tion  is  to  remain  warranted  as  the  uncertainty  of  the  state
issue-and  thus the  chance  of federal  error--decreases.  Even
when  the  federal  question  is  extremely  sensitive,  however,
there  may be  reason  not to  abstain when  it  is  fairly  clear  that
state  law  authorizes  the  challenged  state  provision.  Of course,
as  state  law  becomes  increasingly  clear  in  whatever  direction,
abstaining  becomes  increasingly  purposeless,  for the  likelihood
of federal error  decreases;  a significant lack of clarity  is  thus  a
general  prerequisite  to  abstention.120  But  slightly  less  ambigu-
ity  arguably  is  required  when an  enactment appears  to be  un-
authorized  than  when  it appears  to  be authorized,  even  if the
policies  underlying  abstention-avoiding  erroneous  interfer-
ence  with  a  state  program  in  one  case  and  avoiding  unneces-
sary  constitutional  adjudication  in  the  other-are  implicated
to an  equal  extent. One  reason  is  the greater likelihood  of ob-
taining  a definitive  state  answer to the state  law  question when
indications  are  that  the  challenged  enactment  is  unauthorized
and  that  lower  state  courts  would  strike  down  the  program;
overturning  a state  program  probably  maximizes  the likelihood
of a  definitive  answer  from  the  authoritative  state  tribunal.  A
less speculative and more fundamental reason is that the costs of
abstention  may be  less  when  state  law  suggests  that the  enact-
ment  is  unauthorized:  If  the  federal  court  is  correct  that  ab-
stention  will  result  in  the  state  court  definitively  disposing  of
the case on the state issue-and the clearer the state law  is,  the
more likely it  is that the court is  correct-no return  to  the fed-
eral  court  will  be  necessary  because  the  federal  constitutional
issue  will  not have  to be  reached.  If  the  federal  court believes
120 The  one  possible  exception  to  this  principle  is  discussed  at  text  accompany-
ing  notes  135-39  infra.  That  exception,  however,  is  qualified  by  the  principle  dis-
cussed at text accompanying  notes 140-43 infra.
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correctly  that  the  enactment  is  authorized,  however,  the  case
will  return  to  the  federal  court in  precisely  the  same  posture
as when it was sent to the state court, and the federal court will
have  to  decide  the  federal  constitutional  issue.  Abstention  will
have fulfilled none of its objectives.
This  analysis  suggests  simply  a  slight  difference  in  the
degree  of state  law  ambiguity  requisite  to  abstention  between
the  situation  in  which  an  enactment  appears  authorized  and
that  in  which  it  appears  unauthorized.  Alternatively,  if  the
degree  of  ambiguity  is  constant  in  the  two  situations,  it  sug-
gests  a  slight  difference  in  the  degree  to  which  the  relevant
policy must call for abstention:  The federal court should abstain
slightly  less  readily  in  authorization  cases  involving  the  avoid-
ance  of  constitutional  questions  than  in  those  involving  the
avoidance of harm to state programs.
d.  Cases Involving Clear and Nonsensitive Federal
Constitutional  Questions
As  was  discussed  earlier,  there  is  no  important  interest
in  avoiding  adjudication  of  clear  and  nonsensitive  federal
constitutional  questions;  accordingly  if  such  an  issue  is  dis-
positive-if the  challenged  enactment  is  clearly  unconstitution-
al-abstention  is  improper.' 21  Even  when  the  federal  consti-
tutional  issue  does  not  call  for  avoidance,  however,  consider-
ations of efficient decisionmaking  may cut in favor of abstention
in  some  cases  in  which  that  federal  issue  is not dispositive-in
some  cases,  that  is,  in  which  the  federal  court would  uphold
the  constitutionality  of  the  challenged  enactment:  When  the
federal  court  believes  a  case  to  contain  a  clear  and  nonsensi-
tive,  nondispositive  federal  constitutional  issue,  and in addition
the  state issue  is  sufficiently  unclear  for abstention,  but  in the
absence  of abstention  the  federal  court would  hold  the  chal-
lenged  enactment  unauthorized,  the  court  should  not  first
decide  the  federal  constitutional  issue.122  Since  the  state  issue
121  See text accompanying notes  108-09 supra.
12  The  facts  of Constantineau can  be  varied  to  provide  an example  in  which  the
challenged  state  enactment  is  quite  clearly  constitutional  (rather  than  clearly  uncon-
stitutional)  and  in  which  the  federal  court,  though  uncertain  concerning  state  law,
would  hold  it  does  not sanction  the  challenged  provision.  Suppose  the  provision  re-
lating  to  posting  the  names  of  "excessive  drinkers"  clearly  does  provide  for  notice
and  hearing  and  that  the  federal  constitutional  challenge  is,  instead,  that  it  violates
due  process  and  equal  protection  for  the  state  to  deprive  "excessive  drinkers"  of
liquor.  Let us  assume as  well  that  "excessive  drinkers"  is  defined  with  sufficient  pre-ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
is  appropriate  for abstention  in such  a case,  ruling first on the
constitutional  issue  would  require  abstaining  after  the  consti-
tutional  ruling-a  course  that  in  all  likelihood  would  prove
more  costly  to  the  litigants  than  abstaining  on  the  state  issue
at the outset. Since, by hypothesis,  the state  issue  is more  likely
to  be  dispositive  of  the  controversy  than  is  the  federal  issue,
abstaining at the outset would settle the case more expeditiously
than  would  having  the  litigants  first  go  through  the  federal
system  on  the  nondispositive  federal  issue. 123 If, however,  the
cision  to  escape  charges  of unconstitutional  vagueness  and,  further,  that  it  seems  to
the  federal  court that the  constitutional  challenge,  while  not frivolous,  is  fairly  clearly
erroneous  on  the  merits. The  challenged  posting  provision  is  not  a  state  statute  but
a  city  ordinance,  and the  state  issue  is  whether  the city  may  enact  such an  ordinance
despite  state  legislative  regulation  of  the  distribution  of  liquor,  which  is  arguably
preemptive.  A  perusal  of  relevant  state  law  leaves  the  federal  court  without  confi-
dence  concerning  the proper  resolution of the  state  question. This  hypothetical  states
a  case  in  which,  if  the  federal  court,  absent  abstention,  would  hold  the  ordinance
preempted, judicial  efficiency  would  call  for  abstaining  at the  outset, before  decision
of the federal constitutional question.
123 The  soundness  of this  analysis  is  clearest  if  the  district  courts'  orders  of ab-
stention  will  not  in  the  normal  course  be  appealed  through  the  federal  system.  If
they  will  be  appealed,  it  might  not  significantly  increase  the  costs  of abstention  for
the  district judge  to  decide  the  clear  and  nonsensitive  constitutional  question  con-
currently  with  the  abstention  issue  and  for the  appellate  courts  to review  the correct-
ness  of both  rulings.  Such a  procedure  would  require  more  time at  the  district court
level  in  cases  in  which  factual  findings  were  necessary  to  the  constitutional  ruling
but not in other cases.
The  appealability  of orders  to  abstain  is  not  definitively  settled.  In  Idlewild  Bon
Voyage  Liquor  Corp.  v.  Epstein,  370  U.S.  713,  715  n.2  (1962)  (per  curiam),  the
Court  held  reviewable  an  order  of abstention,  but  in  that  case  the  district  court,
contrary  to  the later  announced England procedure,  had  referred  the federal  as  well
as  state  issues  to  state  court.  The  Supreme  Court's  explanation  of the  appealability
of  the  order-that  the  order  was  final  because  the  "'[a]ppellant  was  effectively  out
of court',  id.  at  715  n.2  (quoting  289  F.2d  426,  428  (2d  Cir.  1961))-is  not  nec-
essarily  applicable  in  situations  in  which  the  district  court,  under  the  England pro-
cedure,  retains  jurisdiction.  In  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n  v.  MacMullan,  406  U.S.  498
(1972),  the  Court,  without  discussing  appealability,  reviewed  a  district  court  decision
to  abstain;  in  that  case  as  well,  however,  the  district  court  had  dismissed  the  com-
plaint  and  had  apparently  referred  federal  along  with  state  issues  to  state  courts.
336  F.  Supp.  248,  253-54  (E.D.  Mich.  1971);  see  NAACP  v.  Bennett,  360  U.S.  471
(1959)  (per  curiam)  (vacating,  without  discussion,  pre-England  order  to  abstain);
County of Allegheny  v.  Frank  Mashuda  Co.,  360 U.S.  185  (1959).  In  Louisiana  Power
&  Light  Co.  v.  City  of  Thibodaux,  360  U.S.  25  (1959),  the  Supreme  Court  com-
pounded  the  confusion  by  reviewing  an  order  of  abstention  although  it  limited  its
grant  of  certiorari  to  exclude  the  question  of the  appealability  of the  order!  Id. at
26  n.1. No  federal issues were  involved in  that case, but the district court had  retained
jurisdiction,  and  the  Court  indicated  that  a  state  issue  might  return  to  the  federal
forum. Id. at 29; see  notes 219-20 infra.
The  American  Law  Institute  apparently  concludes  from  the  case  law  that  ab-
stention  orders  are  not  reviewable,  for  it  explains  its  failure  to  provide  expressly
for  appellate  review  in  its  abstention  proposals  to  Congress  by  saying  "[s]uch  review
is ordinarily undesirable  ....  In the unusual case where appellate relief from an absten-
1974]1108  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  122:1071
federal  court  in  the absence  of abstention  would  hold  the  en-
actment authorized, but all other facts were  the same, the court
should  not order  abstention at the outset or at any  later stage.
Neither  of the  purposes  of abstention could  be  served  in such
a  case.  There  is  no  significant  interest  in  avoiding  decision  of
a  clear  and  nonsensitive  federal  constitutional  question,  and
the state program, since it will be upheld, cannot be harmed.
124
4.  The Justification for Requiring  Federal Decision of the
State Law Issue Prior to the Abstention Decision
This  interplay  of  the  abstention  factors  reveals  that  ab-
stention  will  not  be  limited  to  instances  in  which  state  law  is
entirely  ambiguous,  a fact  that  is  relevant  in assessing the bur-
den  to  federal  courts  of identifying  in  advance  the  policy  ab-
staining  would  serve.  In many  cases  in  which  a  federal  court
knows  which  way  it  would  rule  on  the  state  issue,  the  court
will  nevertheless  consider abstaining  because  it is  not confident
that its conclusion  is  correct  and because  the harm error would
entail  is  sufficiently  great.  In those  situations  it  places  no bur-
tion  order  is  required,  there  should  be  no  difficulty  in working  out a  remedy  under
the  All  Writs  Statute  ......  ALI STUDY,  supra  note  33  at  291-92.  The  hardship  to
litigants  wrongfully  ordered  into  state  court  militates  against  a  conclusion  that appeal
is  available  only  in  extraordinary  cases;  instead  the  undesirability  of  review  would
seem  to support  the need  for  clear  standards  for  abstention,  a  need  met  neither  by
current law nor by the proposals contained  in this Article.
The inequities  to litigants  in not being able to have  erroneous  orders of abstention
overturned  may  well render abstention orders "final" and appealable under 28 U.S.C.  §
1291.  Cf. Gillespie  v. United  States Steel Corp.,  379 U.S.  148,  152-54 (1964);  Mercantile
Nat'I Bank v.  Langdeau,  371  U.S.  555,  557-58  (1963);  Construction  Laborers  v.  Curry,
371  U.S.  542,  548-52 (1963);  Cohen  v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337  U.S. 541,  545-
47 (1949);  Forgay  v. Conrad,  47  U.S.  (6  How.)  201,  204 (1848).  But cf.  Catlin v. United
States,  324 U.S.  229, 233  (1945);  Schoenamsgruber v. Hamburg Am. Line, 294 U.S.  454,
456  (1935).  Moreover,  in  cases  in  which  interlocutory  injunctions  are  requested,  cf.
Goldstein  v. Cox,  396 U.S.  471  (1970),  an order of abstention might be reviewable under
28 U.S.C.  § 1292(a)(1) as a refusal of an interlocutory injunction. See Glen Oaks Util.,  Inc.
v. City of Houston,  280 F.2d 330, 333  (5th Cir.  1960).  The same reasoning could  allow
Supreme  Court  review  of three-judge  court  decisions.  See  28  U.S.C.  §  1253  (1970).
And, of course,  certification  under 28  U.S.C.  § 1292(b),  and mandamus  or prohibition
under  28  U.S.C.  § 1651,  would  in  any  event  be  available  in  cases  to  which  they  are
applicable.  If  abstention  orders  generally  are  considered  appealable-as  they  would
be  if the  finality rationale  were  applied despite  the  absence  of a  dismissal  and  despite
the  possibility  of return  to the federal  court-then judicial  efficiency  would be  served
by  not  first  deciding  the  federal  issue  in  the  cases  discussed  in  the text  only  if  the
federal  constitutional  issue  were  significantly  more  likely  to  be  appealed  than  the
abstention issue, or if the constitutional  issue required  significant factfinding.
124 When  the  federal  constitutional  issue  is  clear,  nonsensitive  and  nondispositive,
and  the  state  issue  is  clear  enough  not  to  warrant  abstention,  abstention  is  also  im-
proper  since a  significant  lack of clarity  in  the  state  issue  is  a  consistent  prerequisite
to abstention. See text accompanying notes  80-87 supra; cf.  note 120 supra.ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
den, whatsoever  on  the  federal  court  to  take  account  of  its
view of the state  issue in making its abstention decision.
When  it  is  not clear  to  the  court which  way  it would rule
on  the  state  issue,  however,  the  suggested  approach  requires
it to  make  that  decision  in  order  to  identify  which  policy  ab-
stention  Wiould  serve.  To  some  extent  even  the  current  ap-
proach  to  abstention  requires  a  federal  court  to  address  the
merits  of state  issues  in  order  to  make  an  abstention  decision,
for the court is  supposed  to abstain  only  if state  law  is unclear.
Since  current  decisions  are  uninformative  concerning  exactly
how  unclear  state  law  must  be,125  that  standard  may  not,  in
practice,  require  the  court to make  an  exacting  determination.
The absence  of an  ascertainable  standard  should  not, however,
be  deemed  a  virtue;  a  federal judge  operating  conscientiously
under  current  doctrine  should  first  decide  how  unclear  state
law  is  supposed  to be for abstention  to be  ordered and  should
then determine  whether the state  issue before  it is  that unclear.
The  extent  to  which  that  process  will  reflect  a  determination
of the  merits  will  depend  upon  how  much  ambiguity  is  requi-
site  to  abstention.  If  it were required  that  state  law  be  utterly
ambiguous  for  abstention  to  be  ordered,  the  federal  court
would  have  to decide  whether  there were  any  indications  con-
cerning the outcome  of the state  issue before  deciding whether
to  abstain.  The  federal  court  in  effect  would  thereby  decide
how  it would  rule  on  the  merits  in  the  vast  majority  of the
cases-that  is,  in  all  cases  other  than those  which  were  utterly
ambiguous.
If  current  standards  do permit abstention  only  in cases  of
utter  ambiguity,  the  suggested  approach,  then,  would  require
an  advance  ruling  on  the  merits  only  in  a  relatively  small
number  of additional  cases:  those  in  which  the  state  issue  is
utterly  ambiguous.  But  to  the  extent  that  current  standards
sanction  abstention when  the state  issue  is  less  than altogether-
ambiguous,  the  number  of  cases  increases  in  which  the  sug-
gested  approach  requires  a pre-abstention  decision  of the state
issue that the current approach  does not require.126
125 See notes  76-78 supra & accompanying text.
126 The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the point. In  each  the state  issue  is  charted
from  clearly  authorized  to  clearly  unauborized  with  utter ambiguity  at the midpoint.
If, as in Diagram #1,  ihe court is required to decide the  issue unless it is utterly ambig-
uous,  then  in  placing  the  case  on  the spectrum  it  effectively  decides  all  state  issues
except  the  utterly  ambiguous  ones.  But if,  as  in  Diagram  #2,  it  can  abstain  when
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Even  when  the  state  issue  is  entirely  unclear,  it  is  not
troublesome  to require  the  federal  court  to  identify  the  policy
abstention  would  serve  by  determining  how  it  would  rule  on
the  unclear state  issue.  The. notion  of requiring prior determi-
nation  of an  issue  in  order  to  analyze  functionally  the  proper
forum  for  its  ultimate  decision  has  analogues  in  modern  con-
flict-of-laws  analysis,  which  often  requires  a  prior  determina-
tion of one  forum's  law  in order  to analyze whether the law  of
the  forum  governs.' 27  In  the  abstention  context  the  suggested
procedure  is  justified  because  it  enables  the  federal  court  to
avoid  abstention  in  cases  in  which  it would  not  serve  a  valid
purpose.  As  a  general  matter,  then,  the  added  burden  of
making  the  advance  determination  seems justified  by the  bur-
dens it would avoid.
There  may  be  individual  cases,  however,  in  which  the
balance  of advantage  differs.  If  the state  issue  is  such that the
federal  court  cannot  know  how  it would  rule  without  under-
taking  a  complex  factual  hearing,  it  may  sometimes  be  wiser
to  forego  the  advance  determination  and  simply  to  abstain.
Since,  by  hypothesis,  the  state  issue  is  extremely  unclear  in
such  a  case,  less  harm  to  a  state  program  and  a less  sensitive
federal  constitutional  question  are  necessary  to justify  absten-
tion than when state  law  is  less ambiguous.  If  the federal court
can determine  that an error  would  cause  the requisite  amount
state  law  is  not wholly  unclear,  the  court  is  not required  to  determine  the  placement
on  the  spectrum  of  cases  falling  within  the  circle  demarcating  the  area  appropriate
for  abstention.  Hence,  it  need  not  determine  its  ruling  on  the  merits  in  that group
of cases.  The  less  ambiguity  required,  the  fewer  rulings  on  the  merits  the  federal
court will need to make as part of its abstention decision.
clearly authorized  _  T  clearly authorized
utterly  ambiguous  appropriate  1  utter"y  ambiguous
for  i o  a abstention  -,  /
clearly unauthorized  - clearly unauthorized
Diagram #1  Diagram #2
127 The  Restatement  (Second)  of the  Conflict of  Laws  takes the  position  that the
state  with  the  dominant  interest  on  each  particular  issue  should  generally  have  its
law  applied  on  that  issue.  It  recognizes  that  "the  content  of the  relevant  local  law
rule  of a  state  may  be significant  in  determining  whether  this  state  is  the  state  with
the  dominant  interest.  So,  for  example,  application  of  a  state's  statute  or  common
law  rule  which  would  absolve  the  defendanr  from  liability  could  hardly  be justified
on  the  basis  of this  state's  interest in  the  welfare  of the injured  plaintiff."  I  RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND)  OF CONFLICT OF LAws  § 6  at 15  (1971).
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of  each  of  the  harms  then,  of  course,  there  is  no  need  to
decide  the state  issue before  abstaining. Even if only one of the
policies  underlying  abstention  calls  for  abstention,  however,  it
is  conceivable  that  the  resources  expended  on  determining
whether  abstaining  would  serve  that  policy  would  be  greater
than  the  resources  expended  by  abstaining.  If  such  a  case
arose,  abstention  should  be  ordered  although  it  could  only
serve  one  policy  and  that  policy  might  not  be  at  issue  in  the
case.
5.  The Application of the Abstention Principles to
"Construction  Cases"
In  construction  cases  the state  law  issue is  the  meaning  of
a  challenged  state  enactment,  rather  than  its  validity.  For
example,  Constantineau  involved  an  issue  of  construction  as
well  as  an  authorization  issue.  While  the  challenged  statute
did  not  on  its  face  provide  for  notice  and  hearing,  Justice
Black  took  the  position  in  a  dissenting  opinion  that  "notice
and  hearing  might  be  provided  by  principles  of state  admin-
istrative  procedure  law  similar  to  the  federal  Administrative
Procedure  Act." 12 8  He  agreed  with  the  other  members  of the
Court  that  the  statute  would  be  unconstitutional  if it  did  not
allow  for  notice  and  hearing,  but  he  thought  the  Wisconsin
courts  should  be  given  an  opportunity  to  construe  the  statute
so as  to avoid  both state and federal  defects. The  case  is  some-
what  unusual  for  a  construction  case  because  the  ambiguity
was  not evident  on the  face of the challenged  statute but rath-
er  was  found  by Justice  Black  in  other  state  law;  that  distinc-
tion, however, does not affect the abstention analysis.
Construction  cases  involve  the  same  policies  as  authoriza-
tion  cases,  but  they  operate  in  somewhat  different  ways.  In
construction  cases  it  is  generally  not  possible  for  the  federal
court to  determine  what  constitutional  issue  to  decide  without
passing  upon  the  state  law  issue.  Moreover,  it  may  be  much
less obvious  than in authorization  cases  which of the abstention
policies  abstaining  in  a  particular  case  may  serve.  And  there
is  a  possibility  in  construction  cases  that  does  not  exist  in
authorization  cases:  In certain  cases  an  erroneous  federal deci-
sion  will  not  seriously  threaten  a  state  program  because  of
the state's ability to correct  it without any delay.
128  400 U.S. at 444.
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a.  The Need to Decide the State Law Issue Prior  to the Federal Issue
Whether  the  ambiguity  in  the  challenged  state  enactment
arises  from  its  language  or  from  other  state  legislation,  a
federal  court  in  the  usual  construction  case  must  pass  on  the
issue  of the  enactment's meaning-or  abstain  to  have  the state
system  do  so-prior  to  adjudicating  the  federal  constitutional
question.  This  provides  an  important  difference  from  autho-
rization  cases,  in  which  it  is  possible  for  the  federal  court  to
decline to decide the  state law  issue  and proceed  to the federal
one,  as the  majority  did  on the. authorization  issue  in Constan-
tineau. The  Court  did  not purport  to  pass  upon  the  construc-
tion issue in Constantineau any more than the authorization  one;
it did not mention that either point was "at issue" at all. But the
opinion  for  the  Court  did  say  that  on  its  face  the  statute  did
not require  notice and  hearing,  and  the  Court had  to  pass  on
the  construction  issue,  whether  it recognized  it  as  an  issue  or
not,  simply  because  the  federal  constitutional  question  posed
was  dependent upon that issue's  prior resolution:  If  the  Court
had  adopted  the  view  that  Wisconsin  law  did  require  notice
and  hearing,  it would  hardly  have  held  the statute  unconstitu-
tional for failure to provide those procedural safeguards.
It is  the very  rare construction  case in which  the state  issue
need  not  be resolved  first. The  federal  constitutional  question
will  not  require  prior  resolution  of  the  state  issue  only  if all
possible  meanings  of the  challenged  state  law  are  alleged  to
violate  the  same  federal  constitutional  provision  in  precisely
the same  way.1 29 In that situation there is no interest in a ruling
on the state  issue,  either by the federal court or by state  courts
through  abstention,  prior  to  a  ruling  on  the  federal  constitu-
tional  question.  Much  more  commonly,  however,  the  possible
state  law  meanings  will  pose  different  federal  constitutional
questions,  whether  under  the  same  constitutional  provision  or
not;130  or  one or more possible  meanings will pose  a significant
129 Even  if both  of two  possible  meanings  present  questions  under  the  same  con-
stitutional  provision,  the  issues  may  be  different:  For  example,  if  both  are  attacked
as  violative  of  equal  protection,  the  equal  protection  argument  against  each  meaning
may differ.
130  An  example  based  on  Constantineau illustrates  the  situation  in  which  two
possible  meanings  pose  different  constitutional  problems.  Suppose  that  the  state
alleged  there  was  a  Wisconsin  enactment  requiring  notice  and  hearing  that  should
be  read  with  the  posting  provision,  but  it  required  notice  of only  five  days  and  ex-
plicitly  stated  that  there  was  no  right  to  present  witnesses  at  the  hearing.  If  the
posting  provision  were construed  to mean  that no  notice  and hearing  were  necessary,ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
constitutional  issue  while  the  other  or  others  do  not. 13'  In
those  situations  it is  necessary  to decide  the state  law  issue  pri-
or  to  the  federal  one,  implicitly  if not  explicitly,  because  the
constitutional  question  will  be  dependent  upon  the  resolution
of the state law question.
b.  The Interaction of the Abstention Policies in Construction Cases
In  many  construction  cases  it is  not  possible  to  isolate  in
advance  one  policy  to  be  served  by  abstaining.  If  in Constanti-
neau the construction  issue  is  the one Justice  Black described-
whether  Wisconsin  law  provides  for  notice  and  hearing-and
a  constitutional  issue  is  raised  only  on  the  theory  that  it does
not so provide,  then if the  federal court would  rule  that notice
and hearing  are not provided but abstains  because  it is unsure
of that  view,  abstention  will  serve  the  interest  of  avoiding  a
federal  constitutional  question.  But  such  abstention  may  also
avoid  illegitimate  interference  with  a  state  law  program,  since
if  the  federal  court's  holding  that  state  law  does  not  require
notice  and  hearing  is  erroneous,  the  court may  possibly  strike
down  as  violative  of  federal  due  process  a  state  enactment
that properly  construed  is  constitutional.  A  state court holding
that  notice  and  hearing  are  required,  therefore,  would  avoid
the  federal  constitutional  issue  and  might,  as  well,  prevent
the state statute from being stricken down erroneously.
In some  factual  contexts,  however,  abstention  in construc-
tion  cases  will  serve  only  one  of the  abstention  policies.  If  in
Constantineau the  federal  court  would  rule  that  the  statute
does  require  notice  and  hearing, and  if no  constitutional  issue
were  raised  with  respect  to  the  adequacy  of notice  and  hear-
ing,  the federal court would avoid  the only constitutional  ques-
tion  without  abstaining.  In  that  case  the  only  policy  that  ab-
staining  could  serve  would  be  avoiding  unwarranted  inter-
ference  with  the  state  program.  If  the  federal  court  were  in
error in holding that state  law provided  for notice and hearing,
and if its decision were  taken to mean that the state must there-
the  federal  constitutionality  of the  failure  to  provide  notice  and  hearing  would  be
at issue.  If,  on  the  other hand,  it  were read  in  conjunction  with  the  notice  and  hear-
ing  provision  that  the  state  argued  for,  the  federal  issue  would  be  the  constitution-
ality of the particular notice and hearing provided.
131  Constantineau itself  was  a  case  in  which  there  was  a  serious  constitutional
problem  if  one  meaning  of the  statute  was  adopted,  and  no  constitutional  problem
-at  least  none  that  was  raised-if the other  meaning  (that notice  and  hearing  were
necessary) was  chosen.
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after  provide  them,  the  federal  decision  might  unduly  and
illegitimately  interfere  with  a  state  program.  For  if  the  state
statutory scheme  in fact did not so require and if that statutory
scheme  were  constitutionally  proper-and  we  cannot  assume  it
would  not be  proper since  we  have,  by hypothesis,  avoided  de-
ciding  that  federal  constitutional  question-then  the  federal
court  would  have imposed an  unwanted  and unwarranted  con-
dition upon the statute's operation.
In  the  Constantineau example,  therefore,  a  federal  judge
can  learn  something  about  which  policies  abstention  may
serve  by  ascertaining  which  way  he  would rule  upon  the  state
construction  issue.  As  in  authorization  cases,  abstention  will
serve  no purpose  unless he  is  wrong  on  his  state  law  holding.
If  he  would  erroneously  rule  that notice  and  hearing  are  not
required,  he  may  serve  both  policies  behind  abstention  by
abstaining  or  he  may  serve  only  the  policy  against  needless
constitutional  adjudication.  If  he  would  rule  that  notice  and
hearing  are  required,  abstention  can  serve  only  the  policy
against illegitimate interference with state law programs.
The  above  analysis  of Constantineau is  typical  for construc-
tion  cases  in  which  one  possible  construction  of the  state  law
at issue  presents  a constitutional  problem  while  the  other  pos-
sible  construction  presents  none.  If,  instead,  each  of the  pos-
sible  constructions  presents  a  constitutional  issue,  then  it  is
less  likely  that  determining  which  way  he  would  rule  on  the
construction issue if he did not abstain  will significantly  advance
a judge's  inquiry  into  what  policy  he  may  serve  by abstaining.
Whichever  way  he  rules  he  may,  if  in  error,  illegitimately
limit  a  state  program  or  unnecessarily  decide  a  federal  con-
stitutional question, or both.
As  in  cases  in  which  only  one  construction  presents  a
constitutional  issue,  a  state  program  may  suffer  illegitimately
whichever  way  the  federal  court rules  on  a  state  construction
issue,  if  its  ruling  is  erroneous.  The  court  may  erroneously
construe  the  state  provision  to  raise  a  constitutional  question
under  which  it  is  invalid.  Or  it  may  erroneously  construe  the
provision  to  avoid  the constitutional  issue  when  even  if other-
wise  construed,  it  would  pass  constitutional  scrutiny,  thereby
imposing  upon  the  state  program  unrequired  conditions.
Whether  the  imposition  has  serious  consequences  for the  pro-
gram depends  upon the  magnitude  of the federal  court  devia-
tion  from  what  the  state  court  would  hold;  the  importanceABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
of the  matter  on  which  it  deviates;  and  the  vulnerability  of
the program's objectives  to delay.
Moreover,  when  each  of  two  possible  constructions  raises
a different constitutional  issue,  a  federal  constitutional  question
will  be  decided  unnecessarily  if the  federal  court  rules  erro-
neously  in either direction.  Once  the  federal  court decides  the
state  law  issue  erroneously,  it  will  decide  the  wrong  federal
constitutional  question-one  that  could  have  been  avoided
by  correct  decision  of the  state  law  issue-though  it  will  avoid
for  the  time  being  decision  of the  other  constitutional  issue,
the  one  that  is  actually  implicated  in  the  case.  Unnecessary
decision of a federal  constitutional  question can still be avoided
by  prior  correct  decision  of  the  state  law  issue,  therefore,  in
the  sense  that  any  particular  federal  constitutional  question
can  be  avoided.' 32  When  each  of  two  possible  constructions
raises  a  constitutional  issue,  federal  error  on  the  state  issue
will  not  result  in  unnecessary  federal  constitutional  adjudica-
tion  only  when  both  possible  meanings  are  alleged  to  violate
the  same  constitutional  provision  in  precisely  the  same  way,
and  that  is  the  unusual  situation  in which  it  is  unnecessary  to
decide the state issue prior to the federal one.
133
The  impossibility  in  many  construction  cases  of isolating
one  policy  that  abstention  may  serve  necessarily  affects  the
process  by  which  a  federal judge  should  analyze  whether  to
abstain.  But  even  in  cases  in  which  either  or both  abstention
policies  may be  served  whichever  way  the  federal judge  rules,
the judge  can  profit  by  determining  before  abstaining  which
way he  would rule if he  did not abstain  and by  deciding from
that  perspective  whether  the  likelihood  of  abstention  serving
a purpose  is  sufficient  to justify  its costs,  If  there are  two  pos-
sible  constitutional  issues  in  a  case,  one  raised  by  meaning X
of the  state  enactment and  one  raised  by  meaning  Y,  the  one
raised by Y  may be a sensitive issue that is important to avoid if
at  all  possible,  whereas  the  one  raised  by  meaning X may  not
be  sensitive  at all.  In such  a  case  it would  be  more important,
for the purpose  of avoiding  federal  constitutional  adjudication,
for a federal judge to abstain if in the absence  of abstention  he
would rule that Y were  the state  law meaning  than  if he would
rule it were X.  Of course since either ruling could also adversely
132But cf. Baggett v. Bullitt,  377  U.S. 360, 378 (1964).
133 See note  129 supra & accompanying  text.
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affect a  state  law  program,  the fact that the constitutional  issue
is  not  a sensitive  one  should  not in  this  setting be  controlling.
If  meaning X is not sensitive because it is clearly unconstitution-
al but it is not at all clear whether meaning X is the correct mean-
ing,  abstention  might  avoid  invalidation  of  the  statute.
134  Or
if meaning X is  likely to be found constitutional  but that mean-
ing  may  narrow  the  statute  in  an  important  respect  that  the
state  may  not have  intended,  the illegitimate  interference  with
a state program that adopting that meaning would  cause might
justly lead the federal court to abstain.
As in  authorization  cases,  it may be justifiable  in  construc-
tion  cases  to  abstain  somewhat  more  readily  when  it  appears
that  the  case  will  turn  ultimately  on  the  state  law  issue  and
need  not  return  to  the  federal  forum  than  when  it  appears
that  a  constitutional  question  will  survive  the  state  court  ad-
judication,  since  in  the  former  cases  abstention  is  likely  to  be
less  expensive  to  the  parties  than  in  the  latter.  When  each  of
two  possible  constructions  is  attacked  as  unconstitutional,
however,  this  distinction  cannot  operate;  in  all  such  cases  a
judge  should  be  slightly  less  ready  to  abstain.  When  one  is
attacked as unconstitutional and the other is not, a judge should
be  slightly  more  ready  to abstain  when  he  believes  indications
are  that  the  state  judiciary  would  choose  the  meaning  that
does  not  raise  the  constitutional  issue  than  when  he  believes
the  state judiciary  would  rule  in such  a  way  that  the constitu-
tional  issue  remains.  Of  course,  the  clearer  it  is  that  the
state  judiciary  would  choose  a  particular  meaning,  the  less
necessary  is  abstention,  for  the  federal  judge  need  fear  less
that  he  would  be  in  error.  Moreover,  if the judge  considers
state  law  utterly  ambiguous,  the  suggested  distinction  should
not  operate,  since,  in  cases  of utter  ambiguity,  the  ruling  he
would  make  is  in  no  way  predictive  of  whether  the  state
judiciary  would  dispose  finally  of the  controversy.  As  in  au-
thorization  cases,  it  is  only  when  state  law  is  neither  clear  nor
utterly  ambiguous  that  a  federal judge  should  abstain  more
readily  when  indications  are  that  state  courts  will  dispose  fi-
nally of the controversy  than when  indications  of equal  weight
suggest  that  a  constitutional  question  will  survive  the  state
adjudication.
'
34But cf. text accompanying notes  140-43 infra.
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c.  Abstention in Cases of Clear  Federal Unconstitutionality  to
Allow the State to Save Its Program
In Constantineau the  suggestion  that Wisconsin  state courts
could  construe  their  statute  to require  notice  and hearing  was
put  forward  by  Justice  Black  even  though  the  state  had  not
argued  that its  statute  could be  so  construed  and even  though
Justice  Black  knew  of no  particular  state  provision  that  might
provide  the  needed  procedural  safeguards.  He  thought never-
theless  that, given  the chance,  the Wisconsin  courts would  cor-
rect  the  statute  by  finding  the  safeguards  in  "the  body  of
other  state  law"  simply  because  without  those  safeguards  the
statute  was  blatantly  unconstitutional. 135  Even  though  clear
federal  unconstitutionality  should  not  support  abstaining  so
that  state  courts  may  hold  that  state  law  does  not  authorize
a  challenged  enactment,
13 6  clear  federal  unconstitutionality
might arguably support abstention in construction cases. For if a
federal  court  correctly  predicts  that  the  clear  unconstitution-
ality  of one  construction  of the  state  enactment  will  lead  the
state  court  to  adopt  the  other  construction,  abstention  would
appear  to  serve  the  interest  of 'saving  a  statute  that  would
otherwise  be  ruled  in  violation  of  the  Federal  Constitution.
It probably is  true that when a state enactment  is obviously
unconstitutional  if  read  one  way  and  can  survive  if  read
another,  a  state  court  is  likely  to  give  it  the  constitutional
reading.  In  construction  cases  involving  a  choice  between  two
possible  meanings  of a  state  enactment,  each  of which  seems
relatively  plausible,  the  element  of  clear  federal  unconstitu-
tionality  of  one  meaning  probably,  therefore,  justifies  the
federal  court  itself deciding  that  the  state  courts  would  adopt
the  constitutional  meaning,  instead  of abstaining  for that state
decision.  But when  the  construction  that quite  clearly  appears
federally  unconstitutional  also  quite  clearly  appears  to  be
correct-either  on  the  face  of the  enactment  or  on  the  basis
of  state  law  generally-difficulties  inhere  in  federal  court
decision of the state  issue.  A state court  in that situation  might
well  choose  to  strain  the  meaning  of the  state  enactment  in
order  to  preserve  its  constitutionality.'
37  The  incentive  to  do
135  400 U.S. at 445.
136 See note  111 supra.
137  For  a  case  in  which  a  state  supreme  court  "performed  a  remarkable  job  of
plastic  surgery  upon  the  face  of the ordinance"  by  giving  it  "an extraordinarily  nar-
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so  will,  of  course,  be  greatest  when  the  enactment  concerns
a  program  of  importance  to  the  state  and  one  that  would
suffer  much  from  interruption. 138  It  seems  preferable  for  a
federal  court  to  abstain  to  allow  the  state judiciary  to  adopt  a
relatively  implausible  construction  than  for  the  federal  court
to  render  that  result  itself. There  may  well  be  limits  on  the
extent  to which  state  courts  will  strain  the meaning  of statutes
to  adopt a  constitutional  construction,  and  the federal  court  is
apt  to  lack  guidance  concerning  the  range  of those  limits.  It
would  be  an  illegitimate  interference  with  state  policy  to  re-
quire  a  statute  to  conform  to  constitutional  requisites  if state
officials  would  prefer  no  statute  at  all.  And  even  if a  federal
judge  confidently  believes  that  the  state  court  would  adopt  a
constitutional  construction,  it  may  be  difficult  to  document
that  belief on  the  basis  of traditional  legal  evidence,  evidence
he  may  feel  is  particularly  important  when  he  is  interpreting
state  law  to  bear a meaning  other than  its evident  one.  Finally,
it  may  be  difficult  to  predict  the  manner  in  which  the  state
judicial  system  will  construe  state  law  when  a  strained  con-
struction  is  necessary;  a federal  decision  on a different  ground
than  the  state  decision  would  be  may  have  a  scope  quite  dif-
ferent  than  the  state  decision  it  precludes.  Even  if a  federal
court  confidently  believes  that  the  state judiciary  will  construe
a challenged  state  enactment  very  freely  in  order  to  preserve
it  against  constitutional  attack,  therefore,  it  may  justifiably
conclude  that  the  state  instead  of the  federal judiciary  should
reach  that result.'
39
d.  The State's Ability to Correct  Some Erroneous  Decisions
Through Administrative  Action
Although  a  federal  court  may  feel  unable  itself to  adopt
a strained  construction even when it believes  state courts would
do so,  in some  situations  it  may  be  possible  instead for  it sim-
ply  to adopt  the  apparent  and unconstitutional  reading  of the
row construction,"  see Shuttlesworth  v.  Birmingham,  394 U.S.  147,  150,  153 (1969).
138 Other  factors  increasing  the  incentive  would  be  that the strained  construction
that  must  be  adopted  either  (I)  allows  the  maximum  that  is  constitutionally  permis-
sible  for  the  state  so  that  it  does  not  unnecessarily  limit  the  state  program  or  (2)
does  not  deviate  in  any  way  that  seems  of  great  importance  to  the  state  from  the
apparent  construction  or  at  least  from  the  closest  thing  to  it  that  is  constitutionally
permissible.
139 This  reasoning  may  conceivably  support  the  decision  to  abstain  in  Lake  Car-
riers'  Ass'n v. MacMullan,  406 U.S. 498  (1972).ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
state  enactment  without  causing  any  significant  harm  to  state
interests.  Constantineau is  a  case  in  which  abstention  for  the
purpose  of saving the  state  enactment or avoiding interference
with  its  operation  would  have  been  inappropriate  because  it
was  Ainnecessary;  even  if the  federal  court  was  in  error  in  its
state  law  ruling,  the state  should  have been  able  to correct the
error without delaying the enforcement of its posting statute.
It  is  generally  the  case  that  a  state  can  save  its  statutory
program  when  a  state  statute  may  be  construed  to  be  either
constitutional  or  unconstitutional  and  a  federal  court  errone-
ously  adopts  an  unconstitutional  construction.  One  obvious
method  is  legislative  enactment  of  another  statute  in  which
the  construction  the  legislature  desires  is  explicit,  a  method
that  is  available  whether  the  federal  court's  reading  of  the
earlier  statute  was  correct  or  erroneous.  A  second  method  is
to  take  the  issue  of the  statute's  meaning  to  state  court.  Both
methods,  however,  require  the  elimination  of  the  state  pro-
gram  pending  the  corrective  measures;  it is  wrongful  interfer-
ence  during that period that abstention  is  designed to  prevent.
If  after the  federal  decision  in Constantineau, however, the
state  attorney  general  believed,  with  Justice  Black,  that  the
Supreme  Court  was  wrong  in  holding  that  state  law  did  not
require  notice  and  hearing,  or  even  if he believed  simply  that
a  plausible  argument  could  be  made  to  that  effect,  he  should
have  been  able  to effectuate  those  requirements  without  delay
by  simply  informing those  enforcing  the  statute  not to  invoke
it  without  providing  notice  and  hearing. 14 0  In  a  situation  like
Constantineau, there  is  no  federal-law  bar  to  having  state  offi-
cials  thus  save  the  statute  by  operating  under  it  without  its
140  The  possibility  of  a  state  through  administrative  action  correcting  an  erro-
neous  federal  court  ruling  without  delay  exists  only  in construction  cases.  In  authori-
zation  cases  state  officers  cannot  ever  wholly  remedy  a  federal  court  error  on  state
law  without  judicial  or  legislative  proceedings.  Even  when  the  federal  court  erro-
neously  invalidates  a  state  enactment  because  of  a  provision  that  can  be  removed
without  abandoning  the  entire  statutory  program,  the  federal  court's  error  illegiti-
mately  limits  the  state's  program.  Suppose,  for example,  that  the  issue  is  the  legality
under  state  and  federal  law  of a  posting  procedure  that  does  not provide  for  notice
and  hearing,  and  that  the  federal  court  avoids  the  federal  constitutional  issue  by
ruling  that  the  state  constitution  invalidates  the  procedure.  If the  federal  court  is
in  error in  construing the  state  constitution  to require  notice  and  hearing, then  even
though  state  officials  can  save  the  state  program  by  providing  those  safeguards,  the
federal  court  has  illegitimately  imposed  those  procedures  upon  the  state.  Only  if
the  Federal  Constitution  as  well  requires  the  procedures-an  issue  the  court  has  by
hypothesis not decided-has the court not wrongfully limited the state program.
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constitutional  defects.  The  injunction  issued  pursuant  to  the
federal  decision  of unconstitutionality  should  not  extend  be-
yond  prohibiting  enforcement  of  the  statute  without  notice
and  hearing;  if  it  does,  the  order  should  be  amendable  on
the  motion  of  the  proper  state  official.  Admittedly,  the  Su-
preme  Court  held  the  statute unconstitutional  and  not  simply
the  police  chief's  conduct,  but  the  only  reason  it  did  so  was
that it deemed  state  law  to be correctly  reflected  in the actions
of  the  state  officials,  and  state  officials  need  not  accept  the
federal interpretation.
Of course,  erroneous  construction  decisions  are  not always
correctible  at  an  administrative  level;  there  are  instances  in
which  it would offend  a federal  interest for  a state to continue
to  enforce  in  any  way  a  statute  that  the  federal  system  has
held  unconstitutional. 141  Whether  a  program  is  administrative-
ly  correctible  will  often be  a  difficult issue  in  itself. In  making
that  determination,  a  court  must  ask whether,  on  the  facts  of
the  particular  program,  any  person  may  be  detrimentally  af-
fected  by  state  alteration  of  the  federal  construction  at  an
administrative  instead  of  a judicial  level.  Constantineau appears
to  satisfy  that  criterion  because  no  federally  protected  interest
is  impinged  upon by having  a statute that does  not reflect that
notice  and  hearing will  be provided  if in fact  those  safeguards
are provided.
142
Whenever  a  program  is  administratively  correctible-not
simply in situations  of clear  federal unconstitutionality-absten-
tion should  not be  ordered  for the  purpose  of avoiding  inter-
14'  An  obvious  example  is  a  federal  court  holding  a  statute  regulating  speech
unconstitutionally  overbroad  because  it  proscribes  some  activities  that cannot  be  so
regulated.  See,  e.g.,  Cramp  v.  Board  of  Public  Instruction,  368  U.S.  278  (1961);
Thornhill  v.  Alabama,  310  U.S.  88  (1940).  When  the  overbreadth  inheres  in  the
wording  of  the  statute,  it  is  unlikely  that  state  officials  could  constitutionally  save
the  statute by  enforcing it  simply  where  the regulation  was  permissible;  nor, indeed,
in  all  probability,  could  the  state judiciary  save  the  statute  by  construing  it  to  apply
only  to  the  nonprotected  conduct.  As  a  matter  of  federal  constitutional  law,  there
is  an interest  in  not  having on  the books  an  enactment  that appears  to regulate  first
amendment  activity  that  it  is  not  permitted  to  regulate,  thus  "chilling"  constitu-
tionally protected conduct.  Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.  479, 486-87, 494  (1965).
142 The  only  argument  that administrative  instead  of judicial  correction  in  Con-
stantineau might  violate  procedural  due  process  is  that persons  aware  of the  Supreme
Court's  apparent  voiding of the statute  would  not have  notice  that  any  posting  pro-
cedure  remained.  Even  if a  state  could not  constitutionally  have  a  posting  procedure
without  embodying  it  in  statutory  form,  however,  the  argument  fails,  for  if  persons
are deemed  to  have notice  of the  Supreme  Court decision they should  also be deemed
to  have  notice  of the  limits  of the  decision's  effect,  and  one  of those  is  its  ability to
be corrected at an administrative  level.
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ference  with  the  program,  since  an  erroneous  federal  adjudi-
cation  does  not  necessitate  its  interruption.  But  there  is  the
difficulty  that  state  officials  may  not feel  free  so  to act  on  the
interpretation  of state  law  that  the  federal  court  has  rejected.
They  may be unaware  that federal law  leaves them that option;
or  state  law  may in  fact  preclude  correction  of a  federal  error
except  through the  state judiciary  or legislature.  State  officials'
ignorance  can be  handled  by enlightenment,  but state  law pre-
clusion  of  administrative  correction  presents  a  more  difficult
problem.  Such  state  provisions  causing  the  federal  decision
to  have  a  disruptive  effect  might  be  ignored  by  the  federal
system  as  matters  of state  choice. 143  When  a  federal  court  is
aware,  however, that as  a  practical matter its decision, if wrong,
could  seriously  hamper  an  important  state  program, that  real-
ity may influence it to abstain.
6.  The Application of the Abstention Policies in Cases
Apparently  Involving Construction  in Which
Conduct Under Authority of the Ambiguous
Provision Is Also at Issue
The  discussion  of  construction  cases  has  concerned  the
situation  in  which  a  plaintiff  challenges  a  state  enactment
under  the  Federal  Constitution  and  it  is  not  clear  what  that
enactment  means.  When  in  addition  conduct  has  occurred
under  the  authority  of the  enactment  and  the  plaintiff's  con-
stitutional  challenge  is  leveled  at  the  enactment  on  the  theory
that  its  meaning  is  consistent  with  such  conduct,  the  analysis
changes.  Constantineau  again  provides  an  example.  Assume
that  Justice  Black  was  correct  in  believing  that  the  body  of
Wisconsin  law  did  not  clarify  whether  the  challenged  statute
contemplated  a  notice  and  hearing  procedure  or  not.  It  was
nevertheless  clear  that  the  chief  of police  had  acted  without
providing  notice  and  hearing  in  Ms.  Constantineau's  case,  af-
fecting  her  rights  just  as  if  his  interpretation  of  the  statute
were  a  correct  one.  Because  he  had  acted  in  the  manner  al-
leged  to  be  unconstitutional,  abstention  was  less  appropriate
than  if no  such  action  under  the  enactment  had  taken  place.
Of all  the  types  of  cases  considered  in  this  Article,  the
143 Since  the  interest  protected  by  abstaining  for  this  purpose  is  solely  that  of
the  state,  it  is  not  problematic  for  the  state  to  have  within  its  control  the  ability  to
waive  that protection. See text accompanying  notes  196-204 infra.
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argument  for abstention  is  most persuasive  when  the meaning
of the challenged  enactment  is  ambiguous  and no action  taken
under the  enactment  is  challenged.  In  those cases,  even  if the
plaintiff's  argument  as  to  federal  unconstitutionality  is  a  cor-
rect  one,  it is  not certain  that any  unconstitutional  state  action
has  taken  place. 144  If  in  Constantineau, before  the  police  chief
had  taken  any  action,  the  plaintiff  had  attacked  the  statute's
constitutionality  because  of  its  apparent  failure  to  provide
procedural  safeguards,  there  would  be  no  unconstitutional
state  action,  even  assuming  the  plaintiff's  constitutional  con-
tention  was  sound, if the  plaintiff  was  wrong on  her  state  law
point  that  the  statutory  scheme  did  not  provide  notice  and
hearing.  If  in  that situation  the  federal court  made  an errone-
ous  state  law  ruling,  it  would  render  a  totally  hypothetical
federal  constitutional  decision-one  relating  to  a  state  law  sit-
uation  that  simply  did  not  exist.  That  cannot  result  in  cases
in  which  a state  official  has  acted  in accordance  with the  chal-
lenged  meaning.  In Constantineau as  it  actually  occurred,  there
is  no  doubt  that if it is  unconstitutional  not  to  provide  notice
and  hearing,  unconstitutional  state  action  had  taken  place.
The  only  unknown  is  whether  the  unconstitutional  action  is
attributable  to  the  state  legislature  or  solely  to  the  chief  of
police.
145
An  argument  can  be  made  that  in  the  situation  in  which
the police chief  has acted  a court  should  necessarily  pass  upon
the  constitutionality  of  that  action  instead  of  abstaining.  In
that  situation,  the argument runs,  one  or the  other of two  hy-
potheses  is  true,  and  under  neither  is  abstention  proper.  If
the  interpretation  of the  enactment  that the  police  chief acted
on  does  in  fact  reflect  the  enactment's  meaning,  abstention
is  unnecessary  because  a federal  court passing on the constitu-
tionality  of  that  interpretation  by  hypothesis  will  make  no
'  Many  such  cases  may  accordingly  involve  issues  of ripeness  or  standing.  It  is
not  necessary,  however,  for  a  case  to  be justiciable,  that  the  challenged  enactment
have been acted upon. Cf. Epperson v. Arkansas,  393 U.S.  97  (1968).
'14  The  same  point  may  be  conceptualized  as  a  difference  in  the  ambiguity  of
the  challenged  state  action  in  the  two  instances.  In  both  the  case  in  which  the  suit
is  brought  before  the  police  chief's  action  and  the  one  in  which  it  is  brought  after
the  action,  the  state  enactment  is  ambiguous  as  to  whether  notice  and  hearing  are
required.  In  the  latter  instance,  however,  though  the  statute  is  ambiguous,  there  is
state  action  that  is  the  subject of attack  as  to  which  there  is  no  ambiguity:  the  con-
duct  of  the  chief  of  police,  who  invoked  the  procedure  without  the  procedural
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error  in interpreting state law.  And  if instead the  police chief's
action  does  not  reflect  the  statute's  meaning,  abstention  is
improper,  according  to  the  argument,  because  the  constitu-
tional  attack  is  not  levied  against  the  enactment  but  simply
against  conduct  by  a  state  official.  If  Pullman  abstention  is
improper  when  it  is  an  individual  state  official's  action  that
is  the  object  of the  constitutional  attack,  a  per  se  rule  against
abstention  in  the  category  of  cases  under  discussion  would
therefore follow.
The  Pullman  doctrine  has  not  generally  been  invoked
when  it  is  an  individual  official's  conduct  that  is  challenged,
and  a  case  can  be  made  that  the  doctrine  is  concerned  with
constitutional  attacks  on  state  enactments  and  not  simply  on
unconstitutional  conduct  by  state  officials.1 4 6  But  any  such
limitation  on  the  doctrine  would  be  irrational.  Its  rationale
could  not  be  simply  that,  the  state  official  having  acted,  no
ambiguity  concerning  the  allegedly  unconstitutional  state  ac-
tion  exists;
147  that rationale  would  distinguish  such  cases  from
construction  cases  in  which  no  conduct  under  the  challenged
enactment has  occurred,  but it does  not distinguish them  from
authorization  cases.  In  authorization  cases  as  well,  the  chal-
146 Such  a  limitation  does  exist  in  the jurisdiction  of three-judge  courts.  See  28
U.S.C.  §§  2281-82  (1970).  Supreme  Court  cases  do  not discuss  whether  it  is  a limita-
tion  on  Pullman  abstention  as  well,  but  they  almost  invariably  involve  challenges  to
enactments  or  administrative  orders  and  not  solely  individual  officials'  action.  Some
commentators  refer  to  Pullman abstention  as  applicable  to  challenges  to  "state  leg-
islative  or  administrative  action."  See,  e.g.,  ALI  STUDY,  supra note  33,  at  282,  284;
Wechsler,  supra note  29,  at  229.  But  "administrative  action"  may  well  embrace  the
actions  of  individual  officials.  If  abstention  were  permissible  for  constitutional  chal-
lenges  to  individual  actions,  it  should  perhaps  have  been  considered  in  a  case  like
Monroe  v.  Pape,  365  U.S.  167  (1961),  in  which  the  plaintiffs,  who  sought  damages
under  the Federal  Civil  Rights  Act  against  Chicago  police  officers,  might  have  raised
similar  claims  under  the  Illinois  statutes  and  constitution.  Id. at  172.  Either  abstain-
ing  or  deciding  state  issues  might  have  enabled  the  federal  court  to  avoid  constitu-
tional  decisionmaking  if  the  state  damage  remedy  was  as  extensive  as  the  federal
remedy  and if the  two were  exclusive  of each other.  Yet  without mention  of the  pos-
sibility,  the  Court  proceeded  to  the  federal  issues.  That  the  petitioners  raised  only
federal  issues  is  insufficient  to  explain  why  abstention  was  not  considered,  for  in
other  contexts  abstention  has  been  considered  on  the  Court's  own  motion  when  no
claim  under  state  law  was  made.  See  e.g.,  Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau,  400  U.S.  433
(1971)  (dissenting  opinions);  cf.  England  v.  Louisiana  State  Bd.  of  Medical  Exam-
iners,  375  U.S.  411  (1964).  See  text accompanying  notes  196-98  infra. The  fact  that
the  suit  was  for  damages  rather  than  an  injunction  likewise  does  not  explain  the
failure  to  consider  abstaining.  See  Fornaris  v.  Ridge  Tool  Co.,  400  U.S.  41  (1970),
and  text  accompanying  notes  177-95  infra. And  no  exception  to  the Pullman absten-
tion  doctrine  exists  for  actions  brought  under  the  Civil  Rights  Act.  See  Harrison  v.
NAACP,  360 U.S. 167  (1950);  notes 162-66 infra & accompanying  text.
14
7 See note 145 supra.
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lenged  state action-though  it is  a  state  enactment  rather than
an  individual  official's  action-may  be  perfectly  clear  and  the
uncertain  question of state  law  is  whether  that action  is  autho-
rized.  Cases  attacking  an  individual  official's  conduct  can  thus
be  conceptualized  as  authorization  cases;  the  state  law  issue  is
whether  the  official's  conduct  was  consistent  with  state  law  or
inconsistent with it.
If there  is to be a difference in treatment between  the cases
under  discussion  and  authorization  cases  that  are  appropriate
for  abstention,  it  must  center  solely  on  the  fact  that  it  is  an
individual  state  officer's  action  which  is  attacked  as  unconsti-
tutional  in one category  of cases  and  which may or may not be
consistent  with  state  law,  while  in  the  other  category  of  cases
it is  a state enactment  which  is  attacked  as unconstitutional  and
which  may  or  may  not  be  consistent  with  state  law.  It  may
appear  plausible  to  maintain  this differentiation  for abstention
purposes  because  one  objective  of the  Pullman doctrine  is  to
protect  against  improvident  interference  with  ongoing  state
programs  that  reflect  state  legislative  policy.  While  state  stat-
utes  and  administrative  orders  represent  ongoing  programs
and reflect  state legislative  policy,  an individual  official's  action,
if not sanctioned by statute,  does not rise to that level.14 8
But this  difference  would  affect  the  way  that  the  absten-
tion  policies  operate  in  the  two  categories  of  cases  only  if  it
meant  that,  in  cases  challenging  individual  officials'  actions,
an  ongoing  state  program  that reflected  state  legislative  policy
could  not be  harmed  by  an  erroneous  federal  court ruling. If
that were  true,  it would  mean  that, in  cases  involving  individ-
ual  officers'  conduct,  the  only  policy  that  abstention  could
serve  would  be avoidance  of unnecessary  federal constitutional
adjudication, whereas  in cases involving  state  enactments  either
policy  behind  the  abstention  doctrine  could  be  served.  It  is
unclear  why,  even  if that were  true, abstention  should  be  pre-
cluded,  since  in  any  particular  authorization  case  abstention
will  serve  only  one  of  the  policies  behind  the  Pullman  doc-
trine.' 49  But in  any  event,  it is  not correct  that a  state  legisla-
tive  program  cannot  be  adversely  affected  in  an  illegitimate
way  by  an  erroneous  state  law  decision  in  a  case  involving  a
148  Cf  Phillips  v.  United  States,  312  U.S.  246  (1941),  applying  the  similar  lim-
itation in the three-judge  court act. See note  146 supra.
149  See  text  accompanying  notes  114-18  supra  & text  accompanying  notes  169-76
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constitutional  attack  on  an  individual  state  official's  action.
If  the  federal court erroneously  decides  that  the official's  con-
duct  is  not  authorized,  it  thereby  interprets  state  law  to  be
narrower  than  it is  and binds  the  state  by  that adjudication  to
the same extent as in other authorization  cases.' 50
Of course,  when  individual  conduct  is  the  subject  of chal-
lenge, if the federal court rules that the conduct  is inconsistent
with state law  and it is correct  in that ruling, no state legislative
policy  will  suffer;  only a deviation  from that policy  on the part
of an  individual  officer, or a  group  of individual  officers,  will
be  stricken down.  Cases  like Pullman in which  state enactments
are  at  issue  differ.  In  those  cases,  state  legislative  policy  will
be stricken down  even if the federal court  is correct  in its state
law  ruling,  though  by  hypothesis  it  will  be  a  state  legislative
policy  that,  for  other  reasons  of state  law,  it  was  illegitimate
for  the  enacting  body  to  make.  But  this  difference  between
cases  involving  state  enactments  and  those  involving  individual
officials  should  not  affect  the  application  of  the  abstention
doctrine,  since  that  doctrine's  purposes  are  accomplished  only
in  the  event  that the  federal  court  is  incorrect  in  its  state law
holding.
In short,  abstention  should  be  ordered  in  cases  involving
challenges  to individual  officials'  actions  on the  same  basis that
it  is  ordered  in  authorization  cases;  in  both  these  categories
the  case  for  abstention  is  weaker  than  in  construction  cases
in which conduct has not occurred. 151
150 To  use  the  Constantineau example,  a  federal  court  that  avoided  the  federal
constitutional  question  and  held  that  state  law  precluded  the  police  chief from  acting
without notice  and  hearing  would,  if  it  was  wrong  about  the  meaning  of state  law,
narrow  the  meaning  of the  state  statute.  Unless  the  state  statute  happened  in  any
event  to  be  federally  unconstitutional,  it  would  thereby  illegitimately  narrow  the
state program.
15t  While  the  hypothetical  character  of a  federal  decision  makes  abstention  most
appropriate  in  construction  cases  where  conduct  has  not  occurred,  see  text  accom-
panying  notes  144-45  supra,  on  that  ground  it  is  roughly  equally  appropriate  in
authorization  cases  and  in  construction  cases  where  conduct  has  occurred.  Perhaps
as  a  category,  the  last  group  is  slightly  less  appropriate  for  abstention  than  authori-
zation  cases,  for  in  construction  cases  in  which  conduct  has  occurred,  by  definition,
a  state  official  has  necessarily  affected  the plaintiff  in  the  same  way  as  if  his  action
were  authorized.  In authorization  cases,  that may  or may  not be the  situation.  On  the
facts  of Pullman, for example,  porters might or  might  not be already  affected  by  the
state  action  challenged  as  unconstitutional,  depending  upon  whether  it  had  already
been put into effect.
The  effect  on  the  parties  of delaying  adjudication  should  be taken  into  account
in  an  abstention  decision,  but more  is  involved  than  simply  inquiring  whether  the
allegedly  unconstitutional  action  currently  affects  them.  It  should  also  be  relevant
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7.  Summary of Suggested Rules for Applying Current
Requirements That State Law  Be Unclear and That It  Be
Susceptible  to an Interpretation That Would Avoid a
Federal Constitutional Question
a.  Authorization Cases
Before  abstaining  in  an  authorization  case,  the  federal
judge  should  ascertain  whether  abstaining  will  serve  any  pur-
pose by  determining which  way he would  rule  on the state law
issue  in  the  absence  of abstention.  If  he  would  hold  the  pro-
gram  unauthorized,  so  that  abstention  might  prevent  inter-
ference  with  a state  program,  he should  ascertain  also whether
the  program would  suffer irreparable  harm from interruption.
The  greater  the  harm, the more  this  factor weighs  in  favor of
abstention;  but  in  any  event  a  significant  degree  of  harm
should  be  required.  Similarly,  if  the  judge  would  hold  the
program  authorized,  so  that  abstention  might  avoicd  unneces-
sary  constitutional  adjudication,  he  should  determir  whether
the  constitutional  question  is  one  that  it  is  especially  lesirable
to  avoid  adjudicating.  The  more  desirable  it  is  to  avoid,  the
more this factor weighs in favor of abstention.
When  a  constitutional  question  is  not  particularly  difficult
or  sensitive  and  would  dispose  of the  case,  the  federal  court
should  not  abstain  regardless  of how  unclear  state  law  is  and
how  it would  rule  on  the  state  law  issue.  Instead  (unless  the
state  issue  is  even  clearer  than  the  federal  issue  and  also  is
dispositive),  it should  rest its  decision  on the federal  issue.  But
the  rules  may  differ  if the  federal issue,  though clear  and not
sensitive,  is  also not dispositive.  In that case,  it may be permis-
sible  to  order  abstention  if the  state  issue  is  unclear  and  the
federal  court  would  hold  the  enactment  unauthorized, 152  but
not if the issue is  clear or if the court would hold  it authorized.
how important  is the  respect in which it affects  them and how  much swift adjudication
will  ameliorate  their  situation.  For  those  reasons  and  because  authorization  cases
can  involve  completed  state  conduct,  it  seems  desirable  in  deciding  whether  to  ab-
stain  to  inquire  in  each  case  whether  the parties'  situation  is or  is  not one  in  which
swift  adjudication  is  particularly  desirable  to  them,  rather  thaA  to  make  abstention
more  readily  available  in  authorization  cases  as  a  class  than  in  cases  involving  com-
pleted  conduct  by  individual  officials.  Similar  reasoning  supports  not  limiting  'ab-
stention  to  construction  cases  in which  conduct  has  not  occurred.  See  note  173  infra.
152 The  permissibility  of  abstention  in  this  situation  depends  largely  upon  the
appealability  of abstention  orders. See note  123 supra.ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
The above  factors usually require  a federal judge  to deter-
mine  how he would  rule in  a particular case  before  he decides
the abstention  question. Even if state  law  is entirely ambiguous,
so  the judge  lacks  any  confidence  that  his  ruling  is  correct,
by  making  the  determination  he  can  eliminate  purposeless
abstention.  The  judge  can  avoid  prejudging  the  state  issue
if  he  decides  that  the  facts  of the  case  warrant  abstention  to
fulfill  either abstention  policy.  Or,  in  the  very  rare  case,  he
may  conclude  that  the  costs  of  determining  the  state  issue
prior  to  abstaining  outweigh  the  costs  of  a  possibly  purpose-
less abstention.
While  the  necessity  of prejudging  the  state  issue  generally
obtains  no  matter  how  unclear  that  issue  is,  there  is  another
abstention  factor  that  is  relevant  only  when  the  state  issue
though still unclear  is not wholly  ambiguous:  In cases involving
such  a  state  issue,  the  argument  for  abstention  is  somewhat
stronger  if  the  enactment  appears  unauthorized  than  if  it
appears  'athorized.  If  the  indications  of  how  state  courts
would  r('  are  strong,  however,  abstention  is  improper  be-
cause  th.  likelihood  of an  erroneous  federal  result is  slight. 15
153  The  following  diagram  suggests  some  of  the  factors  relating  to  abstention
decisions in authorization  cases:
State Law  Constitutional question
Fed. CL would hold  Fed. CL  would  hold
authorized  unauthorized
clearly authorized  dearly constitutional
basis of  established
not otherwise sens~w  Abstention
possible only when case falls
in gray area on
both issues.  (if
-the  lighter area,
the case for ab-
stention  is aided
tsate  if  the other is
pr-  ran from  rin  the darker
delay  area. If both
issues are in
no harm  great harm  the fringe  areas
abstention may
clearly unconstitutional on  be improper.)
dearly un-  the basis of  established law
L_  authorized  and not otherwise sensitive
Cases  involving  state  law  authorization  are  placed  on  the  "state  law"  spectrum  ac-
cording  to  how  clear  the  state  law issue  appears  to  the federal judge. The  spectrum
extends  from  clearly  authorized  to  clearly  unauthorized  state  enactments,  with  the
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b.  Construction Cases
If  there  are  two  possible  readings  of the state  law  at issue
and  if both  meanings  are  alleged  to  violate  the  same  federal
constitutional  provision  in  precisely  the  same  way,  abstention
is  inappropriate,  and  regardless  of the  ambiguity  of the  state
law  issue,  the  federal  court should  proceed  immediately  to  the
federal  constitutional  question.  In the  usual  case  in  which  the
court  must  first  decide  the  state  law  issue,  however,  it should
abstain  only  if that issue  is  very unclear.  Even  then  the federal
court  should  not  abstain  if two  conditions  both  exist:  first,  if
the  state  law  meaning  the  federal  court  would  adopt  is  either
clearly  unconstitutional  or  clearly  constitutional  on  the  basis
of established  and  nonsensitive  federal  constitutional  doctrine;
second,  if the  state  program  is  such  that  an  erroneous  federal
court  construction  can  be  corrected  without  delay,  or  if  the
program  will  not  suffer  any  irreparable  harm  from  any  delay
caused  by  the  error  limiting  or  invalidating  it.  In  that  situa-
tion, though there may be error on the state law issue, it cannot
significantly  affect  any  interest  that  the  abstention  doctrine  is
designed  to  protect.  It should  be  noted  that where  the federal
issue  is  clear  and  not  sensitive,  no  differentiation  is  made
among cases according  to how the constitutional  issue  would be
decided.  Construction  cases  are  unlike  authorization  cases  in
this  respect  because  in  construction  cases,  whichever  way  the
federal  court  rules  on the  federal  issue,  its  ruling  will  dispose
of the controversy.
Abstention  should  be  permissible  when  state  law  is  highly
ambiguous  and  the  above  conditions  are  not  present.  The
degree  of  ambiguity  required  may  be  less  as  the  sensitivity
of the  federal  constitutional  issue  increases,  or  as  the  harm  to
the state program  that an  erroneous  federal construction might
cause  increases;  but  in  any  event  substantial  ambiguity  is
required.
154
Abstention  is  slightly  more  justifiable  when  it  appears
that  the  state  court  decision  will  be  dispositive-that  it  will
cases  where  state  law  is  utterly  ambiguous  on  the  authorization  issue  falling  in  the
middle.  The  federal  constitutional  issue-whether  the  challenged  state  enactment,
authorized  by  state  law  or  not,  violates  the  Constitution-is  placed  on  a  similar  spec-
trum  according  to the  degree  to which  it  appears  clear  and/or  sensitive  to  the judge
making the abstention decision.
154 The following diagram embodies  the principles  thus far articulated:
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choose  a  state  meaning  to  which  no  constitutional  challenge
is made-than  when it does  not. Finally,  when  a state program
appears  clearly  unconstitutional  in some  respects  but  is  a  pro-
gram  that a  strained  construction  of state  law  might  save  and
that  would  be  important  to  state  interests  to  save,  abstention
may be proper  to  enable the  state judiciary  so  to save the pro-
gram,  if  the  program  is  one  that  cannot  be  corrected  at  an
administrative  level.
c.  Construction Cases in Which Conduct Under the Ambiguous
Enactment Is Also at Issue.
Abstention  should  operate  in  the  same  manner  in  these
cases as in authorization cases.
C.  A  Countervailing  Factor-The  Relevance of a Public Interest
in Swift Adjudication of the Federal Constitutional  Issue
Even  when  the  factors  suggested  above  would  mandate
abstention, the nature of the federal  constitutional  issue should
State  Law  Constitutional question
clearly constitutional and otherwise
not  sensitive
clearly] X
utterly ambiguous or otherwise sensitive
pnoharm  'great  harm  4
an  o  sdearly  unonstitutional  and otherwise
amountof  :/not  sensitive
harm to  nitv
state  we  s utterly  prga
unclear  from
construction  isu  early  constirdd  onal and otherwise
e  snot  sensitive
'no  arm  reatamnutterly 
ambiguous  or otherwise  sensitive
clearly Y
clearly unconstitutional and otherwise
not sensitive
When  constitutional issue is in gray area, abstention is permissible
only when state law issue  is in gray area.
When constitutional issue  is in black-bordered  area, abstention is permissible
w,,hen  state law issue is anywhere in black-bordered  area.
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sometimes  preclude  it.  There  is  some  recognition  in  the  case
law on abstention  that the impact of a delay in the adjudication
of  federal  rights  should  be  a  separate  factor  in  a  decision
whether  to abstain. In Baggett v. Bullitt1 55 and Zwickler v. Koota,  156
for  example,  the  Court held  abstention  improper  not  only  on
the  ground  that  the  statutes  there  involved  were  not  reason-
ably  susceptible  to  a  construction  that  would  avoid  the  consti-
tutional  questions  at  issue,  but  also  because  "in  [first  amend-
ment  cases]  . ..to  force  the  plaintiff who  has  commenced  a
federal  action  to  suffer  the  delay  of  state  court  proceedings
might  itself effect  the  impermissible  chilling  of the  very  con-
stitutional  right  he  seeks  to  protect."'157  And  Harman v.  Fors-
senius1 5 s  involved  an  attack  on  the  constitutionality  of newly
promulgated  state  voting  provisions  requiring,  as  a  condition
of voting  in  federal  elections,  that  a  person  either  pay  a  poll
tax  or  file  a  certificate  of  residence  six  months  before  the
election.  The  Court  said  it was proper not to  abstain,  not only
because  the  state  statutes  were  clear,  but  also  because  the  de-
privation alleged  was "fundamental," the "civil  rights of a broad
class  of  citizens"  were  affected,  and  the  forthcoming  election
made the problem  an immediate one. 59
Since  there  were  independent  reasons  not  to  abstain  in
all  the  cases  suggesting  the  nature  of the  federal  question  as
a  factor  in  abstention  decisions,  it  is  not  definitively  settled
that  such  a  factor  exists.  In  any  event  the  factor  should  be
recognized;  harmful  public  consequences  resulting  from  ab-
stention  should  be  weighed  in  the  balance  against  the  public
injury  that the abstention  is designed  to prevent. Clearly,  when
the  interest  abstention  would  serve  is  avoiding  federal  consti-
tutional adjudication, a court should consider, facts affirmatively
calling  for  swift  constitutional  decision  in  deciding  whether
to abstain.  The same  should be  true when-the  other abstention
policy  is  at  stake.  Just  as  there  may  be  an  especially  strong
state  need  in  a  particular  situation  not to  have  the status  quo
erroneously  changed,  so  in  some  situations  there  may  be  par-
155  377 U.S. 360 (1964).
156  389 U.S.  241  (1967).
157 389  U.S.  at 252.  See also  377  U.S.  at 379  (citing Smith  v.  California,  361  U.S.
147,  151  (1959)).
158 380 U.S.  528 (1965).
l
59 Id.  at  537.  See  also  Dombrowski  v.  Pfister,  380  U.S.  479,  489-90,  491-92
(1965), discussed in note  166 infra.
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ticular  need  to  change  the  status  quo  rapidly,  when  that is  to
be  the  ultimate  and  the  correct  disposition;  in  that  event  the
federal  interest  in  expeditious  decision  should  be  balanced
against the state interest.
16 0
The  question remains  which  federal  issues show  particular
need  for  swift adjudication.  The answer  depends  in part upon
the  factual  situation  in  each  particular  case just  as  the  factor
of harm  to a  state  program  does.  First amendment  issues  and
issues  pertaining  to  racial  discrimination  may be  the  most  ob-
vious  candidates  for  especially  expeditious  treatment,  as Bag-
gett, Zwickler,  and Harman might  indicate.  Some  commentators
have  considered  the  need  for  speedy  decision  of  particular
federal  issues  sufficiently  great  that  they  have  recommended
to  Congress  a  per  se  rule  precluding  abstention  when  those
issues  are  raised.16 1  And  some  language  in McNeese  v.  Board
of Education 62  could  support  an  argument  that  section  1983
(civil  rights)  actions  are  a  court-imposed  exception  to  the  ab-
stention  doctrine.163  That interpretation  would create  an  enor-
mous  exception  to  Pullman abstention,  for  today  virtually  all
constitutional  challenges  to action  under color  of state  law  can
160  It  may,  of  course,  happen  that  some  issues  calling  for  swift  adjudication  are
also  "sensitive,"  so  that  the nature  of the  constitutional  issue  theoretically  cuts  both
for  and against abstention  in the  same case.  Or possible  harm  to a state  program  that
might  be  avoided by  abstaining  may cut  in  favor  of abstention  though  an  interest  in
deciding  the  federal  constitutional  question  cuts  against  it.  These  observations  mili-
tate  against  a  per se  rule and  in  favor  of decisions  on  a case-by-case  basis,  in  which
all relevant factors  can be balanced.
161  When  advocating  a  general  rule  that the  presence  of an  adequate  state  rem-
edy  should  require  a litigant  to use the  state  rather than the  federal  forum,  Professor
Wechsler  also  suggested  an  exception  for "the  rights  of action  specially  conferred  by
Congress  in  the  Civil  Rights  Laws,"  because  "Congress  has  declared  the  historic
judgment  that  within  this  precious  area,  often  calling  for  a  trial  by jury,  there  is  to
be  no  slightest  risk of nullification  by  state  process."  Wechsler,  supra note 29  at  230.
The  American  Law  Institute  has  made  an  exception  to  its  abstention  proposal,  dis-
cussed  in  note  33  supra, for  "actions  to redress  the  denial,  under  color  of any  State
law,  statute,  ordinance,  regulation,  custom,  or  usage,  of the  right  to  vote  or  of the
equal  protection  of the  laws,  if such  denial  is  alleged to  be on  the basis of race,  creed,
color,  or  national  origin,"  ALI STUDY,  supra  note  33,  §  1371(g),  at 50,  because  "there
is an especially strong national interest in a federal  forum for such cases." Id. at 297.
162 373  U.S.  668 (1963).
163 In  McNeese  the  plaintiffs,  who  were  black,  claimed  they  were  racially  segre-
gated  in  the  Illinois  public  schools,  and  sought  to  enjoin  such  segregation.  The
state  provided  an  administrative  remedy  for  racial  segregation,  which  the  plaintiffs
had  not  exhausted.  The  Supreme  Court  held  that the  plaintiffs  could  come  directly
to  federal  court,  bypassing  both  state  administrative  and  judicial  remedies.  Justice
Douglas said for the Court:
Where  strands  of local  law  are  woven  into  the  case  that  is  before  the
federal  court,  we  have  directed  a  District  Court  to  refrain  temporarily  from
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be  brought  under  the  Civil  Rights  Act.'64  The  language  in,
McNeese  seems too slight a peg on which  to hang the exception,
and  other  cases  do  not support  a per  se  exception  either  for
exercising its jurisdiction  until a  suit could  be  brought  in the  state  court.  See
Railroad Comm'n  v.  Pullman  Co.,  312  U.S.  496;  Thompson  v.  Magnolia  Co.,
309  U.S.  478;  Harrison v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167.  Thus  we  have  stayed  the
hands of  a  Federal  District  Court  when  it sought  to  enjoin  enforcement  of
a  state  administrative  order  enforcing  state  law,  since  any  federal  question
could  be  reviewed  when  the  case  came  here  through  the  hierarchy  of state
courts. Burford v.  Sun Oil  Co.,  319  U.S.  315. The variations  on  the theme  have
been numerous.
We  have,  however,  in  the  present case  no  underlying  issue  of  state  law
controlling  this  litigation. The  right alleged  is  as plainly  federal  in origin  and
nature  as  those vindicated  in Brown v.  Board of Education, 347  U.S.  483.  Nor
is  the  federal  right  in  any  way  entangled  in  a  skein  of  state  law  that  must
be  untangled  before  the  federal  case  can  proceed.  For  petitioners  assert
that  respondents  have  been  and  are  depriving  them  of rights  protected  by
the  Fourteenth  Amendment.  It  is  immaterial  whether  respondents'  conduct
is  legal  or  illegal  as  a  matter of  state  law. Monroe v.  Pape, supra, at  171-187.
Such  claims  are  entitled  to  be  adjudicated  in  the  federal  courts.  Monroe
v. Pape, supra, at  183;  Gayle  v. Browder, 352  U.S.  903, affirming  142  F. Supp.
707;  Borders v.  Rippy,  247  F.2d  268,  271.  Cf.,  e.g.,  Lane v.  Wilson,  307  U.S.
268;  Smith  v.  Allwright,  321  U.S.  649;  Schnell  v.  Davis, 336  U.S.  933,  affirm-
ing 81  F. Supp. 872; Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S.  350.
373  U.S. at 673-74  (footnote omitted).
As  Pullman  analysis,  the  reasoning  seems  faulty.  The  Pullman  requirement  is
more than  that "strands  of local law  are woven  into the  case  that is before  the federal
court."  And  McNeese  does  not  escape  being  appropriate  for Pullman abstention  for
the  reason  Justice  Douglas  gives.  It  is  not  true  in  the  Pullman sense  that  there  was
present  "no  underlying  issue  of state  law  controlling  [the]  litigation,"  simply  because
the  right the  plaintiffs  invoked  was  federal.  The  state  issue  was  "controlling"  in  the
same  way  as  in  Pullman: if it  was  decided  in  a  particular  fashion,  it  would  dispose
of the  controversy  and make  decision  of the  federal  constitutional  question  unneces-
sary.
The  fact  that  McNeese  did  consider  it  "immaterial  whether  respondents'  conduct
is  legal  or  illegal  as  a  matter  of state  law"  might,  however,  be  taken  to  state  a  rule
of Pullman abstention  that  is  peculiar  to  civil  rights  cases.  It  might be  taken  to  mean
that  in  civil  rights  cases  a  federal  court  should  never  invoke  Pullman  abstention  if
the  state  law  issue  is  whether  the  state  rule  complained  of is  authorized.  Or McNeese
might  be  taken  to  state  the  still broader  rule  that  in  any  case  in  which  there  is ju-
risdiction  under  the  Civil  Rights  Act,  abstention  should  not  be  ordered,  for  state
law  is  deemed  not  controlling  and  immaterial;  the  right  to  the  federal  forum  is
absolute.  Under  either  of  these  approaches,  abstention  could  have  been  avoided  in
the Pullman case  itself if  only the  parties  had invoked  the  Civil Rights  Act  as a ground
of  jurisdiction.  (The  difference  between  the  cases-that  in  Pullman  the  plaintiffs
raised  state  as  well  as  federal  claims  while  in McNeese  they  raised  only  federal  claims
-should  not be dispositive. See text accompanying notes  196-98 infra.)
164  See  Lynch  v.  Household  Finance  Corp.,  405  U.S.  538  (1972).  Prior  to  that
decision  it appeared  that  suits  could  be  brought under  28  U.S.C.  §  1343,  the statute
conferring  jurisdiction  over  civil  rights  actions,  only  if  they  involved  "personal"  and
not  "property"  rights.  It  is  unclear  whether  that  limitation  of  §  1343(3)  applied  to
§  1983  as  well.  See  Eisen  v.  Eastman,  421  F.2d  560,  565  n.8  (2d  Cir.  1969)  (Friend-
ly, J.).
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all  section  1983  cases16 5  or  for  any  more  delimited  category
165 In  Davis  v.  Mann,  377  U.S.  678  (1964),  a  suit  under  the  Civil  Rights  Act
questioning  the  apportionment  of  the  Virginia  legislature,  the  usual  Pullman prin-
ciples  appear  to  have  been  applied  in  deciding  whether  to  abstain.  Both  the  district
court  and  the  Supreme  Court  declined  abstention  not  because  of  any  absolute  rule
for  cases  under  the  Civil  Rights  Act  but  because  the  statute  was  not  ambiguous.
Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389  U.S.  241  (1967),  also  under  the  Civil  Rights  Act,  engaged  in
typical  Pullman analysis,  and  Harrison  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167  (1959),  in  which
abstention  was  ordered,  was  brought  under  the  Civil  Rights  Act.  In Harrison, Justice
Douglas,  without  success,  espoused  the  position  that  Pullman abstention  was  inap-
propriate  in  civil  rights  actions.  360  U.S.  at  180-81  (dissenting  opinion).  Admittedly,
though,  the  cases  are  not  conclusive.  Only  Harrison squarely  contradicts  the  exist-
ence  of a  civil  rights  exception  in Pullman cases,  and  Harrison was  decided  prior  to
McNeese. McNeese's reasoning could be deemed  to have overturned  it.
Askew  v.  Hargrave,  401  U.S.  476  (1971),  a  post-McNeese  civil  rights  case,  does
support  to  some  degree  the  proposition  that  no  civil  rights  exception  to  Pullman
abstention  exists.  The  case  involved  a  claim  that Florida's  system  of  financing  public
education  discriminated  against  school  children  of  property-poor  countries,  thereby
violating  equal  protection.  The  district  court  enjoined  the  program,  refusing  to
defer  in  favor  of proceedings  in  state  courts  that  had  been  instituted  subsequent  to
the federal  suit, and  saying  that  under  McNeese  and  Monroe  v.  Pape  "[t]he  fact  that
a  state  remedy  is  available  is  not  a  valid  basis  for  federal  court  abstention."  401
U.S.  at 478.  In  a  unanimous  per  curiam  opinion  (after  oral  argument)  the  Supreme
Court  vacated  the  decision  of the  three-judge  court  and  remanded  the  case  to  that
court  so  it  could  exercise  its  discretion,  governed  by  the  usual  Pullman principles,
whether to abstain.  It said:
The  reliance  upon  Monroe v.  Pape and  McNeese  was  misplaced.  Monroe v.
Pape is  not  in point, for  there "the  state  remedy,  though  adequate  in  theory,
was  not  available  in  practice."  365  U.S.,  at  174.  McNeese  held  that  "assertion
of a  federal  claim  in  a federal  court  [need  not]  await  an attempt  to vindicate
the  same claim  in  a  state  court."  373  U.S.,  at  672  (emphasis  added).  See  also
Wisconsin v.  Constantineau, 400  U.S.  433  (1971).  Our  understanding  from  the
colloquy  on  oral  argument  with  counsel  for  the  parties  is  that the  Christian
case  asserts,  not  the  "same  claim,"  that is,  the  federal  claim  of alleged  denial
of the  federal  right of equal  protection, but  primarily  state  law  claims  under
the  Florida  Constitution,  which  claims,  if  sustained,  will  obviate  the  ne-
cessity  of  determining  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  question.  In  such  case,
the line  of decisions of which Reetz  v. Bozanich, 397  U.S. 82  (1970),  is a recent
example,  states  the  principles  that should  inform  the  exercise  of the  District
Court's discretion  as to whether to abstain.
401  U.S. at 478.
One  factor  that  may  be  deemed  to  detract  from  whatever  significance  Askew
might  otherwise  have  is  the  existence  of ongoing  state  court  litigation  which,  though
begun  subsequent  to  the  federal  action,  may  have  influenced  the  decision.  Cf.  Scott
v.  Germano,  381  U.S.  407  (1965).  See  note  256  infra.  Nevertheless,  Askew's  treat-
ment  of McNeese  is  significant  in  that  it  apparently  abandons  McNeese's  implications
of  a  § 1983  exception  to Pullman principles.  Askew  correctly  says  that McNeese's  state-
ment  that  a litigant  need  not  await  decision  of  the  same  claim  in state  court  did  not
cover  the  situation  in  Askew.  But  as  indicated  in  note  163 supra, it  did  not cover  the
situation  in  McNeese  either,  a  fact  that  Askew  does  not  point  out.  Repudiating  that
language  repudiates  the  basis  on  which  McNeese  arguably  creates  a  civil  rights  ex-
ception in Pullman cases. The Court in Reid v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 238, 242 (2d Cir.
1971),  seems  thus to  have  read Askew  to show  that abstention in  § 1983  actions  is  per-
missible.  (Askew's distinction  of Monroe is also erroneous. See 365 U.S. at  172,  183.)
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of them.
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D.  Conclusion Regarding  Proposed Application of Existing Factors
Relating to Unclear State Law and the Nature of the
Federal Constitutional  Issue
The  suggested  abstention  criteria  provide  a  framework
for applying  the Pullman requirements  that  state  law  must be
unclear  and  susceptible  to  an  interpretation  that  would  avoid
a  constitutional  question.  They  provide  more  guidance  than
current  statements  of the  requirements,  which  do not  indicate
with any consistency  whether or not extreme  ambiguity in state
issues  is  required  and which  generally  do not disclose  the oth-
er  variables  in  an  abstention  decision.  But  like  current  stan-
dards,  the  suggested  criteria  leave  much  room  for  individual
judgment.  Among  the  imprecise  factors  are the  degree  of un-
clarity  of state  law;  the  extent  to  which  error  might  harm  a
state  program;  and  the  extent  to  which  the  federal  constitu-
tional  issue  is  sensitive  or, instead,  calls  for  swift  adjudication.
For  each  of these  inquiries  there  is  obviously  no  principle  by
which  one  can  pick  any  particular  point  of exactly  how  un-
clear,  potentially  harmful,  sensitive,  or in  need  of adjudication
an  issue  must be  to  be  determinative.  Moreover  cases  can  fall
at  all  points  along  each  relevant  spectrum,  and  the  spectra  do
not  solve  what  may  be  the  most  difficult  problem  in  many
cases,  which  is  where  on  a  particular  spectrum  a  particular
issue  should  be  placed;  the  solution  to  those  problems  will
To  find  no  support for  a  civil  rights  exception  to Pullman abstention  is  not,  of
course,  to  deny  that  exception  to  the  administrative  abstention  doctrine,  which  will
be discussed  in text accompanying notes  250-53 infra.
166 Rather  than  an  exception  for  all  §  1983  cases,  there  could  be  one  limited  to
particular  types  of  actions,  as  the  ALI  apparently  suggests.  See  note  161  supra. The
one  square  holding  of abstention  in  a  §  1983  case-Harrison  v.  NAACP,  admittedly
decided  prior  to  McNeese-would  probably  fall  within  any  exception  that  would  be
devised,  as  would  most  probably  the  facts  of Pullman itself. The  only  suggestion  by
the  Supreme  Court  of any  absolute  exception  is  language  in  Dombrowski  v.  Pfister,
380  U.S.  479,  489-90  (1965).  There  the  Court,  apparently  discussing  the  propriety
of Pullman abstention  on  the  facts  of that case,  said  "we  hold  the  abstention doctrine
is  inappropriate  for cases  . . . where  . . . statutes  are justifiably attacked  on  their  face
as abridging  free  expression,  or as  applied  for the  purpose of discouraging  protected
activity."  See  also  id. at 491-92.  While  that  language  would  seem  to  suggest  a  per  se
rule  against  abstaining  because  of the  nature  of  particular  issues,  in  fact  the reason
abstention  is  inappropriate  in  that  context,  as  the  ensuing  discussion  in Dombrowski
demonstrates,  is  that,  in  the  Court's  view,  the  basic  requirements  cannot  be satisfied:
The  decision  of  the  state  issues  cannot  avoid  the  constitutional  question.  Accord.
Baggett  v.  Bullitt,  377  U.S.  360  (1964).  On  whether  the  Court  is  correct  in  believing
that  the constitutional  issue  could  not be avoided,  see the  cases  cited in  note  261 infra.ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
depend  on the particular  substantive  issues involved.  A further
fact  preventing  the  suggested  factors  from  showing  with  any
precision  a  single  correct  course in  each  particular  case  is  that
there  is no precise  way  to quantify the factors  in order to relate
them  to  each  other. Accordingly,  the  suggested  criteria  would
not  result  in  consistent  application  of the  abstention  doctrine
and indeed  would  permit judges to depart from the standards,
intentionally  or otherwise,  without  their  departure  being  man-
ifest.  Intentional  departures  might result  from judges  wishing
to  take account  of factors  going  to the  merits of the  cases  but
not embodied in the abstention  criteria 67  or simply from a dis-
taste  or  disdain  for  the  intellectual  acrobatics  involved  in  ap-
plying the suggested rules.
While  a judge  might justly  recoil  from  applying  the  sug-
gested  standards,  if  their  distinctions  and  subdistinctions  are
not  deemed  worth  the  energy  they  require,  then Pullman ab-
stention  should  not be  perpetuated  at  all.  For  it  simply  does
not  seem  worth  imposing  abstention's  costs  on  the  parties  to
order  it  more  broadly  than  when  functional  analysis,  applied
in  good  faith,  would  suggest  it  is  likely  to  serve  a  significant
purpose.  If  the  rule  is  to  be  simply  that  abstention  may  be
ordered whenever a federal court believes state law is "unclear,"
then  the chances  of different  state  and federal  results  and the
chances  of any  significant  detriment  resulting  from  a  federal
court  decision  do  not seem  great enough  to warrant  the delay
and expense.
168
167  While  such  an  assertion  is  difficult  to  prove,  there  is  some  evidence  in  Su-
preme  Court case  law  that the  current  lack  of consistency  in  the  degree  of state  law
ambiguity  required  for abstention,  see  notes 76-78  supra,  is  attributable  to  the Justices'
views of the  merits.  In Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n. v.  MacMullan, 406  U.S. 498  (1972),  a suit
by  owners  of  Great  Lakes  bulk  cargo  vessels  to  enjoin  various  sections of Michigan's
Watercraft  Pollution  Control  Act,  Chief Justice  Burger joined  an  opinion  dissenting
from  the Court's  order  of abstention  on  the  ground  that  the  Michigan  law,  though
unconstrued,  was  not ambiguous;  that the  plaintiffs  have  a  right to  choose  a federal
forum;  and that  they  would be  hurt  by  delay. Id. at  513-17.  The  dissenting  position
appears  directly  inconsistent  with  the  Chief Justice's  position  in  Wisconsin  v.  Con-
stantineau,  400  U.S.  433  (1971),  that  the  state  should  have  the  first  opportunity  to
pass  on  its  statute  without  regard  to  whether  it  was  ambiguous.  Similarly,  some  of
the  Justices  in  the  MacMullan majority  have  seemed  far  less  receptive  to  the  absten-
tion  doctrine  when  the  claimants  challenge  statutes  allegedly  abridging  individual
liberties  than  in  the  case  in  which  an  environmental  protection  statute  was  at issue.
Compare  Justice  Brennan's  opinion  denying  abstention  in  Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389
U.S.  241  (1967)  with  his  opinion  for the  Court  in  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n  v.  MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498 (1972).
168 Another  criticism  that  might  be  levelled  at  the  suggested  rules  is  that  they
could  be  wasteful  in  situations  in  which  an  appellate  tribunal  disagrees  with  a  trial
1974] 11351136  UNIVERSITY  OF PENNSYLVANIA  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  122:1071
E.  A Proposal  to Abandon the Requirement That the Case Must
Contain a Federal Constitutional  Issue
The  above  suggestions  for  limiting Pullman abstention  to
cases  in which  it is  likely  to serve  a valid  purpose  tend  to nar-
row  the  range  of cases  within  the authorization  and  construc-
tion  categories  that  are  appropriate  for  abstention.  But  the
analysis  of  how  the  Pullman requirements  apply  in  authori-
zation  cases  reveals  other respects  in which Pullman abstention
should  not  be  as  limited  as  it  has  been  heretofore.  As  noted
above, 169  it  suggests  that  the  doctrine  should  not  be  limited
to challenges  to state  enactments  to  the exclusion  of state  offi-
cials'  conduct,  if in  fact  it  is  so  limited  today.  Moreover,  it  is
logically  inconsistent  to  abstain  in  authorization  cases  and  at
the  same time  to  insist on  the  traditional Pullman requirement
that,  for  abstention  to  be  considered,  decision  of the  unclear
state  issue must have  the potential  of avoiding  a federal  consti-
tutional  issue.  There  is  no  doubt  that under  current law Pull-
man  abstention  is  impermissible  in  cases  containing  only  state
issues,'70  and  "[w]here  a case  involves  a nonconstitutional  fed-
eral  issue  ...the  necessity  for deciding  which  depends  upon
the  decision  on  an  underlying  issue  of  state  law,  the  practice
in  federal  courts  has  been,  when  necessary,  to  decide  both
issues" even  though "[t]he  state law question  [is]  .. .concededly
difficult  and  unsettled;  [and]  its  decision  admittedly  control[s]
the existence  of a federal  question  .... ,,'.7  The  only apparent
rationale  for  this  limitation  is  that  a  purpose  of Pullman ab-
stention  is  to  avoid,  where  possible,  adjudicating  federal  con-
stitutional  issues  and  that  abstention  is  proper  only  when  it
judge's  application  of the rules  and  orders  abstention after  the  trial judge  has heard
the  case.  But  this  problem  is  independent  of  the  substantive  standards  for  absten-
tion.  It  exists  under  current  law,  as  should  be  clear  from Pullman where  abstention
was  ordered  after  a  three-judge  court  had  passed  on  the  merits.  The  problem  is
inherent  if  there  are  to  be  definitive  standards  and  if  a  decision  not  to  abstain  is
not  reviewable  until  the  conclusion  of trial.  See note  123  supra.  It  could  be  cured  by
allowing  immediate  review  of such  a  decision  (though  that  might  itself be  wasteful)
or  by  allowing  trial  tribunals  discretion  always  to  hear  a  case  in  which  abstention
could  have  been  ordered.  The  latter  approach  could  be  adopted  consistently  with
retaining limits on the cases in which the district court could abstain.
169 See text accompanying notes 146-51 supra.
170  Meredith  v.  Winter  Haven,  320  U.S.  228  (1943).  Post-Pullman cases  in  which
the  Court  has  abstained  despite  the  absence  of any  federal  issue  are  explicable  on
grounds  other  than  the  Pullman doctrine.  See  text  accompanying  notes  174-76  &
206-53 infra.
171  Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 490  (1949).ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
may serve that purpose. But that rationale  is at odds with those
authorization  cases,  like  Pullman itself,  in  which  despite  the
presence  of  a  federal  constitutional  question,  the  purpose  of
abstaining  could  not  be  to  avoid  it,  because  the. district  court
had  invalidated  the  challenged  enactment  under  state  law.  If
abstention  is  permissible  in  authorization  cases  in  which  the
only  purpose  it  can  serve  is  to avoid  interference  with  a state
program,  it would  seem  to  follo.  that when  that risk  is  pres-
ent,  a federal  court should be  permitted  to abstain  despite  the
absence  of  any  constitutional  issue  in  the  case.1 7 2  Retention
of Pullman abstention  in  authorization  cases,  therefore,  calls
for a rethinking of the general parameters  of that doctrine. 7 3
In Louisiana Power &  Light Co.  v.  City  of Thibodaux,174  ab-
stention  was  ordered despite  the  absence  of any  federal  issues.
The city  in  that case  sought to  expropriate  the land,  buildings
and  equipment  of the  Louisiana  Power  &  Light  Company.  It
sued  in  Louisiana  court,  but  the  company,  which  was  incor-
porated  in Florida, removed  the case to federal court. One issue
was  whether  under  Louisiana  law  a  city  possessed  the  power
of eminent domain;  a Louisiana  statute appeared  to confer  the
power  upon  cities  but  a  Louisiana  attorney  general  had  con-
cluded  that the  power  did  not exist. The  Supreme  Court  held
that on  those  facts  the district court did not err  in  staying the
federal  proceeding  while the  state courts  were  given an  oppor-
tunity to construe the doubtful statute.
Thibodaux is  a case  in which  it appeared  that an  erroneous
federal  decision  on  the  unclear  state  issues  might  seriously
affect  the  state.  Its  holding  might  suggest  that  abstention  is
172 The  interest  in  avoiding  federal  constitutional  adjudication  does  not  extend
to  federal  question  cases  in  which  the  federal  issue  is  not  constitutional.  In  such
cases,  therefore,  the  federal  court  can  proceed  directly  to  the  federal  issue,  partic-
ularly if it  is dispositive, just as  in  cases  involving clear  and  nonsensitive  constitutional
questions.  Although  Propper  v. Clark,  337  U.S. 472  (1949),  is to  the contrary,  absten-
tion  should be  permissible  on  the state  issues  in such  a case  if  they  are  unclear  and  if
in the absence of abstention the  federal court would limit or invalidate a state program.
1'  An  alternative  to  broadening  Pullman abstention  is  limiting  it  to  construction
cases  in  which  conduct  has  not  occurred,  not  an  unreasonable  approach  since  the
hypothetical  quality  of  federal  decisions  in  that  category  of  cases  makes  it  the  most
appropriate  category  for  abstention.  See  text  accompanying  notes  144-45  supra. In-
dividual  authorization  cases,  however,  may  warrant  abstention  more  than  particular
construction  cases  in which  conduct  has not occurred,  even  those in  which  abstention
is justly  ordered.  That  fact  cuts  against  differentiating  the  availability  of abstention
according  to  the  appropriateness  of  categories  instead  of  on  a  case-by-case  basis.
See note  151  supra.
174 360 U.S. 25  (1959).
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in  fact  available  on  a showing  simply  that state  law  is  unclear
and  that  there  is  a  danger  that  a  federal  court  deciding  the
issue  might harm an  important  state  program.  The  Court  did
not  adopt  that rationale,  however;  rather  than  treating Thibo-
daux as  a Pullman abstention  case,  it seemingly  created an  addi-
tional variety of abstention,  limited  perhaps  to eminent domain
cases.  And  since  Thibodaux  it  has  reiterated  as  a  requirement
of Pullman abstention  that  the  state  issue  must be  susceptible
to  a  construction  that  would  avoid  a  federal  constitutional
question.
175  While  it  is  not  clear  precisely  what  contours  the
Court  intended  to  place  on  "Thibodaux  abstention,"  a  subject
to  be  discussed  further,
1 7 6  the Pullman rationales  would  make
abstention  available  on  the  facts  of that  case  as  readily  as  in
Pullman  itself.  Abstention  should  be  equally  available  if  the
federal  court  would,  in  the  absence  of  abstention,  invalidate
the  challenged  provision;  if  the  unclearness  in  the  state  law
(and  the  consequent  likelihood  of  federal  error)  is  as  great;
if the  program  is  as important  to  the  state  as the  program  in
Pullman; and  if  the  state  could  be  equally  harmed  by  delay
caused  in  it.  In  both  cases  abstaining  serves  only  the  policy
against  wrongful  interference  with  state  programs,  and  that
policy  can  be  served  equally  whether  or not  there  is  any  fed-
eral constitutional  issue in the case.
F.  Possible Additional Pullman Requirements
1.  A Requirement That the Suit Be One
to Enjoin State Action
The prototype Pullman abstention  case  involves an  attempt
to  enjoin  state  action  as  unconstitutional.  A  limitation  of Pull-
man abstention  to suits to enjoin state  officials  would  seemingly
proceed  on  a  theory  that  erroneous  decisions  in  such  suits
T75  E.g.,  Baggett  v.  Bullitt,  377  U.S.  360  (1964).  It  is  not  possible  to  interpret
Thibodaux  as  allowing  abstention  simply  when  state  law  is  unclear  and  to  preserve
this Pullman requirement without rendering the entire Pullman category superfluous.
Kaiser  Steel  Corp.  v.  W.S.  Ranch  Co.,  391  U.S.  593  (1968),  is  another  case  in
which  the  Supreme  Court  stayed  its  hand  when  no  federal  constitutional  issue  was
present,  without  making clear  how  its  holding  fit  within  traditional  Pullman require-
ments.  The  case  may  be  an  example  of "Thibodaux abstention,"  or  of administrative
abstention,  to  be discussed  later, see  text accompanying  notes  206-53  infra, or it  may
be explainable  by  the  fact  that a  suit that would  settle disputed  state  issues was  pend-
ing in state court. See note 256 infra.
1'7 See text accompanying notes  206-17 infra.ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
could  be  especially  harmful  to  the  states. 7  Any  such  limita-
tion should, therefore,  not apply  when the interest to be served
by  abstaining  is  the  federal  interest  in  avoiding  constitutional
adjudication.  Just  as  abstention  should  be  permissible  without
regard  to  the  presence  of a  constitutional  issue  if state  law  is
unclear  and  a federal  court  ruling  on  it would  disrupt  a state
program,  so  should  the  policy  of avoiding  unnecessary  federal
constitutional  adjudication  be  sufficient  for abstention  in  cases
in  which  the  federal  court  would  decide  unclear  state  issues
in such  a  way that difficult or otherwise  sensitive  constitutional
issues would remain.
The  appropriateness  of  a  requirement  that  the  suit  be
one  to  enjoin  state  action  in  cases  in  which  a  purpose  of ab-
staining is to avoid wrongful interference with the state depends
upon  whether  erroneous  federal  court  decisions  will  actually
harm  the  state  more  in  suits  to  enjoin  state  action  than  in
suits in  which  no state  official  is  a defendant,  or  even a party,
177  Under  another  theory,  one  could  require  an  injunctive  suit,  but  not  require
that  state  officials  be  the defendants.  The  federal  courts' power  to abstain  in  the  face
of congressional jurisdictional  grants  has  often  been  deemed  founded  on  the  discre-
tion inherent in equity jurisdiction. See,  e.g.,  Burford  v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,  317-
18  (1943);  Pullman, 312  U.S.  at  500-01;  Harlow  v.  Ryland,  172  F.2d  784  (8th  Cir.
1949).  Such  a  rationale  for  abstention,  though  not  an  entirely  satisfactory  explana-
tion,  see  note  66 supra, could  limit  it to  injunctive  suits.  The  Court  has not  adopted
the  limitation,  however.  It  has  abstained  in  simple  damage  actions  without  discussion
of  the  issue.  Fornaris  v.  Ridge  Tool  Co.,  400  U.S.  41  (1970)  (per curiam  without
argument);  United  Gas Pipe  Line  Co.  v.  Ideal  Cement  Co.,  369  U.S.  134  (1962)  (per
curiam  after  argument).  It  addressed  the  issue  in  Louisiana  Power  &  Light  Co.  v.
City of Thibodaux,  360  U.S.  25  (1959).  There, in  response  to  the  objection  that  ab-
stention  was  not  proper  because  no  equitable  relief  was  sought,  the  Court  said  that
[a]lthough  an  eminent  domain  proceeding  is  deemed  for  certain  purposes
of legal classification  a  'suit at  common  law',  Kohl  v.  United  States,  91  U.S.
367,  375-76  (1876),  it  is of a special  and peculiar nature  . . . [I]t  is intimately
involved  with  sovereign  prerogative  . . . A  determination  of the  nature  and
extent  of  delegation  of  the  power  of eminent  domain  concerns  the  appor-
tionment of governmental  powers  between  City and  State. The issues  normally
turn  on  legislation  with  much  local  variation  interpreted  in  local  settings.
The  considerations  that  prevailed  in  conventional  equity  suits  for  avoiding
the  hazards  of  serious  disruption  by  federal  courts  of  state  government
or  needless  friction  between  state  and  federal  authorities  are  similarly  ap-
propriate  in  a  state  eminent  domain  proceeding  brought  in,  or  removed
to, a federal court.
360  U.S.  at 28.  If,  despite  later  application  of the Pullman doctrine  in  damage  suits,
this were taken  to imply  that a suit must be in  equity except when  it is as analagous  to
an  equitable  proceeding  as  Thibodaux  was,  it  would  be  difficult  to  see  how  far  the
exception  to the  equity requirement  would extend.  For the factors  the Court relied  on
to  draw  the  analogy  to  equity  are  not  peculiar  to  eminent  domain  cases.  Perhaps  a
declaratory judgment  action,  "essentially  an equitable  cause  of action"  in that a  federal
court exercises  a  discretion  whether  to  grant relief,  Great  Lakes  Dredge  & Dock  Co.
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or  in  which  injunctive  relief  is  not  sought. Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. Thibodaux178 would suggest that abstention  is not lim-
ited  to  suits  seeking  injunctions  against  state  action  since  the
city was the plaintiff, not the defendant, in that case, and no in-
junction- was  sought.  Moreover, the  Court has  invoked Pullman
abstention when the state  was not a party at all,'7 9 though it has
given the issue little if any attention. 180  Similarly, without discuss-
ing the issue,  it has  twice  ordered Pullman abstention in actions
for damages  between  private  parties  in which no  injunctive  re-
lief was  sought. 8"  Both  were  cases  in  which  abstaining  could
serve  the  purpose  of  avoiding  constitutional  adjudication  as
well  as  protecting  state  interests, 82  but the  Court did  not rely
on that fact.  And it seems  that even  when,  as  in Thibodaux, the
purpose  of abstaining  is  solely  to  avoid  harm  to the  state,  it  is
probably  correct  not  to require  that  the  suit be  one  to  enjoin
state action.
183
It  may  generally  be  true  that  a  state  will  suffer  more
interference  from  a  federal  pronouncement  erroneously  inval-
idating or limiting  a state program if it is rendered  in litigation
in which  the state  is  a defendant  than when  the state  is  either
v.  Huffman,  319  U.S.  293,  300  (1943),  would  be  sufficiently  equitable.  But  in  any
event,  abandonment  of the  equity  requirement,  as  Fornaris  and Ideal Cement  suggest,
would  seem  appropriate  unless,  as  is  explored  in  text,  a  suit  in  equity  were  more
harmful  to  interests  that  abstention  is  designed  to  protect. A  strict law-equity  dichot-
omy,  which  would  allow  the  plaintiff in  his  choice  of remedy  to affect  decisively  the
abstention  question,  would  not  seem  functional,  since  the  abstention  doctrine  does
not exist to protect  plaintiffs' interests.
178 360 U.S.  25  (1959).
179 E.g.,  Fornaris  v.  Ridge  Tool  Co.,  400  U.S.  41  (1970);  United  Gas  Pipe  Line
Co.  v.  Ideal  Cement  Co.,  369  U.S.  134  (1962);  cf.  Kaiser  Steel  Corp.  v.  W.S.  Ranch
Co.,  391  U.S.  593  (1968)  (state  court  proceeding  on  disputed  issue  pending);  Clay  v.
Sun  Ins.  Office,  363  U.S.  207  (1960)  (certification).  Lower courts  also  have  abstained
in  actions  between  private  parties.  E.g.,  Barrett  v.  Atlantic  Richfield  Co.,  444  F.2d
38  (5th  Cir.  1971);  Warren  v.  Government  Nat'l  Mortgage  Ass'n,  443  F.2d  624
(8th  Cir.  1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.  886  (1971).
180 Justice  Brennan  did  advert  to  the  issue  whether  the  suit  was  one  to  enjoin
state  action  in  his  Thibodaux  dissent,  360  U.S.  at  34-35,  and  to  the  injunction  issue
in his  opinion for the  Court  in  County of Allegheny  v.  Frank  Mashuda  Co.,  360 U.S.
185,  190  (1959).  One  should  compare  his  concurring  statement  in  Kaiser Steel,  391
U.S.  at  594-95,  and  note  that  he joined  in  the  Court's  per  curiam  decisions  in Ideal
Cement and Fornaris.
181  Fornaris  v.  Ridge  Tool  Co.,  400  U.S.  41  (1970);  United Gas  Pipe  Line  Co.  v.
Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S.  134 (1962).
182  Fornaris and Ideal Cement  are  construction  cases  in which  it appears abstention
could serve  either or both abstention policies.
1"
3  But see  ALI STUDY,  supra note  33, at  286:  "In  a  suit between  private litigants,
a  mistaken  determination  of  state  law  by  the  federal  court,  obviating  considerationABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
plaintiff in the action or is not a party at all. The state is directly
bound  by  a judgment  to  which  it  is  a  party  as  it  is  not  when
litigation  is  between  private  parties.  And  when  the  state  is  a
defendant  in  an action,  the court's judgment may be  so broad
as  to  delay  state enforcement  of a program  against more  than
the  parties  to  the  suit;  the judgment  also  may  shield  persons
situated similarly to the plaintiff.'1
4
The  lines  between  the  three  situations  in  which  the  state
may  find  itself-a  defendant,  a  plaintiff,  or, not  a  party-are
not,  however,  absolute.  Although  a  state  as  plaintiff  will  be
bound 85  only in  relation  to  the  party  to  the suit,  it  is  readily
conceivable  that the very suit may involve  extremely  important
state  interests.  If  immediate  expropriation  of  the  Power  &
Light  Company's  property  was  important  to  the  city  in  Thibo-
daux,  for example,  then erroneous  delay  in  that expropriation
could  seriously  affect  ,it  even  though  the  erroneously  enunci-
ated  rule  of  law  was  not  elsewhere  applied.  And  when  the
state  is  in  a  defensive  posture,  the  issues  can  be  sufficiently
peculiar  to  the  particular  controversy  that there  is  no  serious
probability  of a federal  order  affecting  its relations  with  other
than the  plaintiff in the case. That may have been  the situation
in County of Allegheny v.  Frank  Mashuda Co.,' 86 a suit against the
state  involving  the  eminent  domain  power,  in  which  diversity
was  the  basis  of federal jurisdiction;  the  Supreme  Court  de-
cided Mashuda the  same  day  it  decided  Thibodaux, but in Ma-
shuda it declined to abstain. The plaintiff in Mashuda contended
that the county had taken  its property  for a private  use, which
was  illegal under state law.  If a ruling that Mashuda's  property
was  taken  for  a  private  use  rested  on  grounds  peculiar  to
that  company's  controversy  with  the  county,1 87  then  whether
the  state  subdivisions  could  be  more  harmed  by  an  erroneous
federal  ruling  on  state  law  in  Thibodaux or  in Mashuda would
turn  solely  on  whether  the  condemnation  in  one  case  was
of  the  constitutional  issue,  is  not  of  great  importance.  In  litigation  to  which  the
state is a party, it is of more  significance."
184 See note  89 supra.
185 Bound,  that  is,  until  a  corrective  state  ruling  is  obtained  and  the  federal
decree  is reopened  to reflect its result.
186  360 U.S. 185  (1959).
187 Justice  Brennan's  opinion  for  the  Court  indicates  that the  ruling  might  well
rest on such  grounds,  for  it says  that the  only  issue  in  the  case  is  the  "factual"  one.
360 U.S.  at 190.
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more  important  to  the  state  subdivision  than  in  the  other.  It
would  be  unaffected  by  the  fact  that the  state  subdivision  was
plaintiff in Thibodaux and defendant in Mashuda.
Similarly  a  state  can  be  harmed  by  an  erroneous  federal
court  ruling  in  a  case  involving  only  private  parties,  even
though  its  officials  are  not  bound  by  the judgment.188  United
Gas Pipe Line Co.  v. Ideal Cement Co., 1' 8 9 for example,  concerned
the  construction  and  federal  constitutionality  of a  state  taxing
provision. 90  If  a  federal  court  erroneously  struck  down  that
tax,  a  hiatus  in  its  payment  might  leave  the  state  as  harmed
as  in  many  cases  in  which  it  is  defendant.  Accordingly,  it  is
more  sensible  to  have  a  rule  to  be  applied  on  a  case-by-case
basis  that  for  abstention  to  be  ordered  there  must  be  a  risk
that an  erroneous  federal  ruling would  severely  hurt the state's
interests,  than  it  is  to  have  any  absolute  requirement  that  the
state must be party to, or defendant in, the suit. 191
Nor  is  it  clear  that  the  state's  interests  are  necessarily
more  harmed  if an  injunction,  instead  of some  other  kind  of
188 This  is  especially  likely  in  cases  in  which  private  party litigation  is  an  impor-
tant means of enforcement  of a scheme  designed to protect state interests.
189  369 U.S.  134 (1962).
190 The  plaintiffs  sought  contractual  reimbursement  for city  taxes  they  had  paid
pertaining  to  sales  to  the  defendants,  and  the  defense  focused  on  the  federal  uncon-
stitutionality of the city tax in question.
191  The  Court  has  not  necessarily  limited  abstention  in  cases  between  private
litigants  to  circumstances  in  which  states'  interests  could  suffer  from  erroneous
state  law  rulings.  In Fornaris  v. Ridge Tool  Co., 400  U.S. 41  (1970),  the  issue between
the  parties  did  not risk  delaying  a  state  program  in  a  way  that  would  greatly  harm
the  state  if the  federal  court  erred,  but  in  any  event  abstaining  there,  as  in  United
Gas  Pipe  Line  Co.  v.  Ideal  Cement  Co.,  369  U.S.  134  (1962),  served  the  purpose  of
avoiding  constitutional  adjudication  as  well  as  avoiding  interference  with  the  state.
In  Kaiser  Steel  Corp.  v.  W.S.  Ranch  Co.,  391  U.S.  593  (1968),  a  nonconstitutional
case  involving  only  private  parties  in  which  the  Court  deferred  to  state  adjudication,
the  Court noted that the case  involved water,  "a  vital state resource,"  391  U.S.  at 594,
but  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  that  the  state  would  be  seriously  harmed  in  a  manner
that  a  federal  court  should  take  cognizance  of if the  federal  court  erred.  One  com-
pany  which  had  been given  water  rights by the  state  claimed  a right to  use the  plain-
tiff's  land  as  an  incident  to  exercising  those  water  rights.  The  plaintiff  company
claimed  that  so  to  condemn  its  land  for  the  use  of another  private  company  would
violate  state  constitutional  commands  that  condemnation  is  legitimate  only  if  for
"public  use."  While  the  suit  involved  water,  the  issues  in  the  suit  did  not  therefore
pertain  to  the  allocation  of that "vital  state  resource."  391  U.S.  at 594.  An  erroneous
federal  ruling  would  either  wrongly  deprive  the  private  company  of  its  access  to
water or  would  wrongly limit  the  state's  ability  to  condemn  for the benefit of private
companies-an  interest  probably  not  so  central  to  the  state  that  a  hiatus  would  do
the  state  severe  harm.  Kaiser can  be  explained,  however,  by  the  fact  that  a  state
proceeding on the condemnation  issue was pending. See note 256 infra.
For  a case  in which the  court in abstaining noted that  the effect on state  economic
policy  of an  erroneous  ruling  would  be  great, even  though  the  case  involved  privateABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
relief,  is  sought.
192  Even  limiting  the  cases  to  those  in  which
the  state  is  a  defendant,' 93  it  is  not  clear  that  the state,  or  its
official  or agency,  is  significantly  more limited  by an  injunction
than  by a declaratory judgment.
194  Although  declaratory  relief
is  not of itself coercive  and  does  not  carry  the  contempt sanc-
tion,  the  parties  will  ordinarily  heed  it,  and  it  is  issued  on
that supposition. If  it is  violated,  an  injunction  should  ordinar-
ily  follow  without  a  retrial  on. the  merits  since  the  earlier  liti-
gation,  through  res  judicata  or  collateral  estoppel,  would
seemingly govern the issue.' 95
2.  The State's Consent As  a Precondition to Abstention
a.  A Requirement that State Officials Consent to Abstaining in
the Particular  Case
In Thibodaux and  in  some  Pullman abstention  cases,' 96  the
federal  court  has  raised  the  issue  of  abstention  sua  sponte.
Indeed,  in Thibodaux the  city opposed  abstention  and the  party
that had sought the  federal forum  supported abstention before
litigants,  see  Union  Carbide  &  Carbon  Corp.  v.  White  River  Distribs.,  Inc.,  118
F. Supp. 541,  550 (E.D. Ark.  1954).
192  Injunctive  and  declaratory  proceedings  will  be  the  principal  forms  of uncon-
sented  relief  against  the state.  Suits  for damages  to be  paid  out of state  funds  cannot
be  maintained  against  state  officials  without  the  state's  consent,  Edelman  v. Jordan,
94  S.  Ct.  1347  (1974);  Great Northern  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. Read,  322  U.S.  47,  52  (1944),
and  the  state  can  limit  any  consent  to suit  in  state  courts,  Smith  v.  Reeves,  178  U.S.
436,  445  (1900).  Although  cities  and  counties  are  subject  to  federal  court  suit  with-
out their  consent,  Chicot  County  v.  Sherwood,  148  U.S.  529  (1893);  cf. Workman  v.
City of New  York,  179  U.S.  552  (1900),  they are  immune to  the  extent that  state  law
is  determinative  of  liability,  e.g.,  Broward  County  v.  Wickman,  195  F.2d  614  (5th
Cir.  1952),  and they are not liable  in  damage actions under 42  U.S.C.  § 1983,  Monroe
v.  Pape,  365  U.S.  167  (1961).  Suits  for  return  of  specific  property  in custody  of the
state  but claimed  to  belong  to  the  plaintiff can  be  maintained  against  state  officials
without  the state's  consent.  Land  v.  Dollar,  330  U.S.  731  (1947).  The  measure  of the
harm to the state's interests  in such  cases is the value of the property  to be retrieved.
193  Only  in  those  cases  would  the  existence  of a  request  for  an  injunction  seem
even arguably to affect the degree  to which an erroneous ruling might harm the state.
194  The  Supreme  Court  has  recognized  in  other  contexts  that  a  declaratory judg-
ment can  interfere  with  a state  program  in the same  way an injunction  does.  Samuels
v.  Mackell,  401  U.S.  66,  69-74  (1971);  Great  Lakes  Dredge  & Dock  Co. v.  Huffman,
319  U.S.  293,  299  (1943).  But  see  Perez  v.  Ledesma,  401  U.S.  82,  111-16,  122-28
(1971)  (Brennan, J.,  concurring and  dissenting);  Mitchell  v.  Donovan,'398  U.S.  427,
429-30  (1970);  Kennedy  v. Mendoza-Martinez,  372  U.S.  144,  152-54  (1963).
'9  See  Samuels  v.  Mackell,  401  U.S.  66,  72  (1971).  But  cf. Perez  v.  Ledesma,
401  U.S.  82,  125 (1971)  (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
196E.g.,  England  v.  Louisiana  State  Bd.  of  Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S.  411
(1964).  Several  Justices  in  Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau,  400  U.S.  433  (1971),  simi-
larly raised the issue of abstention in dissenting opinions.
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the  Supreme  Court. 197  When  the  purpose  abstention  is  to
serve  is  avoiding  federal  constitutional  adjudication,  it  seems
appropriate  that  abstention  be  considered  at  the  request  of
either  party  or  on  the  motion  of  the  federal  court  itself.198
But when the  purpose of abstaining is to protect state  interests,
the  state  should  be  able  to  waive  the  protection.  If,  as  it
appears,  that  was  the  purpose  of abstaining  in  Thibodaux,  it
was  error to do so over the state's protest.
b.  A Requirement of Adequate State Remedies
It is  settled  that a  federal  court  can  order abstention  only
if the  state  provides  the  parties  with  adequate  means  to  adju-
dicate  the  controverted  state  law  issue.199  (The  case  law  is
less than  clear, however,  as to which remedies  are adequate.)2 00
One  situation  in which  state  remedies  may  be  deemed  inade-
197 360  U.S.  at 42-44  (Brennan, J.,  dissenting).  Delay-and  accordingly  abstention
-benefited  the  defendant company,  which  retained  possession  of its property  during
the  proceedings.  Cf.  Hostetter  v.  Idlewild  Bon  Voyage  Liquor  Corp.,  377  U.S.  324,
329  (1964).
198 A  private  litigant  might  be  indulging simply  in  a  strategy  of  delay  or  might
have  a  genuine  interest  in  state  court  decision  of  state  issues,  on  the  assumption
that the  outcome  would  benefit  him  and  would  differ  from  a  federal  court's  result.
But  when  in  an  authorization  case  the  only  interest  to  be  served  is  avoiding  consti-
tutional  adjudication,  a  state  raising  the  abstention  issue  would  be  serving  only  pur-
poses  of delay,  because  it  would  be  arguing  against  the  validity  of  the  enactment  it
was  defending. The state's  failure  in  Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau  to request  abstention
on  the  ground  that  the  challenged  provision  might  violate  the  state  constitution  is
thus  explicable  as  a  recognition  by the  state  that  its  interests  in  preserving  the  chal-
lenged  statute  would  be  no  better  served  by  its  invalidation  under  state  than  under
federal law.
Because  legitimate  state  purposes  do  not  argue  for  abstention  in  such  a  context,
a  federal  court,  in  order  to  serve  the  federal  purpose  of  avoiding  unnecessary  con-
stitutional  adjudication,  must  have  power  to  consider  abstention  on  its  own  motion.
The  power  must extend  to  considering  a state  law  ground  for invalidation  of a  chal-
lenged  enactment  although  the  plaintiff  has  not  raised  that  issue  at  all;  otherwise
the  plaintiff,  whose  interests  abstention  is  not  designed  to  serve,  would  control  ab-
stention  by  his  pleading. Thus  in  both  Constantineau and England the parties  had  not
raised  the  state  law  claim;  the  court  had  to  raise  the  issue  sua  sponte,  if  abstention
was to fulfill  its federal  purpose. Cf  McNeese  v.  Board of Educ.,  373  U.S.  668 (1963).
Presumably  having  raised  the  state  law  claim,  the  district court  can  itself decide  the
suit  on  that ground,  if  the  state  issue  is  sufficiently  clear  or  is  otherwise  inappro-
priate for abstention.
'99  As  early  as  Pullman  the  Court  emphasized  in  abstaining  that  "[t]he  law  of
Texas  appears  to  furnish  easy  and  ample  means  for  determining  the  Commission's
authority." 312  U.S. at 501.
200 The  state  procedure  should  be  deemed  inadequate  whenever  it  is  so  cumber-
some  that  the  individual  litigant  suffers  substantial  prejudice  in  addition  to  that
necessarily  accompanying  the  abstention  procedure.  There  are  many  ways  in  which
the  state  procedure  for  resolving  the  state  law  issue  may  so  cause  the  litigant  preju-ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
quate,  so  that  the  parties  will  be  permitted  to  pursue  their
action in federal court,  is where the state  courts will  not decide
the  disputed  issue  subject  to  the  limitations  the  abstention
doctrine  would  impose  on  their adjudication.  In Pullman cases,
dice.  Even  if  the state  has  a  declaratory judgment  procedure  which  allows  access  to
state  adjudication  whenever  there  is  a justiciable  controversy,  there  may,  for  exam-
ple,  be  peculiarly  long  delays  involved  which  could  support  an  allegation  that  the
remedy  is  inadequate.  The  state  remedy  may  also  be  inadequate  if  no  declaratory
relief  is  available.  In  such  a  case,  the  inquiry  would  be  whether  the  parties  are  sig-
nificantly  prejudiced  by  whatever  alternative  does  exist.  Pullman  indicates  that  the
fact  that  the  plaintiff  in  the  federal  action  will  be  in  the  defensive  position  in  the
state  litigation  is  not  alone  sufficient  to  render  the  state  remedy  inadequate.  One
of the  proceedings  the  Court  there  noted  in  saying Texas  afforded  "adequate  relief"
was  an  "action  on  the  part  of the  State  to  enforce  obedience  to  the  order."  Id.
The  Court  also  apparently  presumed  in  favor  of the  adequacy  of the  state  remedy,
placing  on  the  objecting  party  the  burden  of  coming  forward  with  a  showing  that
the  available  means  "cannot  be  pursued  with  full  protection  of  the  constitutional
claim." Id.
Despite  this  language,  it  is  questionable  that  a  litigant  should  be  required  to
undergo  a  criminal  proceeding  or  otherwise  risk  heavy  penalties  under  the Pullman
abstention  doctrine.  Certainly  if  he has  not  already  acted  to  make  himself criminally
liable,  he  should  not  be  required  to  do  so  as  a  precondition  to  state  adjudication,
and  a  state  "remedy"  that  requires  him  to  do  so  should  be  deemed  an  inadequate
substitute  for  federal  adjudication;  a  central  purpose  of  the  Federal  Declaratory
Judgment Act,  28  U.S.C.  §§  2201-02  (1970),  is "to  avoid  accrual  of avoidable  damages
to one  not certain  of his rights  and  to  afford  him  an early  adjudication  without wait-
ing  until  his  adversary  should  see  fit  to  begin  suit,  after  damage  has  accrued,"  E.
Edelmann  & Co.  v.  Triple-A  Specialty  Co.,  88  F.2d  852,  854  (7th  Cir.),  cert. denied,
300  U.S.  680 (1937).  See  note 288  infra & accompanying  text.  Dombrowski  v.  Pfister,
380  U.S.  479,  489-92  (1965),  would  indicate,  however,  that  in  the  case  of a  litigant
who  is  already  criminally  liable,  abstention  under  the Pullman doctrine  in  favor  of
a state  criminal  proceeding  may  be  proper.  There  the Court  discussed  the  possibility
of  abstention-seemingly  referring  to  Pullman  abstention-when  the  contemplated
state  proceeding  was  a  criminal  prosecution.  It  seemingly  declined  to  abstain  there
because the  state  issue  was  such  that the constitutional  question  could not  be  avoided
and  not  because  criminal  proceedings  were  an  inappropriate  forum  for  the  state
adjudication.  But  if  the  issues  had  been  appropriate  for  abstention,  one  wonders
whether  the  Court would  have  ordered  it  in that setting  in  view of  the England pro-
cedure,  which  clearly  gives  a  federal  plaintiff  the right  to  resepve  federal  issues  for
the  federal  court.  Surely  those  issues  could  not  constitutionally  be  excised  from  a
criminal  proceeding.  The  only  way  to  preserve  the  plaintiff's  England  rights  and
also  abstain  for litigati6n  of state  issues  in a  criminal  proceeding  would seem  to be to
allow  the  federal  plaintiff  to  litigate  all  issues  in  the  state  prosecution  and  then  to
relitigate  federal  issues  in federal  district court.  It  is  not  clear  whether England sanc-
tions  that  approach,  see 375  U.S.  at 421-22  &  n.12, but it does  not seem  substantially
to  prejudice  the  federal  plaintiff over  and  above  the  prejudice  he  generally  suffers
in  Pullman  abstention.  Moreover,  the  federal  relitigation  would  seem  in  keeping
with  usual federal  habeas corpus practice,  being broader only in extending  a right to  a
factual  hearing  in  federal  court  without  regard  to  the  adequacy  of  the  state  court
hearing. Cf England, 375  U.S.  at 417  n.8.  In  any  event,  Pullman issues  may  never  be
reached  in  many  cases  in which  a  federal  plaintiff, by  the  time  of his  federal  suit,  is
already  liable  to  criminal  sanctions,  because  of the  other  type  of "abstention"  at issue
in  Dombrowski  v.  Pfister,  which  will  be  discussed  below  at  text  accompanying  notes
254-328 infra.
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the England procedure  arguably  forbids  state  courts  to  decide
federal  issues without  the parties'  consent; 201  in Thibodaux they
are  left  only  the  unclear  issue  of state  law.  Some  states,  how-
ever,  adhere  to  limitations  which  prohibit  their  courts  from
ruling  on  state  law  issues  unless  they  have jurisdiction  of the
entire  controversy. 20 2  Under  existing  doctrine  it  would  seem
improper  for  a federal  court to abstain  in favor  of state courts
that  under  such  a  limitation  will  not  hear  the  controversy;
instead,  the  federal  court  should  proceed  with  its  own  adju-
dication.
2 03
Such  a  rule  would  allow  the  states  to  veto  abstention  by
failing  to provide  necessary  procedures  even when  the purpose
of abstaining  is  to  serve  the  federal  interest  against  unneces-
sary  constitutional  adjudication,  in  apparent  contradiction  of
the  rationale  suggested  above  for  sua  sponte  abstention.  It
may  not  be  inconsistent,  however,  to  hold  that  while  a  state
cannot  always  bar  abstention  by  declining  to raise  the issue  at
trial, it can  always  block  it by declining  to  provide the requisite
201See  375  U.S.  at  421-22  n.12.  An  alternative  reading  is  that  state  courts  may
decide  federal  issues,  but  if they  do  so  without  the  parties'  consent,  the  parties  may
religate them de novo in federal court.
202See  United  Services  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Delaney,  396  S.W.2d  855  (Tex.  1965);
cf.  Leiter  Minerals,  Inc. v.  California  Co.,  241  La.  915,  132  So.  2d  845  (1961);  In re
Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me.  1966). See also 48 IowA L. REv.  185 (1963);  40 TEXAS  L. REv.
1041  (1962).
The  problem  is  that  some  state  courts  have  interpreted  a  restriction  on  their
jurisdiction  to  the  decision  of "cases  and  controversies"  to  mean  that they  cannot
decide a case  unless  they have  power  to dispose  of it. When  the  federal court  abstains
for decision  of state  issues,  the  state  court  cannot  necessarily  dispose  of the  case.  In
Pullman, for  example,  the  Texas  courts  would  dispose  of  the  case  only  if  they  held
the  Commission's  order  was  not  authorized.  If  they  held  it  authorized,  the  disposi-
tion  of the  controversy  would  depend  upon  the  resolution  of  the  federal  constitu-
tional  question.  Since England it  has  been  clear  that,  absent  a  waiver  by  the  parties,
they have a right to have that issue determined in the federal  forum.
103 See England  v.  Louisiana  State Bd. of Medical Examiners,  375 U.S.  411,  421-22
n.12  (1964).  Cf  ALI  STUDY,  supra note  33,  at 286,  294-96  (certification).  The  alterna-
tive of  litigating the federal  issues  in  both  the  state  and  the  federal  fora  is  discussed
in note  200 supra. It  is  worth  noting that if  federal  courts adopted  the  alternative  and
abstained  in  favor  of  state  courts  that  had  announced  they  would  decline  to  decide
state  issues  alone,  persons  claiming  federal  constitutional  violations  should  never con-
sent to  have  them  heard  in the  state  court  that nevertheless  would  hear them.  By  re-
fusing their consent, those litigants would retain the right wholly to litigate their  claims
in two separate fora and thus  would increase their chance of victory.
In  Barrett  v.  Atlantic  Richfield  Co.,  444  F.2d  38,  45-46  (5th Cir.  1971),  Judge
Wisdom  implies that the correct  approach  for a federal  court  faced  with  a case  where
state  courts  will  not  confine  themselves  to  state  issues  but  which  otherwise  warrants
Pullman abstention  is  to  abstain  but  dismiss  the  case  rather  than  retain  jurisdiction.
Presumably  that  would  solve  the  state  courts'  problem  only  if the  difference  in  dis-
position  were deemed  to allow  the  state  courts to  pass  upon federal  claims. DismissingABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
procedures.  For the  federal  system  to  tell  the  states  that  they
must provide  a procedure  for the  adjudication  of single  issues
would  be  a  fairly  radical  interference  with  state  decisionmak-
ing.2° 4  Since  state-  procedural  limitations  affect  more  than
abstention  cases,  it  may  be  thought  that  the  state  interest  in
deciding  what  those  limitations  should  be  outweighs  any  fed-
eral  interest  in  avoiding  federal  constitutional  adjudication
in particular cases.
This  analysis  would  indicate  a different  result,  however,  if
the  state  does  not  have  a  general  principle  against  deciding
less  than  an  entire  case  but  unreasonably  delays  or  otherwise
hampers  the  adjudication  of  a  particular  case.  When  that  is
the  sense  in  which  the  state  provides  inadequate  procedures,
only  federal  reluctance  to  subject  state  courts  to  compulsion
can  explain  declining  to require  them  to proceed  expeditiously
in  cases  in  which  the  purpose  of  abstaining  is  to  serve  the
federal interest.
PART  TWO:  THE  RELATION  OF  PULLMAN
ABSTENTION  TO  OTHER  TYPES  OF  ABSTENTION
The  term  "abstention"  is  used  indiscriminately  to  refer
to  several  quite  distinct doctrines,2 0 5 only  one of which  is Pull-
man abstention.  Partly because  of the confusion  of terminology,
and  partly because  the limits  of the other categories  of absten-
tion  are  largely  incoherent,  the  relationships  between  the
various  categories  are  less  than  clear.  Whether  it  is  proper  to
treat  any  particular  case  in  accordance  with  the Pullman doc-
Pullman cases does seem to contravene England. But see 444 F.2d at 45  n.3. Nevertheless,
in  Barrett there  was  an  independent  reason  both  for  dismissing  rather  than  retain-
ing jurisdiction  and for leaving  federal  as  well as  state  issues  to the  state  system:  that
the  case  qualified  for  administrative  abstention  as  well  as  meeting Pullman require-
ments.  See  text  accompanying  notes  221-23  infra;  note  242  infra  &  accompanying
text.
204 Moreover,  the  federal  system  should  be  rather  sympathetic  to  such  state
limitations,  both  because  article  III  of  the  Federal  Constitution  contains  similar
restrictions  and  because  the  purpose  of such  restrictions  appears  to  be  improving
the  quality  of judicial  decisionmaking.  Indeed  it  may  be  that  federal  constitutional
limitation  which  is  primarily  responsible  for  the  absence  of  a  counterpart  to  the
Pullman abstention  doctrine  for  cases  litigated  in  state  courts  which  contain  very
unclear  federal  issues  that  are  potentially  controlling.  Another  explanation  for  the
absence  of  any  procedure  whereby  state  courts  could  refer  such  issues  to  federal
court lies  in the  possibility of Supreme  Court review  of erroneous  federal  determina-
tions;  but the  pressures  on  the Court's docket and  the consequent  difficulty  of obtain-
ing review may make that explanation insufficient.
205  C.  A.  WRIGHT, FEDERAL  COURTS  196 (1970).
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trine  or  instead  to  place  it within  another  abstention  category
is  not  always  obvious,  although  that  decision  can  be  of enor-
mous  consequence  to  the  determination  of the  proper  forum.
Moreover,  the rationales behind  the other.categories  of absten-
tion are  in  some  respects  inconsistent  with  the Pullman ration-
ales.  This  section  will  attempt  briefly  to  delineate  the  scope
of  the  various  abstention  categories;  to  show  the  respects  in
which  the  coexistence  of the  various  categories  is  inconsistent
with  the  limits  upon  Pullman abstention;  and,  finally,  to  ad-
dress  the  question  how,  if all  the  categories  of abstention  are
to  persist,  a  court  should  decide  which  doctrine  comes  into
play  in any given  situation.
I.  "THIBODAUX  ABSTENTION"
Louisiana Power &  Light  Co.  v.  City  of  Thibodaux2 0 6  is  the
controlling  case  in  this category,  a  category that would  be ren-
dered  superfluous  if  the  previously  suggested  approach  of
eliminating  the  requirement  of  a  constitutional  issue  were
adopted  for Pullman abstention.  The  Court  in  Thibodaux  did
not  take  this  approach,  however,  but  purported  to  create  a
supplemental  Thibodaux category  of uncertain  scope.  The  dif-
ficulty  in determining  its  scope  is  compounded  by the decision
the  same  day  reversing  a  district  court  dismissal  in  County  of
Allegheny  v.  Frank Mashuda  Co.207  While  much  in  Thibodaux
suggests  a  rule  of  abstention  peculiar  to  eminent  domain
206 360 U.S.  25  (1959); see  notes  174-76 supra & accompanying  text.
207 360  U.S.  185  (1959);  see  notes  186-87  supra &  accompanying  text.  It  is  not
surprising  that the  cases  are  difficult  to  reconcile,  since  seven  of  the  nine Justices
sitting  on  the  two  cases  disagreed  with  the  holding  of one  of them,  and  the  author
of  each  opinion  dissented  in  the  other.  In  fact  Justice  Brennan's  opinion  for  the
Court  in  Mashuda bears  a  marked  resemblance  to  the  vigorous  dissent  he  voiced  in
Thibodaux.  Only  Justices  Stewart  and  Whittaker  joined  in  both  majority  opinions,
and  only  Stewart  gave  an  explanatory  statement.  He  said  he concurred  in  Thibodaux
because  it "was  clearly  within  the  District  Court's  allowable  discretion"  for it  to  defer
"immediate  adjudication  of  this  controversy  pending  authoritative  clarification  of  a
controlling state statute of highly doubtful meaning."  He went  on to say:
This  case  is  totally  unlike  County  of  Allegheny  v.  Mashuda  Co.,  decided
today  . . . except  for the  coincidence  that  both  cases  involve  eminent domain
proceedings.  In  Mashuda the  Court  holds  that  it  was  error  for  the  District
Court  to  dismiss  the  complaint.  The  Court  further  holds  in  that  case  that,
since  the  controlling  state  law  is  clear  and  only  factual  issues  need  be  re-
solved,  there  is  no  occasion  in  the  interest  of justice  to  refrain  from prompt
adjudication.
360 U.S.  at 31.
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cases,20 8  abstention  was  refused  in  Mashuda,  which  also  in-
volved  eminent  domain,  and  language  in Mashuda states  that
there  is  nothing  special  about  eminent  domain  for  abstention
purposes. 2 0 9  Mashuda and  Thibodaux might  be  reconcilable  on
the  ground  that  the  state's  interests  would  be  more  adversely
affected  by  an  erroneous  ruling  against  the  state  in  one  in-
stance  than  the other,2 1 0  but  the Court's  opinion  does  not rest
on  any such  distinction.  Another  distinguishing  feature  is  that
state  law  was  unclear  in  Thibodaux  and  it  was  relatively  clear
in Mashuda.211  But  that  is  the  rationale  that cannot  alone  ex-
plain  Thibodaux  abstention  without  rendering  superfluous  the
Pullman category  with  its  requirement  of a constitutional  ques-
208 The  Court  referred  to  the  problem  involved  in  the  case  as  one  generic  to
eminent  domain  cases  when  it  said,  "We  granted  certiorari  . . . because  of the  im-
portance  of the question  in the judicial  enforcement of the  power  of eminent  domain
under  diversity  jurisdiction."  360  U.S.  at  26.  It  went on  to  mention  that  the  Court
had  been closely  divided  in  the decision  in which,  in  1905,  it  allowed eminent  domain
cases  in  federal  courts  at  all  under  the  diversity  jurisdiction.  Madisonville  Traction
Co.  v.  St.  Bernard  Mining  Co.,  196  U.S.  239  (1905).  It  quoted  with  approval  from
Justice  Holmes'  dissent  in  that  case  concerning  the  plenary  power  of the  state  over
eminent  domain  and  emphasized  "the  distinction  between  expropriation  proceedings
and ordinary  diversity  cases."  360  U.S. at  26. The  Court then  said abstention  was not
precluded because  the suit was  not  in equity,  because  it was an  eminent domain  suit.
See language  quoted in note 177 supra. See also note 213 infra.
One  could,  however,  interpret  the  Court's  discussion  of  eminent  domain  in
Thibodaux  as  relating  solely to  whether  a  suit  must  be  in  equity  for  abstention  to  be
permissible, see  note  177 supra, and not suggesting that eminent domain was a factor  in
any other sense in a decision whether to abstain.
209 "[T]he  fact  that  a  case  concerns  a  State's  power  of eminent  domain  no
mpre justifies  abstention  than  the  fact that it  involves  any other  issue  related
to  sovereignty.  Surely  eminent  domain  is  no  more  mystically  involved  with
'sovereign  prerogative'  than  . . . a  host  of other  governmental  activities  car-
ried  on  by  the  States  and  their  subdivisions  which  have  been  brought  into
question  in  the  Federal  District  Courts  despite  suggestions  that  those  courts
should  have  stayed  their  hand  pending  prior  state  court  determination
of state law."
360 U.S. at 191-92;  see id. at 192-96.
210 See  text  accompanying  notes  186-87  supra.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  the  state
law  issue  in  Thibodaux  was  more  generalized  than  that  in  Mashuda,  and  thus  less
likely  to affect  only  the particular  litigants,  may  have  made state  court  discrimination
against  out-of-staters  less  likely in  Thibodaux than  in Mashuda. Accordingly,  the breach
in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction  would seem less problematic  in Thibodaux.
211 A  variant  on  this  explanation  is  the  suggestion  made  in  Justice  Stewart's
Thibodaux  concurrence  and  in  Justice  Brennan's  opinion  for  the  Court  in  Mashuda
that  the  only  issues  in Mashuda were  factual.  Whether  that  is  a  correct  characteriza-
tion  of the Mashuda issues  is,  however,  open  to  doubt.  The  facts  concerning  the  use
to  which  the  condemned  property  had  been  put in  Mashuda were  fairly  clear.  The
question  to  be  decided  was  whether  Pennsylvania  law  would  characterize  that  use
as "public" or "private".
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tion.2'2  Probably  the  most  satisfactory  way  to  explain  the  two
holdings  is  to  conclude  that  Thibodaux abstention  is  proper  in
eminent  domain  cases  to  elucidate  unclear  issues  of state  law;
neither  eminent  domain  nor  unclear  state  law  is  sufficient  for
abstention,  but  the  two  in  combination  are. 2 1 3  The  reconcilia-
tion  is  not  problem-free,  however.  Mashuda's language  that
there  is  nothing  peculiar  about  eminent  domain  proceedings
is  contradicted.21 4  And  the  only  statement  given  by  a Justice
212  One might  argue  that  unclear  state  law  is  determinative  in Thibodaux and  that
it  still does  not displace Pullman by saying  unclear  state law  is  sufficient  for abstention
only  in  cases  not  involving  any  federal  issue.  But  that  position  is  either  irrational  in
its  limitation  to  non-federal  question  cases,  or  it  constitutes  a  direct  undercutting  of
the  diversity  jurisdiction  by  deeming  private  litigants'  interest  in  not  having  their
case  determined  according  to  an  erroneous  view  of  state  law  sufficient  to  displace
federal  jurisdiction  in  diversity  cases  alone.  In  a  pre-Thibodaux  case,  Meredith  v.
Winter  Haven,  320  U.S.  228  (1943),  the  Supreme  Court  said  that  such  a  position
would be contrary to the  diversity jurisdiction.  Cf Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.  315,
336  (1943)  (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);  Alabama  PSC  v.  Southern  Ry.,  341  U.S.  341,
351  (1951)  (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  But  cf.  Kaiser  Steel  Corp.  v.  W.S.  Ranch  Co.,
391  U.S.  593  (1968);  Hawks  v.  Hamill,  288  U.S.  52  (1933)  (alternative  holding).  See
also Louisiana  Power  & Light  Co. v.  City  of Thibodaux,  360  U.S.  25,  31  (1959)  (Bren-
nan,  J., dissenting).  Moreover,  in Thibodaux  the  Court seems  to  have  denied  any  such
general  undercutting  of  the  diversity  jurisdiction  when  it  spoke  of  "the  distinction
between  expropriation  proceedings  and ordinary diversity cases."  360 U.S.  at 26.
Much  has  been written  on  whether difficult  questions  of state  law  are sufficient  to
justify abstention  in cases  not involving  any  federal issue, see,  e.g.,  C.  A.  WRIGHT,  FED-
ERAL  COURTS  202-03  (1970);  Currie,  The  Federal Courts and The American Law Institute,
36  U. Cm.  L.  REV.  268, 313-14 (1969);  Liebenthal, A  Dialogue on England: The  England
Case, Its Effect on the Abstention Doctrine, and Suggested Solutions, 18 WESTERN  RES.  L. REV.
157,  158  n.2,  183-95  (1966);  Comment,  Recent  Developments in  the  Doctrine  of Absten-
tion,  1965  DUKE  L.J.  102;  Comment,  Abstention  Under  Delaney:  A  Current  Ap-
praisal, 49  TEXAS  L.  REV.  247  (1971);  Comment,  Abstention and Certification in Diversity
Suits:  "Perfection of  Means and Confusion of  Goals,"  73  YALE  L.J.  850  (1964);  a  ques-
tion on which  the  courts of appeal  are in conflict.  Compare United  States  Life  Ins.  Co.
v.  Delaney,  328  F.2d  483  (5th  Cir.  1964)  (abstaining) with  Martin  v.  State  Farm  Mut.
Ins.  Co.,  375  F.2d  720,  722  (4th Cir.  1967)  (not  abstaining) and In  re  Mohammed,
327 F.2d 616, 617  (6th Cir.  1964) (not abstaining).  The bulk of authority ispunfavorable
to  abstention  which  serves  only  the  interest  of  protecting  private  litigants  against
the  risk  of an  erroneous  state  law  ruling  by  a federal  court  in  their  particular  case.
The  existence  of  diversity  jurisdiction  does  not,  however,  affect  the  propriety
of  other  categories  of  abstention;  the  issue  regardless  of  diversity  is  whether  the
abstention  requirements are  met. See,  e.g.,  United  Gas  Pipe  Line  Co.  v.  Ideal  Cement
Co.,  369  U.S.  134  (1962);  Burford  v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,  319  U.S.  315  (1943).  This  is  true
even  though  an argument could  be  made  that abstention  is  per  se improper  in  a  case
in  which  the  parties  are  diverse  because  state  courts'  bias  against  out-of-staters  keeps
them  from being  more  likely  than  the federal  system  to  reach  correct  results,  despite
their general  superiority in interpreting state  law.
213  The language  of the  Court's holding  in Thibodaux supports  this  reading:  "The
special  nature  of  eminent  domain justifies  a  district judge,  when  his  familiarity  with
the  problems of local law  so  counsels him, to ascertain  the meaning of a disputed state
statute  from  the  only  tribunal  empowered  to  speak  definitively-the  courts  of  the
State  under  whose  statute  eminent  domain  is  sought  to  be  exercised-rather  than
himself make a dubious and tentative  forecast." 360 U.S.  at 29.
214  Moreover,  in  seeking  to  distinguish  Meredith  v.  Winter  Haven,  320  U.S.  228ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
voting  with  the  majority  in both  cases  de-emphasized  the  role
of the  eminent  domain  factor,  calling  it  a  "coincidence"  that
both  cases  involved  that  power,  and  focused  instead  on  the
difference  in  the  clarity  of  state  law  in  the  two  cases.21 5  At
any rate, since  it is difficult  to  see what  in the eminent domain
power  warrants  such  special  treatment  for  abstention  pur-
poses,  it  is  difficult  to  predict  what  other  subjects  of  state
power,  if  any,  will  be  deemed  to  fall  within  an  abstention
category  where  ambiguity  of  state  law  is  sufficient  for  ab-
stention."t6
(1943),  the  leading  case  for  the  rule  that  uncertainty  in  state  law  does  not  by  itself
justify  abstention,  the  Thibodaux  Court  did  not  rely  on  the  special  nature  of an  emi-
nent domain  proceeding.  360  U.S. at 27  n.2.  For the distinction  it did adopt,  see note
215 infra.
215  See Justice  Stewart's  opinion  quoted  in  note  207  supra. Justice  Stewart  seems
to  stress  also  two  other  points:  the  district court's  discretion  on  the abstention  isstie
and  the  difference  in  the  dispositions  of Mashuda, where  the  district court  dismissed,
and  of Thibodaux,  where  the  court  retained  jurisdiction.  The  same  two  reasons  were
used  by  Justice  Frankfurter  in  his  opinion  for  the  Court  in  Thibodaux  to  distinguish
the  Supreme  Court's  holding  in  Meredith  v.  Winter  Haven.  360  U.S.  at  27  n.2.
Though  the  Court  often  speaks  of  abstention  decisions  as  involving  discretion,  e.g.,
Harman  v.  Forssenius,  380  U.S.  528,  534,  537  (1965),  it  seems  difficult  to  explain
abstention  decisions  by  discretion  on  the part  of the district judge, when  the  Supreme
Court  reverses  both  district  court  orders  granting  abstention,  e.g.,  Mashuda;  Griffin
v.  County  School  Board,  377  U.S.  218  (1964);  Turner  v.  City  of  Memphis,  369  U.S.
350  (1962),  and  district  court  denials  of  abstention,  e.g.,  Pullman  &  Harrison  v.
NAACP,  360  U.S.  167  (1959),  and does not seem in any cases  to allow  the  trial court's
result  to stand simply  because  the  trial  court so  ruled.  Cf. Clay  v.  Sun Ins.  Office,  363
U.S.  207,  223  n.17  (1960)  (Black,  J.,  dissenting).  Conceivably,  discretion  to  abstain
or  not  if state  law  is  unclear  could  be  the  rule  in  "Thibodax  abstention"  though  not
in Pullman cases,  but any  rationale  for allowing  it would seem to apply in  one category
as much as the other.
Stewart's  and  Frankfurter's  focus  on  whether  the  district judge  retained  juris-
diction  also  seems  misplaced.  If  the  only  way  the  district judge had  erred  in Mashuda
or  Meredith  was  in  dismissing  the  action  rather  than  retaining jurisdiction  pending
state  proceedings,  the  Supreme  Court  should  have  simply  changed  that  disposition
without implying that the district court should proceed  to adjudicate the entire case.
216  There  is  one  suggestion  in  the  Court's  opinion  of  a  category  larger  than
eminent domain.  In stating the proper law  the Court said:
[W]e  have  held  that  the  mere difficulty  of state  law  does  not justify  a  federal
court's  relinquishment  of jurisdiction  in  favor  of  state  court  action.  Mere-
dith  v.  Winter  Haven,  320  U.S.  228,  236. But  where the issue touched upon the
relationship of City  to  State,  Chicago  v.  Fieldcrest  Dairies,  Inc.,  316  U.S.  168,
or  involved  the  scope  of a  previously  uninterpreted  state  statute  which,  if
applicable,  was  of  questionable  constitutionality,  Leiter  Minerals,  Inc.  v.
United  States,  352  U.S.  220,  229,  we  have  required  District  Courts,  and  not
merely  sanctioned  an  exercise  of  their  discretionary  power,  to  stay their  pro-
ceedings pending  the submission  of the  state  law  question  to  state determina-
tion.
360 U.S.  at 27-28 (footnote  omitted;  emphasis  added).
The  category  suggested-that  of  cases  involving  the  relationship  between  cities
and  the  state-does  not seem  any  more rational  than  a  category  of eminent  domain
cases  alone.  Of course,  the  state  has  plenary  power  over  that  subject  matter,  but  it
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In  the  end,  one  is  left  with  an  impression  that  the  limits  of
"Thibodaux  abstention,"  as  a  separate  category,  are  indiscern-
able.21 7  The  proper  resolution  of this  confusion,  as  suggested
above, 218  would be  to merge Thibodaux and Pullman abstention,
making  unclear  state  law  sufficient  in  all cases  in which  a state
program  may  be significantly  harmed  by an  erroneous  federal
decision.
Even  if it  continues  to  be treated  as  a  separate  abstention
category,  however,  the  limits  of  Thibodaux  abstention  are  not
of importance  to  persons  invoking Pullman abstention,  for  the
consequences  of each  type  of abstention  are  similar:  In  Thibo-
daux,  as  in  Pullman,  the  Court  ordered  that  jurisdiction  be
retained  and  eventually  exercised  on  all  but  the  unclear  state
issue.219  Accordingly,  even if there were  some  seeming  overlap
between the categories-if, for example, Thibodaux were deemed
to  apply  to  eminent  domain  cases  with  unclear  state  issues
has  such  power  over all the  subjects  in  question  in  these  cases  as long  as  it  does not
act  unconstitutionally.  The  category  is  vulnerable  also  to  the  other  criticisms  Justice
Brennan  leveled against  a  category  of eminent  domain  cases  in his  Thibodaux  dissent
and in Mashuda. One  case  that  may  possibly be  explainable  as  a non-eminent  domain
version of Thibodaux abstention  is  Kaiser  Steel Corp.  v.  W.S.  Ranch  Co.,  391  U.S.  593
(1968).  See note  175 supra.
217 The use  lower courts  have  made of Thibodaux confirms  this  impression. There
are  cases  adopting  the  reading  of Supreme  Court  case  law  that Thibodaux  abstention
applies  to  eminent  domain  proceedings,  and  its  propriety there depends  upon  wheth-
er  state  law  is  clear  or ambiguous.  See  Mayor  &  City  Council  v.  National  Dairy  Prod.
Corp.,  193  F.  Supp.  556  (D.Md.  1961)  (abstention  not  ordered  because  state  law
clear);  Myrick  v.  Union  Oil  Co.,  418  F.2d  135  (9th  Cir.  1969)  (abstention  not ordered
because  state  law  clear);  Crawford  v.  Courtney,  451  F.2d  489  (4th Cir.  1971)  (absten-
tion ordered).  Other  cases  indicate  that  Thibodaux abstention  can  be  ordered  in  areas
"intimately  involved  with  sovereign  prerogative,"  360  U.S.  at  28,  other  than  eminent
domain. John L.  Burns,  Inc. v.  Gulf Oil  Corp.,  268 F.  Supp. 222  (N.D.  Ga.  1967),  thus
applied Thibodaux to  allow abstention  in a suit  for a tax refund  involving an  uncertain
issue  concerning  the  scope  of the  state  tax.  While that  use  of Thibodaux  may be justi-
fiable.  DuVall  v.  Moore,  276  F.  Supp.  689  (N.D.  Iowa  1967),  indicates  a  tendency  to
apply  the  same  Thibodaux  language  so  broadly  that  an  uncertain  issue  concerning
any  subject  of  state  regulation  would  be  subject  to  abstention.  The  cases  discussed
in  note  212  supra define  Thibodaux  abstention  still  more  broadly  by  suggesting  un-
clear  state  law  as  a sufficient  condition  for its  exercise.  And  in  some  cases  the  limits
the  court  places  on Thibodaux  are  largely  indiscernible.  See, e.g.,  United  Medical  Labs,
Inc.  v.  CBS, 256  F. Supp.  570,  subsequently dismissed 258  F.  Supp. 747  (D.  Ore.  1966);
Richey  v.  Sumoge,  257  F.  Supp.  32  (D.  Ore.  1966);  Portland  Paramount  Corp.  v.
Twentieth  Century-Fox  Film  Corp.,  258  F.  Supp.  962  (D.  Ore.  1966),  rev'd on  merits
sub  nom  Taylor  v.  Portland  Paramount Corp.,  363  F.2d  623  (9th Cir.  1967);  David  v.
London  Shirt Co.,  259  F. Supp.  848  (D.  Ore.  1966);  B-W  Acceptance  Corp.  v.  Tor-
gerson, 234  F. Supp. 214 (D. Mont.  1964).
218 See text accompanying notes  175-76 supra.
219  There  were  two  state  issues  in Thibodaux,  one  the  unclear  one  concerning  the
city's condemnation  power and  the other an issue  concerning the amount of compensa-ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
when  a  federal  constitutional  issue  was  also  at stake-the  cat-
egorization  would  have  no  effect:  If  a  case  falls  within  the
Pullman category,  however  that  is  defined,  the  abstention  will
not vary  according  to whether  it also  falls  within  the Thibodaux
category,  however that is defined.2 20  In that respect,  "Thibodaux
abstention"  differs  from  the  two  categories  of  cases  next  to
be discussed.
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE  ABSTENTION
"Administrative  abstention"  cases  differ  from  Pullman
cases  in that  neither the  existence  of unclear  state  law nor  the
presence  of a  federal  constitutional  question  is  necessary  for
abstention.  Moreover,  abstention  is  ordered  in  administrative
cases  to  enable  state  courts  to  decide  federal  issues  as  well  as
state  ones,  and  under  the  administrative  abstention  doctrine
a  case  must  pass  through  the  state judicial  system  even  if all
its  issues  are  clearly  federal.  Accordingly,  administrative  ab-
stention  does  not merely  postpone  original  federal jurisdiction
but  actually  displaces  it,221  removing  entirely  from the  original
tion, to be decided if the condemnation  were sustained. Justice Frankfurter said that the
second  issue, if reached,  would  be decided  by the federal district court, and accordingly
claimed that Thibodaux abstention "does not constitute abnegation  ofjudicial duty.  On the
contrary,  it  is  a  wise  and  productive  discharge  of  it.  There  is.only postponement  of
decision for its best fruition." 360 U.S. at 29. Even if he is correct that the compensation
issue in Thibodaux itself would, if reached, return to the federal court, see note 220 infra, it
is questionable whether  there would usually be an issue in "Thibodaux abstention  cases"  to
make abstention simply a postponement of  jurisdiction. It would seem perfectly plausible
that the only  issue in the case  would be the disputed  one. In Mashuda, for example, the
issue of damages  had  been litigated in a prior  state proceeding.  If abstention had  been
ordered on the unclear state issue, a return to federal court would not seem a possibility.
Thus in at least some Thibodaux cases,  state jurisdiction  may replace federal jurisdiction,
unlike Pullman abstention.
220 There  is  one  possible  argument  that  the  disposition  of  the  categories  does
differ  and  if  it  were  adopted,  the  categorization  would  sometimes  be important.
While  the  Court  in  Thibodaux  indicated  it  would  abstain  only  on  the  unclear  state
issue,  leaving  clear state  issues  for  the  federal  forum,  see  note  219 supra, language  in
Pullman  cases  often  implies,  without  explicit  mention  of  the  issue,  that  if abstention
is  ordered  state  issues  generally  will  be left  to  state  courts,  with  only  federal  issues
reserved  for  original  federal  adjudication.  See  England  v.  Louisiana  State  Bd.  of
Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S.  411  (1964).  While  a  case  can  be  made  for  either  the
Thibodaux  or  the  England approach  on  this  point,  nothing  in  the  two  categories  of
cases  would  warrant a  different solution  for each  of them.  Presumably  when  the issue
is  explicitly  addressed  the  Court  will  either  leave  all  state  issues  to  state  tribunals
when  it  abstains  under  either  category,  or  else  will  in  both  categories  leave  only  the
unclear  issue.
221 The  same  can  be  true  of at  least  some  Thibodaux  abstention  cases.  See  note
219 supra.
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federal jurisdiction  cases  that  fall  within  federal  jurisdictional
grants; 222  a  state  court will  dispose  of all  the issues  in the case,
subject  to  possible  Supreme  Court  review,  and whether  or  not
such  review  is granted, res judicata will bar a party from having
the federal district court decide  the issue anew. 223
The  scope  of  administrative  abstention,  like  Thibodaux
abstention,  is  ambiguous  largely  because  the  reasoning  that
supports  the  abstention  is  not  clear.  The  doctrine  is  defined
primarily  by  reference  to  two  cases:  Burford v.  Sun  Oil Co. 224
and Alabama PSC v.  Southern Ry.2 25  In Burford, a  diversity  and
federal  question  case, 226  the Sun Oil  Company  sought  to  en-
join  a  Texas  Railroad  Commission  order  granting  Burford  a
permit  to  drill certain  wells  in  East Texas. The Supreme  Court
held  that  the  suit should  be dismissed.  Writing  for  the  Court,
Justice  Black  emphasized  that the  order  in  question  was  "part
of  the  general  regulatory  system  devised  for  the  conservation
of oil  and  gas  in  Texas,  an  aspect  of  'as  thorny  a  problem  as
has  challenged  the  ingenuity  and  wisdom  of  legislatures' ";
that the  "regulation  of the industry  by the  state  administrative
agency"  involved  "basic  problems  of Texas  policy";  and  that
several  state  law  problems  at  issue  were  "of no general  signifi-
cance."2 27  Perhaps  most  important,  he  noted  that  allowing  a
222  Largely  for  this  reason,  one  commentator  takes  the  position  that  this  group
of  cases  should  not  be  termed  "abstention"  cases  at  all.  Liebenthal,  supra note  212,
at 159.
223See  England  v.  Louisiana  State  Bd.  of  Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S.  411,
415  n.5  (1964);  Alabama  PSC  v.  Southern  Ry.,  341  U.S.  341,  350  (1951)  ("whatever
rights  appellee  may  have  are  to  be  pursued  through  the  state  courts");  Burford  v.
Sun Oil  Co.,  319 U.S.  315,  334 (1943)  ("... [I]f the  state procedure  is  followed  from
the  Commission  to  the  State  Supreme  Court,  ultimate  review  of the  federal  questions
is fully preserved  here");  C.A. WRIGHT,  FEDERAL COURTS  200 (1970).
224  319  U.S.  315  (1943).
225  341  U.S.  341  (1951).
226  It  is  a  point  of  some  debate  whether  Burford  should  be  deemed  a  federal
question case  as well  as a  diversity  case.  Compare Note,  56  HARV.  L.  REV.  1162  (1943)
with  H.  HART  &  H.  WECHSLER,  THE  FEDERAL  COURTS  AND  THE  FEDERAL  SYSTEM
872-73  (1953).  See  also  Liebenthal,  supra  note  212,  at  161.  Hastings  v.  Selby  Oil
&  Gas  Co.,  319  U.S.  348  (1943).  Federal  question jurisdiction  in Burford could  tech-
nically  have  been  based  on  a  federal  due  process  challenge  to  the  order,  which  was
challenged  primarily  on state  grounds. The  federal  issue was not, however,  prominent
in  the  case,  and  the  Supreme  Court  said  nothing  of  avoiding  federal  constitutional
adjudication  in support of its decision to abstain.
227 319  U.S.  318,  331-32.  Justice  Frankfurter  dissented,  saying  that since  state  law
was  clear,  the  federal  forum  was  duty-bound  to  exercise  its jurisdiction.  He  deemed
the  federal  forum  necessary  for the  reason  it generally  is  provided  in  diversity  cases
-the  need  for  a  neutral  forum-and  he  contended  that  the  Court's  dismissal  of
jurisdiction contradicted  the premises of diversity jurisdiction.
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federal  forum  to  entertain  the  suit  would  lead  to  "conflicts
in  the  interpretation  of state  law,  dangerous  to  the  success  of
state  policies ....  -221  The  standard  the  state  applied  for  the
spacing  of  oil  wells  was  settled,229  but  it  left  much  room  for
variation  in  its application.  Moreover,  the state had taken  pains
to  minimize  judicial  variation  in  applying  the  rules;  it  had
concentrated  review  in  the  state  district  courts  of  a  single
county.230
In Alabama PSC v. Southern Ry.,  also founded  on both fed-
eral  question  and  diversity jurisdiction,  the  Southern  Railway
sought  to  enjoin  a  Public  Service  Commission  order  refusing
to  allow  discontinuance  of  two  passenger  trains  routed  princi-
pally but not exclusively  within Alabama.231  The railroad  sought
to challenge  the order  on both  state  afid  federal  constitutional
grounds  as  unjustified  by  "public  necessity,"  "contrary  to  the
evidence,"  violative  of  requirements  for  just  compensation,
a  denial  of  due  process  and  equal  protection,  and  a  burden
upon  interstate  commerce.  The  district  court,  finding  state
law  clear,232  enjoined  the  order  on  federal  constitutional
grounds.  Not  disputing  the  clarity  of state  law,  the  Supreme
Court  set  aside  the  injunction  and  ordered  dismissal  on  the
basis  that  the  regulation  of  intrastate  railroad  service  was
" 'primarily  the concern  of the state' ";  the problem was  "essen-
tially  local";  and  statutory  appeal  from  a  Commission  order
was "an integral part of the regulatory  process. '233
The  reasons  for  administrative  abstention  that  one  gleans
from  these  two  cases  are  remarkably  similar  despite  the  fact
that Burford involved  federal  court  decision  of state  law  issues
while Alabama PSC  involved  federal  decision  of federal  issues.
The  first two Alabama PSC reasons-that the problem  was  local
and  primarily  of  state  concern-seem  makeweight.  Because
the  allegation  was  that  the  order  violated  the  Federal  Consti-
228  319 U.S.  at 334.
22,  There  existed  a  standard  for  minimum  spacing,  subject  to  exceptions  where
necessary  "to  prevent  waste  or  to  prevent  the  confiscation  of  property."  319  U.S.
at 322.
230  TEx. REV.  Civ.  STAT.  art. 6049(c)  § 8  (1962);  see Texas  Steel  Co. v.  Fort  Worth
&  D.C.  Ry.,  120  Tex. 597,  604,  40  S.W.2d  78,  82  (1931).  Article 6049(c)  §  8  is  a rule
of jurisdiction,  not  venue.  Alpha  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Terrell,  122  Tex.  257,  265,  59
S.W.2d  364, 367  (1933).
23!  See 341  U.S.  at 343.
232  91  F. Supp. 980 (M.D. Ala.  1950).
233  341  U.S. at 346-48.
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tution,  it  is  difficult  to  see  the  issue  as  of interest  primarily
to  the  state.  Statements  in  Burford  that  the  issues  involved
Texas  policy and  were  of no  general  significance  make  more
sense  since  that  case  involved  difficult  and  substantial  state
issues.  Problems  remain,  however,  insofar  as  federal  constitu-
tional  issues  as  well  were  involved  in Burford. More  seriously,
such  reasoning  seems  contrary  to  the  bases  of  the  diversity
jurisdiction,  which  was  one  basis  for  federal  jurisdiction  in
both cases.
Most  rationales  for  allowing  abstention  in  an  administra-
tive  category of cases on terms  other than those  of the Pullman
doctrine  seem  extremely  unsatisfactory,  because  they  squarely
contradict  the  reasoning  that  limits  Pullman. The  difficulty
is  in  finding  any  factor  in  administrative  cases  that  makes
abstention  more  appropriate  than  in  cases  dealt  with  under
the Pullman  doctrine;  yet  without  finding  such  a  factor,  it  is
troublesome  that  abstention  is  ever  ordered  in  these  cases  in
the absence  of unclear  state law  and the  possibility  of avoiding
a  federal  constitutional  issue.  The  rationale  that  comes  closest
to justifying separate  treatment  for administrative  cases  is  sug-
gested  in  Alabama PSC's statement  that  statutory  appeal  of  a
Commission  order  was  "an  integral  part  of  the  regulatory
process,"  a  rationale  that  seems  to  parallel  Burford's emphasis
on  the Texas  courts'  responsibility  for  working with  the  Com-
mission  in  regulating'  the  oil  industry.  It  is  unclear  exactly
what  aspect  of the  agency's  order  or  its  relation  to  the  state
judiciary  made  the judiciary  be  deemed  "an  integral  part  of
the regulatory  process"  in either case.  But it may  be important
that in both  cases  all  review  of the relevant  commission  orders
was  concentrated-in  one  county's  courts  in  Burford  and  in
one  circuit  court  in  Alabama  PSC.234  Such  concentration  of
judicial  review  would  seem  to  enhance  the  case  for  deference
to  the  state  judicial  machinery  in  two  important  ways.  First,
a  single  state court  passing  on agency  action  may truly  develop
a  subject  matter  expertise  that  the  federal  courts  could  not
match,  and  may  participate  more  fully  in  formulating  regu-
latory  decisions  than  if  the  functions  of judicial  review  were
more  scattered.  Second,  the  concentration  of judicial  review
suggests  that  the  state  may  truly  consider  uniformity  of deci-
234 The  statute  concentrating  review  in Alabama PSC  was  ALA.  CODE  tit. 48,  §  79
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sion on these matters  to be unusually  important. The argument
for abstaining,  at least in  the absence  of some  pressing  consid-
eration  in  favor  of  federal  decision  of  the  particular  issue
and/or  controversy  involved,  would  stress  that  the  state  con-
cern  for uniformity  of decision  is  a  legitimate  one,  and  is  not
aimed  specifically  against  the  exercise  of  federal  jurisdiction
(since  state  courts  that  would  otherwise  have  jurisdiction  are
deprived of it as well). 235
But even the  state's  commitment  to uniformity  and  exper-
tise  would  not  necessitate  abstention  without  regard  to  the
clarity  of state  issues. At most  it would  seem that,  in situations
in which the state  had evidenced  such a commitment,  a federal
court  deciding  whether  to  abstain  should  be  generous  to state
adjudication  in  determining  whether  or  not  a  particular  state
issue  was  clear.  The  explanation  may  be,  however,  that  the
state  tribunals'  expertise  lies  less  in  their  understanding  of
relevant  state  provisions  than  in  their  special  knowledge  of
a  factually  complex  administrative  scheme.  In  Burford  itself
great variations  in the  application  of a  consistently  stated  stan-
dard  were  possible,  rendering  the  results  of  individual  cases
uncertain  although  in  one  sense  state  law  was  clear.  That  ra-
tionale  for  a  separate  administrative  category  has  the  virtue
of also  providing  a  possible  explanation  for abstention  obtain-
ing  for  federal  as  well  as  state  issues.  While  federal  tribunals'
legal  determinations  of federal  issues  are  presumptively  more
reliable,  conceivably  a  body  especially  equipped  to  analyze  a
complex  factual pattern would better apply the federal rules.
While  this  explanation  might  possibly  make  a  separate
category  of  "administrative  abstention"  logically  compatible
with  Pullman's limitations,  the  administrative  abstention  doc-
trine  has  not  been  limited,  in  its  application  by  lower  courts,
to cases in which  the state had concentrated  review of an agen-
cy's  determinations  in  a  single  court  or  group  of  courts,  let
alone  to  those in which the factual situation  appeared especially
complex  and  within  the  reviewing  body's  expertise.2 3 6  More-
23.5  Indeed,  Justice  Frankfurter,  dissenting  in  Burford,  asserted  that  in  its  pro-
vision  confining  review  to  courts  in  Travis  County,  the  Texas  legislature  had  not
intended  to  affect  the  jurisdiction  of federal  courts  but  only  to  displace  the juris-
diction  of state  courts other  than  those  in Travis  County.  319 U.S.  at 342-44.  Compare
Reagan  v.  Farmers' Loan  & Trust Co.,  154  U.S. 362, 391-92  (1894).
236 E.g.,  Atlantic  Coast Line  R.R.  v.  City  of St.  Petersburg, 242  F.2d  613 (5th  Cir.
1957);  Applegate  v.  Waterfront Comm'n,  129 F. Supp. 71  (S.D.N.Y.  1955).
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over,  the lack of complexity  in Alabama PSC may remove  even
that case from the suggested explanation.
While  lower  courts  have  not consistently  adopted  any  one
explanation  or  limitation  for  the  administrative  abstention
doctrine,  their  rationales  and  limitations  generally  contradict
the Pullman doctrine's  premises.  One obvious way  of delimiting
the  administrative  abstention  doctrine,  which  some  lower
courts  have  adopted,  is  to  find  administrative  abstention  prop-
er whenever  a  state  administrative  agency's  order  is  at issue 237
and-as  is  prerequisite  to  any type  of abstention-an  adequate
state  remedy  is  available  to  deal  with  the  plaintiff's  grievance.
Another  less  precise  approach  would  demarcate  administrative
abstention  according  to  the  degree  to  which  the  reviewing
court  will  be  required  to  dabble  in  the  administrative  scheme
in  performing  its  review'ing  function,  but  without  regard  to
the  concentration  of judicial  review  or  any  special  expertise
on  the  part  of  the  state's  reviewing  court.  It  would  call  for
administrative abstention  if the factors that the reviewing court
will  have  to  consider  are  complex,  and  if they  are  within  the
237 The  concurring  Justices  in Alabama  PSC appear  to  have  believed  this  to  be
the  limiting  principle  for  administrative  abstention.  341  U.S.  at  362.  Accord,  Note,
Judicial  Abstention  from  the  Exercise  of  Federal Jurisdiction,  59  COLUm.  L.  REv.
749,  760  (1959);  Comment,  40  CALIF.  L.  REv.  300,  306-07  (1952).  Professor  Kenneth
Culp  Davis,  however,  disagrees.  See  3  K.  DAvIs,  ADMINISTRATIVE  LAw  TREATISE  §
23.18, at 382-84. See also Comment,  19  U.  CH.  L.  REV.  361,  367 n.41  (1952).
A  rule  that  administrative  abstention  would  come  into  play  whenever  a  state
administrative  agency's  order  is  at  issue  raises  the  difficulty  of  deciding  how  an
"administrative  agency"  should  be  defined.  Any  reasons  for  requiring  that  state
rather  than  federal judicial  remedies  be  pursued  for  administrative  decisions  would
seem  to  obtain  as  well  when  a  single  official  was  the  decisionmaker.  Cf. Pennsylvania
v.  Williams,  294 U.S.  176 (1935).
Martin  v.  Creasy,  360  U.S.  219  (1959),  could  be  deemed  Supreme  Court author-
ity  for  the  proposition  that  administrative  abstention  is  proper  for state  court  review
of  the  decision  of  a  single  official.  It  is  not  absolutely  clear,  however,  that  Martin
should  be  deemed  an  administrative  abstention  case.  Liebenthal  suggests  it  is  in
fact  a Pullman case,  see  Liebenthal, supra note  212,  at  165,  though  he recognizes  that
in  so  characterizing  it  he  must  deem  the  Supreme  Court  in  error  in  dismissing  it
rather  than  retaining jurisdiction,  as  England, some  years  later,  made  clear  was  the
correct Pullman procedure.
Martin  does,  however,  bear  characteristics  of  an  administrative  abstention  case:
Not  only  did  the  Supreme  Court  dismiss  the  case,  but  the  case  also  involved  a
complex  regulatory  scheme.  See  360  U.S.  at  224-25.  Moreover,  review  of actions  to
enjoin  the  head  of  an  administrative  department  was  concentrated  in  the  courts
of  one  county.  See  PA.  R.  Civ.  P.  §  1503(c).  Martin  was  such  an  action,  although
subsequent  to  an  abstention  by  the  federal  district  court,  that  state  court  had  al-
ready  found  it  premature  to  decide  the  case  prior  to  "viewers  proceedings,"  see
PA.  STAT.  ANN.  tit.  36,  §§  670-301  et  seq.  (1961),  review  of  which  was  not  concen-
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agency's  expertise  and  beyond  the ken  of the federal  court.238
The  imprecision  of that test  may, allow  it  best to  reconcile  the
case  law;  seeming  deviants,  which  might  include Alabama PSC,
can  be  explained  as  misapplications  of  the  standard  rather
than  an  alteration  in  the  standard  itself. Many  commentators,
however,  have  declined  to  be  even  that  precise  in  delineating
the  administrative  abstention  requirements.  Professor  Wright
recognizes  "Burford-type  abstention"  as  a  separate  category
of  abstention  but  never  states  precisely  what  will  invoke  it,
noting only  that its  purpose  is "to  avoid  interference  with state
activities. '239  Similarly  the  American  Law  Institute  describes
the  Burford  doctrine  simply  as  a  "doctrine  that  the  federal
court  should  relinquish  jurisdiction  where  necessary  to  avoid
needless  conflict  with  the  administratibn  by  a  state  of  its  own
affairs. '240  Likewise  Mr.  Liebenthal  seems  to adopt  an  "all  the
circumstances"  approach.  He suggests  that Burford and Alabama
PSC "are  merely  examples  of the  traditional  equity  cases  con-
cerned  primarily  with  the  propriety  of  equitable  relief  in  a
given  situation  in  which  the  Court  places  great  emphasis  on
the  factor  of  federal-state  harmony"-that  the  doctrine  of
those cases  "is  no more than  the doctrine  which  the Court had
used  before:  No  equity  court  will  unnecessarily  give  extra-
ordinary  equitable  relief, even  though  that  court  has jurisdic-
tion to do so." 241
238  Language  in  Justice  Frankfurter's  dissenting  opinion  in  Great  Northern  Life
Ins.  Co.  v.  Read,  322  U.S.  47,  60  (1944),  concerning  the  scope  of Burford suggests
either  such  a  rule or  a  rule  limited  to  concentrated  review.  The  case Was not an  ab-
stention  case.  The  Court  had  held  that  an  Oklahoma  statute  consenting  to  suits  to
recover  taxes  restricted  its  consent  to  suits  brought  in  state  courts;  construing  the
statute  narrowly,  the  majority  had  adopted  a  rationale  similar  to  the Burford reason-
ing. 322  U.S.  at 54-55. Justice Frankfurter  stated in dissent:
There  is  here  an  entire  absence  of  the  considerations  that  led  to  the
decision  in Burford v.  Sun Oil Co.,  319  U.S.  315.  There  it  was  deemed  desir-
able,  as  a  matter  of discretion,  that  a  federal  equity  court  should  step  aside
and  leave  a  specialized  system  of state  administration  to  function.  Here  the
suit  in  a  federal  court  would  not supplant  a  specially  adaptable  state  scheme
of  administration  nor bring  into  play  the  expert knowledge  of a  state  court
regarding  local  conditions.  The  subject  matter  and  the  course  of  the  litiga-
tion  in  the  federal  court  would  be  precisely  the  same  as  in  the  state  court.
The  case  would  merely  be  argued  in  a  different  building  and  before  a  dif-
ferent judge. Language  restrictive of suit in  a  federal court  is lacking, and in-
trinsic  policy  does  not  suggest  restrictive  interpretation  to  withdraw  from  a
federal court questions of federal constitutional law.
Id. at  60.
239  C.A.  WRIGHT,  FEDERAL  COURTS  200 (1970).
240  ALI  STUDY,  supra note  33, at 283.
241  Supra note  212, at 163-64.
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Any  administrative  abstention  doctrine  broader  than  one
related  to  a  state's  concentration  of judicial  review  should  be
rejected  as  conflicting  with  Congress' jurisdictional  scheme  and
with  the  limits  upon Pullman abstention.  But if  a broader  ad-
ministrative  abstention  doctrine  is  to exist,  as  it unquestionably
does  today,  it is  important  to Pullman abstention  to know  what
the limits are  because otherwise  it may be unclear within which
of the  two  categories  a  particular  case  falls.  If  a case  satisfies
both  the Pullman requirements  for abstention  and the adminis-
trative  ones,  however  those  categories  are  defined,  the  case
should  presumably  be  treated  as  an  administrative  one;  in
cases  falling  within  the  administrative  category,  abstention  is
allowed  more  readily,  and  with  respect  to  more  issues,  than
in  Pullman cases.242  It  may  not  ever  be  desirable,  because  a
case  qualifies  as  "administrative,"  to refer  it to the state judicial
system  for  disposition  on  all  the  issues-or,  indeed,  to  order
any  abstention  at  all.  But  if that disposition  of administrative
cases  generally  is  deemed  desirable  or  proper,  the  fact  that
a  case  also  meets  Pullman requirements  does  not make  it  less
so. The  presence  of unclear  state  law  obviously  does  not make
abstention  less  desirable.  Nor  does  the  presence  of  a  federal
constitutional  issue,  under  the precedents,  make  administrative
abstention  less  proper;  administrative  abstention  cases  have
frequently involved  federal constitutional  issues.243
While  this  treatment  of  a  case  that  satisfies  both Pullman
and  administrative  requirements  may  seem  rather  elementary,
it is  not clear  that courts  have  consistently  so  disposed  of such
cases.  It is fairly typical  for a court not to advert at all  to which
type  of abstention  is  at  issue  or to entangle  references  to both
types  of  abstention  as  though  they  were  interchangeable. 44
242The  Pullman,  administrative,  and  Thibodaux  abstention  doctrines  all  state
conditions  for  removing  cases  from  federal  jurisdiction  which  prima  facie  exists;
the  initial  presumption  in  all  of them  is  in  favor  of federal jurisdiction.  Cf.  note  265
infra  &  accompanying  text.  When  the  Pullman  and  the  administrative  abstention
conditions  concur,  therefore,  it  seems  logical  that  a  court  should  remove  the  case
from  the  federal  jurisdiction  in  accordance  with  the  doctrine  of  administrative  ab-
stention,  since  that  doctrine  removes  it  more  completely.  But see  Barrett  v.  Atlantic
Richfield  Co.,  444  F.2d 38,  45 (5th  Cir.  1971).
243 In  fact, some  commentators  have  found  it necessary  to argue  that the  doctrine
should  not be  limited  to cases  involving  federal  constitutional  issues.  Note,  59  COLUM.
L. REv.  749, 762  (1959).
244 See,  e.g.,  Kaiser  Steel Corp.  v.  W.S.  Ranch  Co.,  391  U.S.  593  (1968).  A concur-
ring  opinion  treats  Kaiser  as  an  administrative  abstention  case,  while  the  majority
opinion  never  adverts  to  what  type  of  abstention  is  at  issue.  Martin  v.  Creasy,  360ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
Burford  is  a  case  that  could  be  used  to  show  that  when  the
requirements  of both  types  of abstention  are  met,  administra-
tive  abstention  is  ordered,  for Burford  arguably  satisfied  the
Pullman  abstention  requirements,2 45   and  Pullman  antedated
Burford.246   Other  cases,  however,  appear  to  contradict  that
rule  and further  discussion  of why they  are treated  as Pullman
rather  than  as  administrative  abstention  cases  is  necessary  to
make  the line between the two categories  intelligible.
Pullman, ironically,  is  itself  a  case  that  under  the  above-
delineated  factors  for  administrative  abstention  would  seem
to  qualify  for  treatment  as  an  administrative  case.247  Clearly
Pullman  involved  review  of  the  order  of  an  administrative
agency-the  Texas  Railroad  Commission.  Moreover,  review
of that agency's orders  was concentrated;  indeed,  it was limited
to  the  same  county's  courts  that  review  of the Burford orders
was. 24 8  Only  if abstention  were  limited  to  suits  involving  factu-
ally complex  situations  would Pullman seem  to fall  without that
doctrine, but on that test Alabama PSC might as well.249
The  troublesbme  fact  is  that  the- Court  has  not  explicitly
addressed  the issue of the line  of demarcation  between Pullman
and  administrative  abstention.  Because  of  the  difference  in
disposition  of the two  categories  of cases,  the  line  can  be  cru-
U.S. 219  (1959),  set  off a debate  as  to  the type  of abstention  involved  which still  con-
tinues.  See  notes  237  supra &  246 infra. In  McNeese  v.  Board  of Educ.,  373  U.S.  668
(1963),  which  was  seen  by  Justice  Harlan  in  dissent  as  an  administrative  abstention
case,  the  Court  did  not  specify  which  type  of  abstention  was  involved-an  omission
that  has  led  to  confusion  concerning  the  possibility  of abstention  in  civil  rights cases.
See notes 162-66 supra & accompanying  text.
245  A  key  question  is  whether  the  federal  constitutional  issue  was  genuine.  See
note  226 supra.
246 Martin  v.  Creasy,  360  U.S.  219  (1959),  may  also support  that  rule.  Certainly
Martin  was  treated,  though  without  explanation  by  the  Court,  as  an  administrative
case,  for  its  disposition  was  dismissal.  Liebenthal  maintains,  however,  though  his
reasoning  is  not  explicit,  that  Martin was  a Pullman case  and  that  the  disposition  by
the  Court  was  erroneous.  Liebenthal,  supra  note  212,  at  165.  Even  if Martin does
satisfy  the  Pullman  requirements,  Liebenthal  should  have  to  show  also  that  it  does
not  satisfy  the  requirements  for  administrative  abstention  in  order  to  prove  the  dis-
position  inappropriate.  The  uncertainty  whether  Martin  is  an  administrative  case
reflects  confusion  concerning  what  the  requirements  for  administrative  abstention
are. See note 237 supra & accompanying text.
24'Pullman  was  decided  prior  to  Burford.  Burford,  however,  did  have  its  pre-
cursors. See, e.g.,  Pennsylvania  v.  Williams,  294 U.S.  176 (1935).
248 The  statutes  concentrating  review  in  the  two  cases  bear  a  marked  resem-
blance.  Compare TEX.  REV.  Civ.  STAT.  art.  6453  (1926)  (Pullman) with  TEx.  REv.  Civ.
STAT.  art. 6049(c),  § 8 (1935)  (Burford).
249 Another  case  that  is  troublesome  from  the  standpoint  of  the  line  between
Pullman and  administrative  abstention  is  Reetz  v.  Bozanich,  397  U.S.  82  (1970).  The
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cial  to  parties  who  have  a  preference  concerning  the  state  or
federal  forum.  Since  so  much  can  turn  on  whether  a  case  is
characterized  as Pullman or  administrative,  it  is strange  to have
no intelligible  law  on the  subject.  If  it retains  an administrative
abstention  category  at  all,  the  Court  should  hold that  the  line
between  it  and  Pullman  abstention  is  defined  by  the  limits
placed  on  administrative  abstention,  since  if a  case  qualifies
as  administrative,  whether  it  satisfies  Pullman requirements  as
well  should  be  simply  irrelevant.  And  if administrative  absten-
tion  is  retained,  it  is  also  important  to  the  proper  application
of the Pullman doctrine  that the  Court  isolate  the  factors  that
invoke  the administrative  doctrine and attend  to their presence
or absence  in each case.
Currently  it  may  be  of little  import  to Pullman abstention
what  the  limits  of  administrative  abstention  are  and  which
category  predominates  when  a  case  satisfies  administrative
and Pullman requirements,  because  there  may  be  an  exception
to  the  administrative  abstention  doctrine  for  suits  brought
under  the  Civil  Rights  Act.  As  stated  earlier, 50  McNeese  v.
issue  in Reetz  was  the  constitutionality,  under  state  and  federal  law,  of Alaska  pro-
visions  limiting  salmon  fishing  licenses  to  particular  persons.  The  licenses  were
issued  through  a  state  administrative  agency.  That  agency's  regulations,  as  well
as the authorizing statute, were attacked  as  unconstitutional.  The plaintiffs  had  applied
for  and  had  been  denied  the  fishing  licenses  they  sought  in  1968.  They  apparently
did  not  request  licenses  under  the  1969  regulations.  See  Bozanich  v.  Reetz,  297
F.  Supp.  300,  304  (D.  Alaska  1969).  The  fact  that  in  the  litigation  they  were  not
formally  challenging  the  denial  of  licenses  may justify  the  Court's  failure  to  treat
the  case  as  administrative.  If  so,  however,  plaintiffs  would  be  able  strategically  to
manipulate  the  application  of the  abstention  doctrines  by  the  way  they  frame  their
suit.  That  would  seem  out  of  keeping  with  abstention's  purposes,  which  are  to
protect  interests  other  than  the  plaintiffs',  and  which  seem  unaffected  by  the  dif-
ference  between  the  form  of  the  plaintiffs'  suit  in  Reetz  and  the  form  the  suit
would  have  taken  if  the  plaintiffs  had  applied  for  licenses  in  1969.  Cf  Wreiole  v.
Waterfront  Comm'n,  132  F.  Supp.  166  (S.D.N.Y.  1955).  Although  the  plaintiffs  in
that  case  attacked  a  statute  authorizing  an  administrative  order  rather  than  the  ad-
ministrative  order  itself,  the  Court  did  not  allow  that  fact  to  prevent  administrative
abstention.
Moreover,  if  in  Reetz  it  is  the  plaintiffs'  failure  to  apply  for  licenses  in  1969
that  explains  the  Court's  treatment  of  the  case  as  a  Pullman  case  rather  than  an
administrative  one,  it  is  troublesome  that  the  opinion  of the  Court  does  not  reflect
that  fact.  Instead  the  possibility  of administrative  abstention  is  not  alluded  to,  and
Pullman  abstention  seems  simply  to  have  been  assumed  as  the  issue.  See  also  Lake
Carriers'  Ass'n  v.  MacMullen,  406  U.S.  498  (1972)  (administrative  abstention  not
contemplated).
Another  case  that  was  treated  as  a Pullman case  but  that  might  conceivably  have
qualified  for  administrative  abstention,  depending upon the  scope  given  that doctrine,
is  Reid  v.  Board  of  Educ.,  453  F.2d  238  (2d  Cir.  1971),  in  which judicial  review  was
not concentrated.  Cf  Chicago  v.  Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc.,  316 U.S.  168 (1942).
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Board of Education251  probably should  not be  read  to  create  an
exception  to  Pullman  abstention  for  civil  rights  cases.  But  it
seemingly  does  create  such  an  exception  for  administrative
cases,  an  exception  allowing  the  bypassing  not  only  of state
judicial  remedies,  as  were  involved  in  Burford  and  Alabama
PSC, but also of remedies of the administrative  agency  itself.252
If  such  an  exception  to  administrative  abstention  is  accepted,
it  could  encompass  all  cases  currently  admitted  to  the Pullman
category.  As  long  as  a  federal  constitutional  issue  is  requisite
to  Pullman abstention,  it  would  seem  that  all  cases  satisfying
current  Pullman standards  could  be  pursued  under  the  civil
rights  exception,  if they  satisfied  the criteria  for administrative
abstention  as  well.  In that event, there would be no problem  of
overlap  between  the  Pullman  and  administrative  categories.
The  problem  of  overlap  remains  relevant,  however,  to  the
extent  that doubt remains  concerning  the  existence of the  civil
rights  exception  or  its  scope.253  Moreover,  the  problem  would
recur  if the  suggestion  were  adopted  that Pullman abstention
not be limited to cases containing a federal constitutional issue.
III.  THE  DOMBROWSKI-YOUNGER  LINE  OF  CASES
It  is  basic  to Pullman abstention  that  the  presumption  is
in  favor of federal jurisdiction;  it  takes  "special  circumstances"
-usually  articulated  as  unclear  state  law  and  the possibility  of
251 373  U.S.  668 (1963).
252 See language quoted in note  163 supra.
253 McNeese's holding  is  the  chief authority  for the  exception. There  is some  prob-
lem  even  with  that case  as  authority,  for the  Court announced  as well  a different  and
sufficient  ground  for  its  decision:  that  the  administrative  procedure  that  the  state
provided  was  an  inadequate  one.  While  that  ground  might  limit  McNeese,  however,
the  case  of  Damico  v.  California,  389  U.S.  416  (1967),  held  that  the  limitation  is
unintended.  Plaintiffs  in  Damico  sued  under  the  Civil  Rights  Act  to  challenge  the
constitutionality  of  certain  welfare  provisions.  They  brought  suit  in  federal  court
without  either  first  pursuing  administrative  remedies  or  challenging  them  as  inade-
quate.  The  district court  dismissed  the  complaint for  failure  to exhaust administrative
remedies  but  the  Supreme  Court,  without  hearing  argument,  reversed  per  curiam,
indicating  that  under McNeese  exhaustion  of administrative  remedies  is  not  required.
Justice  Harlan  alone  dissented,  expressing  a  desire  to  limit  McNeese  to  cases  involv-
ing  inadequate  administrative  remedies.  Damico  is  of  interest  also  because  while
a  civil  rights  exception  laid  down  by  McNeese  could  conceivably  be  limited  to  racial
matters, the Damico holding  precludes such a narrowing of the  exception.
While  Damico would  seem  dispositive  of  the  exhaustion  problem,  Justice  White,
writing  for  the  Court,  has  recently  claimed  it  is  an  open  question  whether  McNeese
states  an  invariable  exception  to  administrative  exhaustion.  Gibson  v.  Berryhill,
411  U.S.  564,  575  (1973).  (Two  concurring  Justices,  however,  stated  it is  an  invari-
able  exception.  Id.  at  581).  Some  lower  courts,  moreover,  have  declined  to  apply  a
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avoiding  a  federal  constitutional  question-to justify referring
state  law  issues  to  the  states.254  There  is,  however,  a  category
of  cases  falling  within  federal  jurisdictional  grants  in  which
the  presumption  is  in  favor  of state jurisdiction,  and  the  fed-
eral  plaintiff  must  show  "special  circumstances"  to justify  the
exercise  of federal jurisdiction. 255  It  is  this  group  that  will  be
referred  to  as  the  "Dombrowski-Younger"  group  of  cases.  It
differs  from  the Pullman group  also  in  that,  as  in  administra-
tive  cases,  a  federal  court  decision  staying  its  hand  results  in
a state proceeding wherein  federal  issues  are adjudicated  along
with state ones.256
A  description  of three  of the  leading  cases  in  the  "Dom-
browski-Younger"  category  illustrates  the  difference.  between
McNeese  exception  where  the  state  remedy  to  be  pursued  is  ain  adequate  one.  E.g.,
Eisen  v.  Eastman,  421  F.2d  560,  567-69  (2d  Cir.  1969).  In  Eisen, Judge  Friendly
distinguished  Damico  on  the  ground  that  a  terse  elaboration  of  Damico  in  King  v.
Smith,  392  U.S.  309,  312  n.4  (1968),  indicated  that  administrative  remedies  need  not
be  exhausted  only  where  constitutionality  was  an  issue  and  exhaustion  would  prob-
ably  be futile.
254See,  e.g.,  Baggett  v.  Bullitt,  377  U.S.  360,  375  (1964);  Propper  v.  Clark,  337
U.S.  472, 492 (1949).
255  Dombrowski  v.  Pfister,  380  U.S.  479,  485  (1965).  See  also  Douglas  v.  City  of
Jeannette,  319 U.S.  157,  163  (1943).
256 Moreover  this  proceeding  may be,  and  usually is,  a  state  criminal  prosecution,
as  it  is  most  unlikely  to  be in  Pullman abstention  cases.  See  note  200 supra. It is  not
altogether  clear,  however,  that  the  Dombrowski-Younger  category  is  limited  to  suits
involving  state  criminal  prosecutions  as  distinct  from  state  civil  enforcement  pro-
ceedings.  See  note  278  infra. It  does  seem  that  only  enforcement  proceedings  by  the
state  against  the  particular federal  plaintiff  will  warrant  the  deference  the Dombrowski-
Younger  category  affords.  This  limitation  obviates  the  problem  that  a  state  declara-
tory  remedy  would  almost  always  be  adequate  to  prevent  irreparable  harm  in  the
Dombrowski-Younger sense  of  that  term, see  text  accompanying  notes  266-68  infra, and
thus,  if it  could  invoke  the Dombrowski-Younger  change of presumption,  could  operate
to  displace  almost  entirely  federal  jurisdiction. See  notes  264-76  infra &  accompany-
ing text.
There  is  another  important  doctrine  that  is  distinct  from  the  Dombrowski-Younger
or  any  other  abstention  doctrine,  whereby  a  federal  court  may  in  its  discretion  defer
to  state  declaratory  or  other  proceedings  involving  the  same  issues  as  the  federal
action,  whether  the  proceedings  are  between  the  same  parties  or  not,  by  awaiting
the  outcome  of  the  state  proceedings  before  going  forward  with  the  federal  suit.
Amdur  v.  Lizars,  372  F.2d  103  (4th  Cir.  1967);  P.  Beiersdorf  &  Co.  v.  McGohey,
187  F.2d  14  (2d  Cir.  1951); see  H.  HART  &  H.  WECHSLER,  THE  FEDERAL  COURTS  AND
THE  FEDERAL  SYSTEM  1057  (1953).  That  doctrine,  which  is  frequently  alluded  to  in
cases  along  with  one or  more abstention  doctrines,  is  supplementary  to the  abstention
doctrines  and  may  explain  some  cases  that  may  otherwise  seem  difficult  to  justify
in  terms  of  the  'traditional  abstention  categories.  E.g.,  Askew  v.  Hargrave,  401  U.S.
476  (1971);  Kaiser  Steel  Corp.  v.  W.S.  Ranch  Co.,  391  U.S.  593  (1968).  It  may  be
justifiable  to  allow  deference  to  an  ongoing  state  proceeding  in  the  district judge's
discretion  without  regard  to  whether  traditional  abstention  requirements  are  met,
not  only  because  of  the  state's  interests  but  also  because  such  deference  does  not
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this  group  and Pullman cases. Douglas v.  City of  Jeannette 257  was
a suit to enjoin the city of Jeannette  from prosecuting the plain-
tiffs  for  violating  an  ordinance  prohibiting  distribution  of
pamphlets  without  obtaining  a  license.  The  plaintiffs  claimed
the  ordinance  violated  the  first  amendment  when  applied  to
Jehovah's  Witnesses.  The  district  court  agreed  and  issued  an
injunction  prohibiting  enforcement  of  the  ordinance  against
the  plaintiffs  or  other  Jehovah's  Witnesses.  In  another  case
decided  the  same  day  as  Douglas,258  the  Supreme  Court  sus-
tained  the  plaintiffs'  position  on  the substantive  ground,  hold-
ing  that  the  ordinance  could  not  constitutionally  be  applied
to  religious  solicitation.  In  Douglas, however,  it  reversed  the
judgment  of  the  district  court,  holding  it  error  to  grant  an
injunction  against  prosecution  under  the  invalid  ordinance.
The Court  said  the injunction was  unnecessary  since  the  plain-
tiffs  could assert their federal  constitutional  claim  in defending
any criminal prosecution.
2 5 9
In D6mbrowski v.  Pfister 2 60  the  plaintiffs  sought declaratory
relief and  an  injunction  restraining  various  state  officials  from
prosecuting  them under  a  statute  which  they  claimed  violated
the  first  amendment  because  it  was  overbroad.  They  also
alleged  that the threatened  prosecutions  would  not be  brought
in  good  faith  but  instead  would  be  brought  with  no  hope  of
securing valid  convictions,  as part  of a campaign  to  harass  the
plaintiffs. The  district court had emulated the Supreme  Court's
Douglas holding  and  held  that  even  if the  plaintiffs'  constitu-
impose  on  the  parties  as  much  as  abstention  often  does,  since  it  does  not  require
initiation of any  additional proceeding.
257  319 U.S.  157 (1943).
258  Murdock v.  Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.  105 (1943).
259  A narrow but possible  explanation of Douglas is that an injunction  was  thought
unnecessary  because  Murdock  rendered  it  unlikely  that  the  city  would  prosecute.
Cf. Speight v.  Slaton,  94  S.  Ct. 1098  (1974).  The Court's language  in Douglas is broad-
er  than that  narrow  reading  and  suggests  that in  the  absence  of Murdock  the Douglas
holding  would  be  the  same.  In  Dombrowski,  while  the  Court  distinguished  Douglas at
one  point on  the  ground  that  Pennsylvania  courts  and  prosecutors  could  be  expected
to  follow  Murdock,  380  U.S.  at  162,  it  dealt  also  with  the  other  reasoning  Douglas
suggested.
Except  for  the Murdock  holding,  the  plaintiffs  in Douglas had  shown a  likelihood
that  the  ordinance  would  be  enforced  against  them.  They  had  earlier  been  arrested
and  prosecuted  for  distributing  pamphlets  similar  to  those  they  currently  desired
to  distribute,  and  state  officials  had  threatened  to  continue  so  to  prosecute  them.
See Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389  U.S.  241  (1967);  cf. Younger  v.  Harris,  401  U.S.  37,  41-42
(1971).
260  380 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tional  allegations  had  merit,  an  injunction  against  state  prose-
cution was not warranted.
The  Supreme  Court  disagreed,  finding  here  special  cir-
cumstances  justifying  the  exercise  of federal  jurisdiction:  De-
fense  of  the  state  criminal  prosecution  in  this  instance  was
not  adequate  to  protect  the  plaintiffs'  constitutional  rights.
While  the  Court  did  not  clearly  set  forth  the  circumstances
that  would  impel  the  exercise  of  federal  jurisdiction,  it  was
relevant  that  bad  faith  was  alleged.  It  was  also  relevant  that
the  challenged  statute  regulated  freedom  of  expression  and
was  attacked  on  grounds  of overbreadth.  A statute  containing
that vice  is  unlikely  to be  cured,  according  to  the  Court,2 61  in
a  single  state  proceeding. 2 62  Yet  plaintiffs  in  such  cases  should
not  have  to  await  a  series  of prosecutions,  for  while  they  are
pending,  the  threat  of  prosecution  may  substantially  chill  the
exercise of first amendment rights.
Finally,  in  Younger  v.  Harris 263  the  plaintiff  sought  to  en-
join  the  Los  Angeles  district  attorney  from  prosecuting  him
for  violating  the  California  Criminal  Syndicalism  Act.  He
claimed  "that  the  prosecution  and  even  the  presence  of  the
Act  inhibited  him  in  the  exercise  of  his  rights  of free  speech
and  press. '264  The district  court  held  in  his  favor,  finding  the
Act  void  for vagueness  and  overbreadth.  The  Supreme  Court
reversed,  saying  that  as  in Douglas the  state  criminal  prosecu-
tion was an adequate  forum for raising the constitutional issue.
While  federal jurisdiction  was  exercised  in Dombrowksi and
declined  in  Douglas and  Younger,  in  all  three  cases  the  Court
started  from  the  premise  that the  federal  courts  should  defer
in  favor of state jurisdiction if the contemplated  state  proceed-
ing  was  adequate  to  protect  the  plaintiffs'  rights.  It  is  that
premise,  which  separates  these  from Pullman cases,  that  is  of
primary  interest  here,  and  not  the  much-discussed  issue  of
which  cases  within  the  Dombrowski-Younger  category  warrant
the  exercise  of federal jurisdiction  and  which  do  not. Why  is
the  presumption  against  the  exercise  of  federal  jurisdiction
261But  see  the  state  courts'  construction  of  the  ordinances  in  Shuttlesworth  iv.
Birmingham,  394  U.S.  147  (1969);  Poulos  v.  New  Hampshire,  345  U.S.  395  (1953);
and  Cox v.  New Hampshire, 312  U.S.  569, 575-76 (1941).
262  380 U.S. at 486. See also Baggett  v. Bullitt, 377  U.S.  360, 378-79 (1964).
263  401  U.S. 37 (1971),
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in  Dombrowski-Younger  cases,  requiring  the  plaintiff  to  show
the  necessity  of federal jurisdiction  on  the  facts  of  his  partic-
ular  case,  when  those  cases  like Pullman cases  fall  within  con-
gressional jurisdictional  grants? 26 5
The  explanation  the  Court  has  most  prominently  given
for  not  exercising  jurisdiction  in  Dombrowski-Younger  cases  is
the  plaintiffs'  failure  to  satisfy  the  requirement  of irreparable
harm.  The  Court  has  recalled  the  traditional  rule  of  equity
that  irreparable  harm  must  be  shown  for  an  injunction  to
issue  and  reasoned  that  that prerequisite  to injunctive  relief 266
is  not  satisfied  if the  state  proceeding  provides  an  adequate
forum for litigating the constitutional  issue.26 7
The  irreparable  harm  requirement  does  not,  however,
adequately  explain  why  Dombrowski-Younger  cases  differ  from
Pullman cases,  which  also  typically  involve  injunctive  relief.  In
Pullman cases,  however,  the Court  follows  its usual equity  prac-
tice  of applying the irreparable  harm requirement  and the rule
of equity  that no injunction should  issue if there  is an adequate
remedy  at  law,  by  looking  to  whether  available  remedies  on
the  law  side  of the  federal  court  afford  the  plaintiff sufficient
protection. 26 8  Because  of  its  "duty"  to  "give  due  respect  to  a
suitor's  choice  of a  federal forum  for  the hearing  and decision
26-  Like  Pullman  cases,  these  cases  are  typically  brought  under  the  general
federal  question jurisdiction,  28  U.S.C. §  1331  (1970);  the  Civil  Rights  Act,  id. §  1343
(1970);  the  Declaratory  Judgment  Act,  id.  §  2201  (1970);  and/or  the  diversity  juris-
diction,  id.  §  1332  (1970).  In  some  of the  cases  there  is  an  issue  of  'Justiciability"
as  well.  E.g.,  Boyle  v.  Landry,  401  U.S.  77  (1971);  Younger  v.  Harris,  401  U.S.  37,
41-42  (1971).  Of  course,  where  the  case  is  deemed  nonjusticiable  federal jurisdiction
will  not  be  exercised  for  that  reason.  What  is  significant  is  the  need  specially  to
justify  the  exercise  of federal jurisdiction  in  these  cases  when  the  standing,  ripeness,
and other  case-or-controversy requirements are met.
266  Though  traditionally  it  is  a  prerequisite  to  injunctive  relief,  the  same  limita-
tion  applies  in  these  cases  when  declaratory  relief  is  sought,  at  least  when  a  state
prosecution  is  pending.  Samuels  v.  Mackell,  401  U.S.  66  (1971).  Zwickler  v.  Koota,
389  U.S.  241  (1967),  indicated  that is  not the  case  when  no state  prosecution  is pend-
ing,  but  the  Samuels  reasoning  suggested  that Zwickler  would  no  longer  be  followed
in  that  respect. But see  Perez  v.  Ledesma,  401  U.S.  82,  103-30  (1971)  (Brennan, J.,
concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part).  The  recent  case  of Steffel  v.  Thompson,
94  S.  Ct.  1209  (1974),  appears,  however,  to  limit  Samuels  to  cases  involving  pending
state prosecutions. But cf. notes  322-23 infra.
267 See  Younger  v.  Harris,  401  U.S.  37,  43-49,  53-54  (1971);  Dombrowski  v.
Pfister,  380  U.S.  479,  484-89  (1965);  Douglas  v.  City  of Jeannette,  319  U.S.  157,
162-64 (1943). 266 See  DiGiovanni  v.  Camden  Fire  Ins.  Ass'n,  296  U.S.  64,  69  (1935);  McConihay
v.  Wright,  121  U.S.  201  (1887).
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of  his  federal  constitutional  claims,
' ' 69   the  Court  does  not
take  into  account,  in  determining  whether  the  equity  require-
ments  are  met,  the  existence  of  state  proceedings  that  could
provide adequate relief.
The  irreparable  harm  requirement  cannot  then  explain
the  difference  in  presumption  between  Dombrowski-Younger
and  Pullman  cases.  For  different  irreparable  harm  require-
ments  are  imposed  in  the  two  classes  of  cases.  Explanation
remains  necessary  for  why  in  Dombrowski-Younger  cases  the
question  asked  is  whether given the  existence of the state forum270
as a possible  forum, irreparable  harm would  result from  a failure
to exercise  federal jurisdiction,  while in Pullman cases the issue
is  whether  irreparable  harm  supports  injunctive  relief  and
not whether it supports a federal forum.
The  most  likely  explanation  for  the  Court's  differing  ap-
proach  delineates  the  Dombrowski-Younger  category  as  cases
involving  attempts  to  enjoin  state  criminal  proceedings  and
then  invokes,  in  addition  to  federal-state  comity,  a  tradi-
tional  equitable  doctrine
2 7 1  against  enjoining  criminal  proceed-
269 Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389  U.S.  241,  248  (1967).  Justice  Brennan  goes  on  to  say
for the Court:
Plainly,  escape  from  that duty  is  not  permissible  merely  because  state  courts
also  have  the  solemn  responsibility,  equally  with  the  federal  courts,  ".  . . to
guard,  enforce,  and  protect  every  right  granted or  secured  by  the  Constitu-
tion  of the  United States  ... ,"  Robb v.  Connolly,  111  U.S.  624,  637.  "We  yet
like  to  believe  that  wherever  the  Federal  courts sit,  human  rights  under the
Federal  Constitution  are  always  a  proper  subject  for  adjudication,  and  that
we  have  not  the right  to  decline  the  exercise  of  that jurisdiction  simply  be-
cause  the  rights asserted  may  be  adjudicated  in  some  other forum". Stapleton
v.  Mitchell,  60  F.  Supp.  51,  55;  see  McNeese  v.  Board of Education, 373  U.S.
at 674, n.6. Cf. Cohens v.  Virginia, 6 Wheat.  264, 404.
Id. Those  statements  are  directly  contradictory,  however,  to  the  practice  in  the Dom-
browski-Younger  group  of cases  where  "adjudication  of  constitutional  defenses  in  the
course  of  a criminal  prosecution"  is  considered  "normal," Dombrowski  v.  Pfister,  380
U.S.  at  485;  where  it  takes  a  showing  that being  left  to  the  state  remedy  will  result
in  irreparable  injury  before  a  suitor's  choice  of  the  federal  forum  will  be  respected;
and  where  the  state  forum  will  not  be  deemed  inadequate  simply  on  grounds  of
federal-court  superiority  in  deciding  questions  of  federal  law,  see  380  U.S.  at  484
-the  view  that  presumably  lies  at  the  basis  of  Congress'  grant  of  federal  question
jurisdiction,  and of the  Court's  insistence  in Pullman cases  that the  parties may reserve
federal questions  for the federal  forum.
270 The  state  forum  will  usually,  perhaps  invariably,  be  a  criminal  trial  court.
See note 256 supra & note 278 infra. But cf. note 323 infra.
271 The  rule  that  equity  will  not  interfere  with  criminal  prosecutions  does  have
deep  roots.  The  Supreme  Court  first  expounded  upon  it  in  In re  Sawyer,  124  U.S.
200  (1888),  pointing  out  that  well  before  the  Declaration  of  Independence  it  was
settled  in  England  that  courts  of chancery  lacked  power  to  stay  criminal  proceedingsABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
ings.27 1 2  Language  in  Douglas supports  both  elements  of  this
explanation:
. . . Congress, by its legislation,  has adopted the policy,
with  certain  well  defined  statutory  exceptions,  of leav-
ing  generally  to  the  State  courts  the  trial  of criminal
cases  arising  under state  laws,  subject to review  by this
Court of any federal  questions involved.  Hence,  courts
of equity  in the  exercise  of their  discretionary  powers
should  conform  to this  policy  by refusing  to interfere
with  or  embarrass  threatened  proceedings  in  state
courts  save  in  those  exceptional  cases  which  call  for
the  interposition  of a court of equity to prevent  irrep-
arable  injury  which  is  clear  and  imminent;  and  equi-
table  remedies  infringing  this  independence  of  the
states-though  they  might  otherwise  be given-should
be  withheld  if  sought  on  slight  or  inconsequential
grounds....
It  is  a  familiar  rule  that  courts  of equity  do  not
ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions ....  273
The  Court's  reasons  for  shifting  the  presumption  in  that
category  of cases  do,  however,  leave  something  to  be  desired.
Immediately  preceding  the  above-quoted  language,  the  Court
and  that  state  courts  had  adhered  to  that limitation  in  interpreting  the  powers  of
their respective court systems.
272 It is not absolutely clear that this  is the explanation for the differing Dombrowski-
Younger and Pullman approaches  to the  exercise  of federal jurisdiction,  however,  for it
is  not  settled  whether  the  Dombrowski-Younger  category  is  limited  to  interference
with criminal enforcement  proceedings.  See note  278 infra.
273  319  U.S.  at  163.  Further  language  suggests  that  the  impetus  against  exercise
of federal jurisdiction  comes  largely  from  a reluctance  to interfere  with  state  criminal
processes:
Notwithstanding  the  authority  of  the  district  court,  as  a  federal  court,  to
hear  and  dispose  of  the  case,  petitioners  are  entitled  to  the  relief  prayed
only  if they  establish  a  cause  of action  in  equity.  Want of equity jurisdiction,
while not going  to the  power of the court to  decide the  cause .....  may  nev-
ertheless,  in  the  discretion  of the  court,  be  objected  to  on  its  own  motion.
: . * Especially  should  it  do  so where  its  powers  are  invoked  to  interfere  by
injunction with threatened  criminal  prosecutions  in a state court.
319 U.S.  at 162.
Language  throughout  Dombrowski  and  Younger  also  indicates  that  the  Dombrow-
ski-Younger  analysis  is  limited  to  cases  in  which  a  plaintiff  attempts  to  interfere  with
state criminal  prosecutions, as  does the language  in other cases  as well. E.g.,  Samuels  v.
Mackell,  401  U.S.  66,  68,  69,  71,  72,  & 73  (1971);  Meredith  v. Winter Haven,  320  U.S.
228,  235  (1943).  And  support  is  found  for  a  traditional  equitable  doctrine  against
interfering  with  state  criminal  proceedings  in  Fitts  v.  McGhee,  172  U.S.  516,  531-32
(1899),  and In re Sawyer,  124  U.S. 200,  210-11  (1888). But cf. Parker v. Brown, 317  U.S.
341,  349-50  (1943);  Packard v. Banton,  264 U.S.  140,  143 (1924).
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said,  "The power reserved  to the  states under the Constitution
to  provide  for  the  determination  of  controversies  in  their
courts  may be  restricted  by  federal  district  courts  only  in  obe-
dience  to  Congressional  legislation  in  conformity  to  the judi-
ciary  Article  of the  Constitution. '274  Yet  congressional  legisla-
tion  rather  clearly  places  the  cases  in  question  within  the
federal jurisdiction.  The  Court's  reference  to  a  congressionally
adopted  policy  of leaving  criminal  cases  to  the  states  is  appar-
ently  an  attempt  to  circumvent  that  difficulty;  its  language
"Congress,  by  its  legislation,  has  adopted  the  policy"  may sug-
gest the  cases  are not in  fact in  the federal  sphere. The  Court
does  not, however,  inform  us what legislation  it has in mind.
2 75
Moreover,  it  becomes  clear  that  the  Court  is  not referring  to
a  legislative  directive,  but  simply  a  policy  the  Court  derives
from  congressional  laws  generally,  when it  goes  on to  say  that
federal  courts  should  accordingly  "in  the  exercise  of  their
discretionary  powers"  decline  to  interfere  with  state  criminal
proceedings  except  when such interference  is  absolutely  neces-
sary  to  prevent  irreparable  harm.  One  wonders  how  such  an
uncodified  congressional  policy,  admittedly  not  binding  on
the courts,  can outweigh and  displace the explicit congressional
grants  of jurisdiction  contained  in the  general federal  question
statute and the  Civil Rights  Acts.
276
But  even  if one  were  to  accept  a tradition  of noninterfer-
ence  with  state  criminal  proceedings  as  sufficient  explanation
for  the  differing  Dombrowski-Younger  and  Pullman approaches
to  the  exercise  of  federal  jurisdiction,  there  would  remain  a
274  319  U.S.  at  162-63.  In  In  re  Sawyer,  124  U.S.  200  (1888),  the  Court  quite
properly  noted  that  the  traditional  bounds  of  equity  courts'  jurisdiction,  which  it
was  describing,  were  controlling  only  "unless  enlarged  by  express  statute."  Id.  at  210.
275  The  legislation  most suggestive  of the  kind  of congressional  policy  the  Court
refers  to  is  congressional  legislation  permitting  removal  much  more  broadly  in
civil cases  in state courts involving federal questions than in similar criminal cases.
276  Cf  text  accompanying  notes  40-45  and  65-71.  One  could  argue  instead
that  the  presumption  in  favor  of  state  fora  in  these  cases  derives  from  the  policy
behind  the  federal  anti-injunction  statute,  28  U.S.C.  §  2283  (1970),  which  forbids
injunctions  against  state  proceedings  except  in  certain  circumstances.  Justice  Black
explained  the  policy  this  way  in  Younger  v.  Harris,  401  U.S.  37,  43  (1971).  Such  an
explanation  of the  deference  paid  state courts  in this  class of cases  does  not, however,
advance  the  inquiry,  since  the Anti-Injunction  Act  does  not apply  to  these  cases.  At
the  time of the  Younger decision  it was  an  open issue  whether  cases  arising  under the
Civil  Rights  Acts, as  all the  cases  in question  do, see text accompanying  note  164 supra,
are  excepted  from  § 2283  or not;  the  Court  in Younger  declined  to  decide  the  issue.
401  U.S.  at 54.  It  is  now  settled,  however,  that such  an exception  does exist.  Mitchum
v.  Foster, 407  U.S.  225  (1972).  And  it  has  long  been  settled  that  the  anti-injunction
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difficulty in  knowing which  cases to treat  as Dombrowski-Younger
cases,  with  the  attendant  presumption  in  favor  of  the  state
forum,  and  which  instead  to  subject  only  to Pullman analysis.
The  difficulty  in  knowing  how  to  treat  a  particular  case  is
solely  in  the  demarcation  of the  Dombrowski-Younger  category,
which  changes  the  usual  presumption  concerning  the  exercise
of  federal  jurisdiction  in  cases  within  a jurisdictional  grant.
Once  it  is  known  which  cases  warrant  the  application  of the
Dombrowski-Younger  presumption,  the  interaction  of  that  doc-
trine  with  the Pullman abstention  doctrine  seems  clear.  If  the
facts  of  a  given  case  place  it  within  the  Dombrowski-Younger
category,  and  if  application  of  that  category's  rules  suggests
the  state  forum  is  proper,  then  a  Pullman analysis  becomes
superfluous;  the  state  forum  will  decide  all  issues  in  the  case
regardless  of whether  the  case  contains  an  unclear  question
of state  law  whose  resolution  might  avoid  a  federal  constitu-
tional  question.  Like  the  administrative  abstention  category,
then,  the  Dombrowski-Younger  category  can  remove  an  other-
statute  applies  only  against  state  proceedings  that  are  pending  at  the  time  the  in-
junction  is  sought,  see  Dombrowski  v.  Pfister,  380  U.S.  479,  484  n.2  (1965);  Ex parte
Young,  209  U.S.  123,  161-62  (1908),  a  rule  that  excludes  some  of  the  cases  in  the
Dombrowski-Younger  category  from  the  statutory  prohibition,  including  Dombrowski
itself.  There  is  another  respect  as  well  in  which  the  Dombrowski-Younger  category
differs  in  scope  from  the  anti-injunction  statute:  The  statute  applies  to  all  pending
state  civil  and  criminal  proceedings  that are  not  excepted,  whereas  the  Dombrowski-
Younger  presumption  may  be  limited  to  criminal  proceedings,  see  text  accompanying
notes  271-76 supra, and  at any rate  does  not cover  more  than  state enforcement  pro-
ceedings, see  notes 256 supra & 278 infra.
It is  clear then  that it1is  not the anti-injunction  statute  itself that requires  the shift
in  presumption  in  these  cases.  It  seems  strange,  then,  to  assume  that  the  policy
behind  the  act  could  extend  it  to  cases  excepted  from  its  reach.  Nonetheless,  that
is  the  approach  of Younger, in  which  the Court  avoided  deciding  whether  the  act  did
apply  by  holding  that  the  same  result  concerning  the  availability  of  an  injunction
would  obtain  whether  or not  it did;  in either  event,  the  federal  court  would  exercise
jurisdiction  upon a  showing  of bad  faith  or  harassment,  which  was  deemed  to satisfy
the  irreparable harm requirement, but not otherwise.
Even  accepting  that  the  same  rule  will  obtain  in  cases  within  the  statutory  pro-
hibition and  those within  exceptions,  however,  "the  policy of the act"  does  not explain
the  shift  of  presumption  in  Dombrowski-Younger cases  without  identification  of  what
that  policy  is.  Nor  can  one  know  how  far  beyond  the  statute's  terms  the  policy  will
apply  without  identifying  it.  In  Younger,  Justice  Black  admitted  that  "the  precise
reasons  for  this  long-standing  public  policy  against  federal  court  interference  have
never  been  specifically  identified,"  but  he said  the "primary  sources"  are,  first, "the
basic  doctrine  of equity jurisprudence  that  courts  of equity  should  not  act,  and  par-
ticularly  should  not act  to restrain  a  criminal  prosecution,  when  the  moving party  has
an  adequate  remedy  at law  and  will  not suffer  irreparable  injury  if denied  equitable
relief"  (see  note  271  supra) and  second,  "the  notion  of 'comity',  that  is,  a  proper
respect  for  state  functions,"  a  doctrine  which  Justice  Black  refers  to  as  "Our  Fed-
eralism." 401  U.S. at 43-44.
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wise appropriate  case  from Pullman treatment. If, on the other
hand,  the  case  is  within  the  Dombrowski-Younger  category  but
is  one  in  which  the  exercise  of federal jurisdiction  is  deemed
proper, then Pullman analysis  as  well  must be  undertaken. The
case  will  remain  wholly within  the  federal forum  if it  does  not
contain  an  unclear  issue  of state  law  whose  resolution  might
avoid  a  federal  constitutional  question.  If  it  does  contain  such
an  issue,  however,  Pullman abstention  under  the England pro-
cedures  is  proper  and  the  parties  retain  the  right  to  return
to the federal court for adjudication of the federal  issues. 2 7 7
Assuming  that  the  Dombrowski-Younger  category  is  accu-
rately described  as  "cases  where  the plaintiff  seeks  to  interfere
277 Professors  Bator,  Shapiro,  Mishkin,  and  Wechsler  in  H.  HART  & H.  WECHSLER,
supra  note  8,  at  1044,  have  suggested  that  a  case  that  survives  Dombrowski-Younger
analysis  but  is  ultimately  referred  to  state  court as  a  result  of Pullman analysis  is  "a
merely  theoretical  possibility."  It  does  seem  perfectly  possible,  however,  that  a  case
that  under Younger  and  Dombrowski  is  deserving  of a  federal  forum  because  the  fed-
eral  plaintiff  would  suffer  irreparable  harm  if  limited  to  the  state  enforcement  pro-
ceedings  might  also  contain  an  unclear  issue  of  state  law  whose  resolution  might
avoid  a  federal constitutional  question.  Such  a  case seems  unlikely  only if it is  deemed
essential,  in  order  to  meet  the  Dombrowski-Younger  irreparable  harm  requirement,
that the case  be  one where  the  disputed issue  does not appear capable  of resolution  in
one  state  proceeding.  For  courts  will  not  abstain under Pullman unless  it appears  that
a  single state  proceeding  can  dispose  of the  state  issue. See  note  166 supra. But  even
if  this  were  so,  Pullman abstention  might  in  a  given  case  be  proper  on  a  different
issue  than  the  one  that,  if  left  to  the  state  enforcement  proceeding,  would  cause
the  litigants  irreparable  harm.  Moreover,  it  is  not  clear  whether  it  is  essential  to  the
exercise  of federal jurisdiction  in  a Dombrowski-Younger case  that the case  be  one where
the  issue  the  federal  plaintiff  raises  could not  be  settled  in  a  single  state  proceeding.
If  a  federal  plaintiff  alleges  bad  faith  or  harassment,  that  may  itself be  sufficient  to
impel  the  exercise  of federal jurisdiction.  Language  in  Younger  is  ambiguous  on  the
point.  401  U.S.  at 49,  53,  &  54.  It  could  be  read  either  as  requiring  only  bad  faith
or  harassment,  or  as  requiring  as  well  that  the  challenge  be  to  a  vague  and/or  over-
broad  statute,  with  which  most Dombrowski-Younger cases  are  concerned,  see  Maraist,
Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The  Significance of Dombrowski,
48  TEXAs  L.  REV.  535,  580-81  (1970),  and  where  it  is  deemed  that  the  defendant
cannot adequately  protect  his federal rights by defending  a single  proceeding.
In Dombrowski  in  fact,  after  holding  that the  irreparable  harm  requirement  for
the  exercise  of  federal  jurisdiction  was  satisfied,  the  Court  went  on  to  discuss  the
propriety  of Pullman abstention,  380  U.S.  at 489-92.  And  the  Supreme  Court  seems
to  have  first analyzed  AFL  v.  Watson,  327  U.S.  582  (1946),  as  a Dombrowski-Younger
case  and,  having  found  that  the  irreparable  harm  requirement  was  met,  327  U.S.
at  593-95,  then  held  that  Pullman abstention  was  nevertheless  proper.  (The  only
doubt  concerning  this categorization  of AFL  v.  Watson  comes from  the  Court's  state-
ment  in  the  midst  of its  apparent  Dombrowski-Younger  analysis  that  it  could  look  to
the  law  side  only  of  the  federal  courts  in  deciding  whether  alternative  remedies  are
adequate.  327  U.S.  at  594.  In  other  respects,  however,  its  analysis  appears  to  be  a
Dombrowski-Younger one.)  In  Harrison  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167  (1959),  moreover,  a
three-judge  court,  NAACP  v.  Patty,  159  F.  Supp.  503,  521  (E.D.  Va.  1958),  found
sufficient  irreparable  harm  to  overcome  Dombrowski-Younger  requirements,  but  the
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with  a  state  criminal  prosecution,' 278  the  question  remains
what  will  be  considered  an  attempt  to  interfere  with  a  state
criminal  prosecution.  It  is  settled  that,  at  least  when  a  state
criminal  proceeding  is  pending  when  the  federal  plaintiff
files  suit,27 9  an  attempt  to  interfere  by  declaratory  relief  will
be  treated  as the  equivalent of an  attempt  to  enjoin. But cases
provide  little  guidance  concerning  which  suits  constitute  at-
tempts  to  interfere  with  criminal  prosecutions.  That  category
is  not  limited  to  situations  in  which  criminal  prosecutions  are
pending, for none  was  pending  in Dombrowski, and  despite  the
exercise  of federal jurisdiction  in  the  case  it  is  a  "Dombrowski-
Younger"  suit  in  the  sense  that  the  Court  required  special  cir-
cumstances  to  support  the  exercise  of  federal  jurisdiction.2 8 0"
Conceivably  all  cases  in  which  a  plaintiff  phrased  his  aim  in
his  pleadings  as  enjoining  a  state  prosecution  would  be  Dom-
browski-Younger  cases,  whereas  if  he  said  he  sought  to  enjoin
27'  The Dombrowski-Younger category  may not,  however,  be limited  to  cases  threat-
ening  interference  with  criminal  enforcenient  proceedings.  The  decided  Supreme
Court  cases  do  involve  criminal  proceedings,  but  it  is  an  open  issue,  which  has  been
adverted  to  by  a  number  of Justices,  whether  civil  enforcement  proceedings  should
be  included.  Chief Justice  Burger  and Justices  White  and  Blackmun  seem  to  have
taken  the  position  that  no  line  should  be  drawn  between  civil  and  criminal  proceed-
ings.  Lynch  v.  Household  Finance  Corp.,  405  U.S.  538,  561  (1972)  (dissenting  opin-
ion).  See  also  Mitchum  v.  Foster,  407  U.S.  225,  244  (1972)  (concurring  opinion).  In
his  separate  concurring  statement  in  Younger  v.  Harris,  Justice  Stewart, joined  by
Justice  Harlan,  noted that the  Court  did "not deal with the considerations  that should
govern  a  federal court  when  it is  asked  to  intervene in  state  civil  proceedings,  where,
for  various  reasons,  the  balance  might  be  struck  differently"  than  in  cases  involving
state criminal  prosecutions.  401  U.S. at 55.  At  the same  time, however, Justice  Stewart
indicated  that  he  found  major  differences  between  criminal  and  civil  proceedings.
401  U.S.  at  55  n.2.  In  Gibson  v.  Berryhill,  411  U.S.  564,  575  (1973),  the  opinion
for  the  Court,  authored  by Justice  White,  stated  that  it  was  still  an  open  question
whether  the  Younger  v.  Harris  rules  applied  in  state  civil  proceedings.  At  another
point in  the  opinion,  however,  it  stated that  only  three  "established  principles"  would
"under  appropriate  circumstances,  restrain  a  federal  court  from  issuing  . ..injunc-
tions"  against  state  court  proceedings:  the  requirement  of exhaustion  of  administra-
tive  remedies,  Pullman abstention,  and  "the  basic  principle  of federalism  .. .that  a
federal  court  may  not  enjoin  a  pending  state  criminal proceeding  in  the  absence  of
special  circumstances  ....  " 411  U.S. at  573-74  (emphasis added). See also Mitchum  v.
Foster, 407  U.S.  225,  230,  237  (1972);  Allee  v. Medrano,  94  S.  Ct. 2191,  2201  (1974);
note  323 infra. In  Speight v. Slaton,  356  F. Supp.  1101  (N.D.  Ga.  1973), a three-judge
district court declined  under Younger to intervene  in a  pending state civil  enforcement
proceeding.  On  appeal  the  Supreme  Court  vacated  the  decision  on  other  grounds.
94  S.  Ct.  1098  (1974).  See text accompanying  notes  323-27  infra. The  Court  has since
noted  probable  jurisdiction  in  a  case  that  should  resolve  the  issue.  MTM,  Inc.  v.
Baxley, 94 S.  Ct.  1559 (1974).
1
7 9 See note  266 supra.
280 One  factor  relevant  to  whether  federal jurisdiction  will  be  exercised  in a  case
that does fall  within  the Dombrowski-Younger category  is  whether  the  proceeding sought
to be  enjoined  is  pending. It  once appeared  that this factor  governed  as well  whether
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operation  of a  statute,  albeit  a  criminal  one,  Pullman analysis
alone  would  apply.  Such  a  rule  would  be  extremely  nonfunc-
tional;  no  purpose  behind  either  the  Dombrowski-Younger  or
the Pullman doctrines  is fulfilled  by allowing  a plaintiff through
his  pleading  so  to  affect  the  choice  of forum.  And  the  cases
show that the plaintiff's pleading  is not determinative. 281  More-
over  the  cases  show  the  determinative  question  is  not  simply
whether  the  statute the  plaintiff attacks  carries  criminal  penal-
ties.  That line might  be justified  simply on  the  theory  that the
basis  for  the  presumption  in  favor  of  state  jurisdiction  is  a
desire  to  allow  states  to  control  their  own  criminal  processes
the  federal  anti-injunction  statute,  28  U.S.C.  §  2283  (1970),  would  apply  to  these
cases  since  it  covers  only  pending  proceedings,  see  Dombrowski  v.  Pfister,  380  U.S.
479,  484 n.2  (1965);  Ex parte Young,  209  U.S.  123,  161-62  (1908),  but now it is settled
that  civil  rights  actions  are  within  the  "expressly  authorized"  exception  to  the  con-
gressional  prohibition,  Mitchum  v.  Foster, 407  U.S.  225  (1972),  so the  anti-injunction
statute  would  seem  in any  event  ineffective  in  the  suits  in question.  But cf  note  276
supra.
Since  Dombrowski  itself  did  not  involve  a  pending  state  prosecution,  it  is  clear
that  the  line  between  pending  and  non-pending  prosecutions  does  not  demarcate
the Dombrowski-Younger category. But cf. Perez  v.  Ledesma,  401  U.S.  52,  120-21  (1971)
(Brennan, J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part).  That  line  may  be  relevant,
however,  in  deciding  how  to  dispose  of  cases  within  the  category.  Douglas involved
threatened  and pending  prosecutions,  while  Younger  involved  principally  a  pending
one.  In  Younger  the  Court  held  the  irreparable  harm  requirement  would  usually
not  be  satisfied  in  an  attempt  to  secure  federal  intervention  in  state  criminal  pro-
ceedings  absent  a  showing  of  bad  faith  and  harassment.  (The  Court  said,  401  U.S.
at  53,  there  might  be  other unusual  circumstances  that could  show irreparable  harm,
including  perhaps that the  challenged  prosecution  "is  only  one  of a  series of repeated
prosecutions  to  which  [the  plaintiff]  . . . will  be  subjected," id. at  49,  but  it  did  not
detail  them.)  That rule  for when  the  irreparable  harm requirement  is  satisfied  seems
narrower  than  Dombrowski's  rule.  The  difference  is  explainable  on  the  ground  that
Younger  involved  pending  proceedings  while  Dombrowski did  not;  there  is  language  in
Younger  that  would  support  that explanation.  401  U.S.  at  41  ("We  express  no  view
about  the circumstances  under  which  federal  courts  may  act  when  there  is  no  prose-
cution  pending  in  state  courts  at  the  time  the  federal  proceeding  is  begun.");  id.  at
45,  49 (references  to  "pending" proceedings).  See  also Perez  v.  Ledesma,  401  U.S.  82,
103-30 (1971)  (Brennan, J., concurring  in part and dissenting in part).  Other language,
however,  would  indicate  that  Younger cuts  back  on  Dombrowski for  non-pending  cases
as  well.  401  U.S.  at 45-53  (reference  to "threatened  prosecutions"  and  use as examples
of cases involving non-pending  prosecutions).
281  In  both  Pullman and  Dombrowski-Younger  cases  the  complaint  typically  prays
for  an  injunction  and/or  declaratory  relief  against  enforcement  of  the  challenged
state  enactment.  In  Pullman  and  Harrison  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167  (1959),  for
example,  both  of which  were treated  as Pullman and  not Dombrowski-Younger cases,  the
plaintiffs  sought  respectively  "to  restrain  the  enforcement  of  a  certain  order  made
by  the  Commission  . . . ",  Pullman  Co.  v.  Railroad  Commission,  33  F.  Supp.  675,
676  (W.D.  Tex.  1940);  and  "to  secure  a  declaratory  judgment  and  an  injunction
restraining  and  enjoining  the defendants  from  enforcing  or  executing  [the  statute  at
issue],"  NAACP  v.  Patty,  159  F.  Supp.  503,  506  (E.D.  Va.  1958).  See  also 360  U.S.  at
169.  The  prayers  for  relief in Douglas and  Dombrowski appear  similar.  In Douglas the
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and  that  the  presumption  must  operate  whenever  a  plaintiff
seeks  to  enjoin  the  operation  of a statute  with  criminal penal-
ties.  Case holdings  belie  the explanation;  not all  cases in  which
plaintiffs  attack  a statute  with  criminal  penalties  are treated  as
Dombrowski-Younger  cases;  some  are  subjected  only  to  Pullman
analysis.
282
A  more  functional  line  of demarcation  for the Dombrowski-
Younger  category  would  focus  on  whether  a criminal  proceed-
ing brought  under  the  statute  challenged  was  either  pending
or  imminent.  If  it  was  neither,  and  there  was  nonetheless  a
case or controversy, Dombrowski-Younger treatment would  not be
proper. The rationale  would be that though defense  of a crim-
inal  prosecution  might  be  adequate  to  protect  the  plaintiff,
if  no  such  proceeding  seemed  imminent  it  would  not  seem
likely  that  the  plaintiff  would  soon  have  that  forum  avail-
able.
28 3  This  line  too  has  difficulties.  The  most  obvious  are
the difficulties  in deciding  how  imminent  should  be considered
"imminent"  and  how  imminence  should  be  shown.28 4  Need
plaintiffs  sought  "to  enjoin  the defendant  city  of Jeannette  and  its  Mayor  from  en-
forcing  against  them  . . . a  certain  ordinance  of  that  city.  ...  Douglas  v.  City  of
Jeannette,  130  F.2d  652,  653  (3d  Cir.  1942).  In Dombrowski the  plaintiff  asked,  inter
alia, "that a  permanent  injunction  issue '*  *  *  restraining  the defendants, their  agents
and  attorneys  from  the  enforcement,  operation  or  execution  of  [the  statutes  in
question]  .......  Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 558 (E.D. La.  1964).
In  Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389  U.S.  241  (1967),  so  far  as  appears  from  the  reports,
the  prayer  for  relief did  explicitly  ask that the  defendant  be restrained  from  "prose-
cuting"  the  plaintiff. 261  F. Supp.  985,  988  (E.D.N.Y.  1966).  It  is  not  clear  whether
it  is  a  Dombrowski-Younger  or  solely  a  Pullman case.  See  note  292  infra.  But  in  any
event the phrasing  of the complaint is not a factor in that determination.
Nor  can  the  two  categories  of  cases  be  separated  according'  to  the  identity  of
the  defendants  sought  to  be  enjoined.  Law  enforcement  and  prosecuting  officials
have  been' defendants  in  such  Pullman cases  as  Harrison and Pullman itself,  as  well
as in Dombrowski.
282 For  cases  involving  statutes  bearing  criminal  penalties,  yet  subjected  only  to
Pullman and not  to Dombrowski-Younger analysis,  see England  v.  Louisiana  State  Bd.  of
Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S.  411  (1964);  Harrison  v.  NAACP,  360  U.S.  167  (1959);
cf.  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n v.  MacMullan,  406  U.S.  498  (1972);  Chicago v.  Atchison,  To-
peka & Santa Fe Ry.,  357 U.S. 77 (1958).
It  is  noteworthy  that  the  statute  carrying  criminal  penalties  in  each  instance
could  be  characterized  as  part  of a  regulatory  program  rather  than  an  ordinary
criminal  statute.  On  the  basis  of current  case  law,  that  distinction,  though  it  is  not
a  very  precise  one,  could  be  said  to  separate  the  Pullman  and  Dombrowski-Younger
categories.
283  Professors  Bator,  Mishkin,  Shapiro  and  Wechsler in  H.  HART  &  H.  WECHSLER,
supra note  8  at  1044,  seem  to  assume  that  this  is  the  line  setting off the Dombrowski-
Younger category.
284 Douglas  v.  City  of  Jeannette,  319  U.S.  157  (1943),  indicated  Dombrowski-
Younger  analysis  should  be  used  when  the  plaintiffs  are  "threatened"  with  prosecu-
tion,  at least  when  they  have  earlier  actually  been  prosecuted  for  engaging in  similar
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state  officials  have  threatened  proceedings  against  the  plain-
tiff prior to the institution of the federal suit, or is  it sufficient
if in  their answer  they  express  an  intent  to  institute  such  pro-
ceedings  promptly?  The  latter approach  would  allow  the  state,
at  the  pleading  stage,  to  control  whether  a  case  would  get
Dombrowski rather  than Pullman treatment,  provided  the  plain-
tiff had violated  the statute  he  challenged  prior  to  his  federal
suit.  That result  might not be dysfunctional,  however,  if when
a  plaintiff challenges  a  state  criminal  enactment  the  only  rea-
son for not presuming  in favor of state  fora when  no proceed-
ings against him  are pending or imminent  is that he should not
have  to forego  the  federal  forum  without an  affirmative  show-
ing that the state will provide an alternative. 2 5
In  some  situations  the  suggested  categorization  may  be
the  equivalent  of  a  rule  that  any  case  in  which  the  plaintiff
attacks  a statute carrying  criminal  penalties  should be  analyzed
in  the Dombrowski-Younger manner,  for  a plaintiff  will  often  be
unable  to  satisfy  "case  or  controversy"  requirements  unless
state  enforcement  proceedings  are  either  pending  or  immi-
nent.  If  the  plaintiff  has  engaged  in  the  conduct  the  state
makes  criminal,  and  no  prosecution  is  even  imminent,  a  chal-
lenge  to  the  criminal  statute  is  not  likely  to  satisfy  those  re-
quirements28 8  unless  the  criminal conduct  is  conduct  he wishes
to continue  to engage  in.  If he  does wish to continue, however,
he  may  well  be  deemed  in  need  of a  present  adjudication  of
the  validity  of  the  state  statute28 -a  need  that  could  satisfy
justiciability  requirements  and  that  would  not appear  satisfied
by  an  ability  to  defend  a  prosecution  in  the  absence  of the
imminence  of any  such  prosecution.  Similarly  when  the  plain-
tiff's  attack on  the validity of a statute  that he  has  not yet  vio-
lated  is  justiciable,288  he  needs  a  forum  in  which  to  test  the
conduct.  Cf. note  292  &  text  accompanying  notes  319-22  infra.  AFL  v.  Watson,  327
U.S.  582,  588  (1946),  applied  Dombrowski-Younger  analysis  when  law  enforcement
agencies  had  been  directed  immediately  to  institute  prosecutions  against  the  plaintiffs
and were in the course of preparing those prosecutions.
285  If  that  were  the  test  of  imminence,  the  only  way  a  plaintiff  could  assure  a
federal  forum  for  a  constitutional  challenge  to  a  state  criminal  statute  would  be  to
test  that  statute  before  violating  it,  and  that  method  would  be  available  only  if  he
could  satisfy justiciability  requirements at that stage.
288 Cf  Younger v. Harris,  401  U.S.  37,  41-42  (1971).
287 Compare Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389  U.S. 241,  252-55  (1967), and Steffel v.  Thomp-
son,  94  S.  Ct.  1209,  1215-16  (1974),  with  Golden  v.  Zwickler,  394  U.S.  103  (1969),
and O'Shea v.  Littleton,  94 S.  Ct. 669, 675-77 (1974).  See also note 259 supra.
28  See  Epperson  v.  Arkansas,  393  U.S.  97  (1968);  Gardner  v.  Toilet  GoodsABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
statute  without  having  first  to  engage  in  criminal  conduct.
In  the  latter  two  situations,  in  which justiciable  controversies
can exist despite the absence of pending or imminent state pro-
ceedings,  the  "pending  or  imminent"  line  does  produce  a
different  result  than  a  test  focusing  on  whether  the  challenge
is  to  a  criminal  enactment,  and  it  allows  those  cases  to  be
analyzed  only  in  accordance  with  the Pullman doctrine  without
regard to the Dombrowski-Younger shift of presumption.
Decided  cases  are  not  altogether  consistent  with  a "pend-
ing  or  imminent  state  criminal  proceedings"  limitation  on
the  Dombrowski-Younger  category.  That  line  can  explain  the
treatment  of  many  cases.  Baggett  v.  Bullitt,289  for  example,
was  treated  solely  as  a  Pullman case  although  it  involved  an
attack  on  a  criminal  statute,  because  the  plaintiffs  had  not
violated  the  statute  they  challenged. 290  AFL v.  Watson 291 was
treated  as  a Dombrowski-Younger case  as  well  as  a Pullman one.
There  the  plaintiffs were  in  violation  of the challenged  statute
and  their  prosecutions  were,  according  to  the  complaint,
"in  process  of  being  prepared. '292  Lake  Carriers' v.  MacMul-
Ass'n,  387  U.S.  167  (1967);  Adler  v.  Board  of Educ.,  342  U.S.  485  (1952);  Euclid  v.
Ambler  Realty  Co.,  272  U.S.  365  (1926);  Pierce  v.  Society  of  Sisters,  268  U.S.  510
(1925);  cf.  Lake  Carriers'  Ass'n  v.  MacMullan,  406  U.S.  498,  504-08  (1972).  But  see
Toilet  Goods  Ass'n  v.  Gardner,  387  U.S.  158  (1967);  Poe  v.  Ullman,  367  U.S.  497
(1961);  International  Longshoremen's  Union  v.  Boyd,  347  U.S.  222  (1954);  United
Public Workers  v. Mitchell,  330 U.S. 75,  86-91  (1947).
289  377 U.S.  360 (1964).
290  Wisconsin  v.  Constantineau,  see text  accompanying  notes  102-06  supra, escapes
Dombrowski-Younger  treatment  because  the  plaintiff  had  not  been  subjected  to  a
criminal  sanction  and  was  not  threatened  with  any  criminal  proceedings.  Insofar
as  the  posting  of her  name  is  considered  the  equivalent  of imposition  of  a  criminal
sanction, it had already taken  place.
291  327 U.S. 582 (1946).
292  327  U.S.  at  588.  Zwickler  v.  Koota,  389  U.S.  241,  254  (1967),  casts  doubt  on
this  analysis  but  does  not squarely  contradict  it. The  plaintiff Zwickler  had  been  con-
victed  of  violating  the  statute  he  complained  of  when  he  distributed  anonymous
political  handbills  in  the  past.  His  conviction  had  been  overttirned  on  other grounds.
He  then  sought  declaratory  and  injunctive  relief  against  future  prosecutions  for  vio-
lating the  same  statute. He seemingly  had  not again  violated the  statute but  expressed
a  desire  to  do  so and  claimed  he  was  prevented  from  doing so  by  a  fear  of prosecu-
tion. 389  U.S. at 252-53.
In  its treatment  of the  case,  the Court  did  not make  clear  whether  it  would  view
it as  a Dombrowski-Younger case  or not. The  court below had  so treated  it and had  held
the  plaintiff  had  not  satisfied  the  requirement  of  irreparable  harm.  The  Supreme
Court  avoided  deciding  whether  Zwickler  was  actually  a  Dombrowski-Younger  case  by
holding that  even  if that  conclusion were  correct with  respect  to the  plaintiff's  request
for  injunctive  relief,  the  same  analysis  did  not  apply  to  declaratory  relief. See  note
266 supra.
Under the analysis suggested  in text, Zwickler should not be treated as a Dombrowski-
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lan293  is  not  a  Dombrowski-Younger  case  because  though  the
plaintiffs  were  in  violation  of the  water  pollution  act  they  at-
tacked  and  though  the  Michigan  authorities  had  enforced  the
provisions  of the  act  regarding  pleasure  craft,294  the Michigan
authorities  had  not  enforced  the  provisions  pertaining  to  in-
dustrial  boats  like  the  plaintiffs',  nor  had  they  threatened  to
prosecute  violations.
295
Supreme  Court  opinions,  however,  rarely  indicate  any
line  of  demarcation  for  the  Dombrowski-Younger  category  or
address  in  particular  cases  whether  Dombrowski-Younger  or
Pullman treatment  is  proper.  Moreover,  they  often  do  not dis-
close  facts  relevant  to  the  proper  treatment- of the  case-such
as  whether  a  criminal  proceeding  is  imminent  or  indeed
whether  the  plaintiffs  have  violated  the  statute  they  challenge
-but  instead  talk  simply  of one  doctrine  in  relation  to  a par-
ticular  case  without  disclosing  why  it  is  the  relevant  one.  As-
suming  that  "pending  or  imminent  criminal  proceedings"  is
indeed  the  line  demarcating  the  Dombrowski-Younger  category,
then  Pullman  itself  is  a  case  in  which  the  Court's  failure  to
discuss  such issues  creates  doubt whether  the case  was properly
handled.  Neither  the  Supreme  Court  opinion  nor  the  district
court  opinion  is  informative  on  the  point,  but  it  seems  likely
that  in Pullman the  complaining  railroads  were  in  violation  of
the  Commission's order,  since  that order sought  to  alter a pre-
existing  practice.  Nor  do  the  opinions  state  whether  enforce-
ment  proceedings  had been  threatened, 296  though  the  district
Younger  case  since  the  plaintiff had  not  engaged  in  the  conduct  he would  be  prose-
cuted for  and  accordingly  no  prosecution  was  imminent. See  text accompanying  notes
319-22  infra. Douglas  v.  City  of Jeannette  is  like Zwickler  in  every  respect  except  that
there  was  more  than  an  individual  plaintiff;  there  was  a  class,  and  despite  previous
prosecution  its  members  had  engaged  in  further  violations  of the  statute  they  chal-
lenged and had been threatened  with  further prosecution.
293 406 U.S.  498 (1972).
294  336 F. Supp. 248, 250  (E.D. Mich.  1971).
295  "Michigan  authorities  . . . seek  the  cooperation  of the  industry  in  the  imple-
mentation  of  its  program  and  have  not  instigated,  nor  does  it  appear,  threatened
criminal prosecutions." Id. at 252.
296 Pullman did  involve  a  penalty,  subjecting  a  violator  to  a possible  fine  of up to
$5000.  TEx.  REV.  Civ.  STAT.  ANN.  art.  6476  (1926).  Multiple  violations  were  multiply
cognizable,  Gulf, Col.  & S.F.  Ry.  v.  Texas,  246  U.S. 58,  60  &  62  (1918).  The Pullman
enforcement  proceeding  appears  to  have  been  denominated  civil,  however,  with  civil
rules  of  evidence  prevailing.  That  the  case  was  thus  not  purely  "criminal"  might
explain  why  it  was  not  treated  as  a  Dombrowski-Younger case.  See  note  282  supra; cf.
Gibson  v.  Berryhill,  411  U.S.  564,  576  (1973)  (suggesting that  the  dividing  line  be-
tween  Dombrowski-Younger  and  Pullman  cases  may  be  whether  state  law  characterizes
the proceedings  as "quasi-criminal").ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
court opinion  does  disclose  that a  temporary  restraining order
against  the  order's  enforcement  was  issued  during  the  pro-
ceedings.297
The  vice  of Pullman is  a  failure  to  address  these  issues;
it may indeed  have been correctly treated. There  are two  cases,
however,  that were  treated  solely  as Pullman cases  in  which  it
affirmatively  appears  that  the  facts  would justify  Dombrowski-
Younger treatment  if pending  or  impending  prosecutions  is the
test  of that  category.  The  district  court  opinion  in  Chicago v.
Atchison,  Topeka  &  Santa Fe Ry. 298  suggests  that  the  plaintiffs
there had violated  the statute  of which  they complained.  More-
over,  the  city  had  threatened  criminal  prosecution.299  As  in
Pullman, however,  a  temporary  restraining  order  against  en-
forcement  had  been  issued  by  the  district  court  after  com-
mencement  of  the  proceeding.  Similarly,  the  district  court
opinion  in  NAACP  v.  Patty 3°0  shows  that  the  plaintiffs  there
were  in  violation  of the  statutes  they  challenged  and  also  that
prosecution  had  been  threatened.  The  district  court  therefore
treated  the  case  as  a  Dombrowski-Younger  one.  It  did  find  the
irreparable  harm  requirement  satisfied,  though  in  doing  so  it
applied  a  test  seemingly  less  stringent  than  that  the  Court
would  have  followed.30  The  Supreme  Court,  however,  did
not  mention  the  possibility  of  Dombrowski-Younger  treatment
for the case302 and applied  only Pullman analysis. 3 0 3
The Supreme  Court has recently  decided  several  cases that
appear  to  contain  the  opposite  error,  applying  Dombrowski-
297 Pullman  Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,  33 F. Supp. 675, 676 (W.D. Tex.  1940).
298  136  F.  Supp.  476  (N.D.  Il.  1956),  rev'd,  240  F.2d  930  (7th  Cir.  1957),  aff'd,
357  U.S.  77 (1958).
299  357 U.S.  at 81.
300  159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D.  Va.  1958),  vacated and remanded, 360 U.S.  167  (1959).
301  Cf.  Douglas  v.  City  of Jeannette,  319  U.S.  157,  163-65  (1943);  Spielman
Motor  Sales  Co.  v.  Dodge,  295  U.S.  89,  95-96  (1935);  & Beal  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.R.,
312  U.S.  45,  50-51  (1941).  Earlier  the  Court  had  followed  a  more lenient  test  closer
to  that  of the  district court.  See  Packard  v.  Banton,  264  U.S.  140,  143  (1924);  cf. Ex
parte  Young, 209 U.S.  123,  161-63 (1908).
302 It  did  refer  to  the  district  court's  finding  that  threatened  enforcement  pro-
duced  irreparable harm  and said  the finding was  supported by  the  evidence.  360 U.S.
at  178.  It  did  not,  however,  appear  to  be  thereby  addressing  the  Dombrowski-Younger
issue  but  instead  seemed  to  state  concern  that  the  parties  be  protected  during  the
Pullman  abstention  it  ordered.  That  concern  was  satisfied  by  pledges  state  officials
made  during  the  course  of  the  litigation  not  to  proceed  against  the  plaintiffs  for
conduct engaged in during the  period they were testing the statutes. Id. at 179.
302  England v. Louisiana  State Bd.  of Medical  Examiners,  375  U.S.  411  (1964),  may
also  properly  be  a  Dombrowski-Younger  case,  though  only Pullman abstention  was  dis-
cussed  or ordered.  The  Supreme  Court did  not rule  on the  validity of the  abstention.
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Younger  analysis  in  situations  calling  only  for  Pullman  treat-
ment.  While  those  cases  do  not  fit  within  the  categorization
this  Article  suggests  for Dombrowski-Younger  cases,  they  do  not
suggest  any  other  workable  classification  either.  Indeed,  they
do  not  recognize  Dombrowski-Younger cases  as  a  separate  cate-
gory  at  all;  their common  mistake  is  a failure  to  note any  dif-
ference  of  approach  between  "Dombrowski-Younger  cases"  and
other  cases  within  the  federal  jurisdiction,  most  noticeably
the  difference  in  applying  the  irreparable  harm  requirement.
Consequently  the opinions  proceed  on the assumption  that the
only  distinction  to  be  made  is  between  one  group  of  cases  in
which  it  is  proper  to  exercise  federal  jurisdiction  and  one
group in which it is not.
In  Steffel  v.  Thompson 304  the  petitioner  sought  declaratory
relief 30 5  against  a  threatened  application  to  him  of Georgia's
criminal  trespass  statute.  While  distributing  handbills  protest-
ing  American  involvement  in  Vietnam  on an  exterior  sidewalk
of a shopping  center,  the  petitioner  had  on  two  occasions  left
under  threats  by  police  that  if  he  continued  handbilling  he
would  be  arrested.  On  the  second  occasion,  petitioner's  com-
panion had refused to leave and had been arrested and charged
with criminal  trespass.
In  his  complaint  the  petitioner  alleged  he  desired  to  con-
tinue  handbilling  but  that  threats  that  if he  did  he  would  be
arrested  and  prosecuted  deterred  him  from  doing  so.  The
district  court  and  the  court  of appeals  denied  relief. The  Su-
preme  Court  reversed,  Justice  Brennan  writing  for  a  unani-
mous Court.
The  Court  found,  first,  that  the  petitioner's  allegations
did  establish  the  existence of an  actual  controversy  at the time
he filed his  action. His fears of prosecution were  not "imaginary
or  speculative, '30 6  as  both  police  testimony  and  his  compan-
which  was  ordered  by  the  district  court.  It  appears  that  the  plaintiffs  had  violated
the criminal statute  and that threats of enforcement had been made.
304  94 S.  Ct.  1209  (1974).
305  In the district court he sought  injunctive relief as well.  It  was  denied along with
the  declaratory  relief. Becker  v.  Thompson,  334  F.  Supp.  1386  (N.D.  Ga.  1971).  On
appeal  to  the  court  of  appeals  the  petitioner  abandoned  the  request  for  injunctive
relief. Becker  v.  Thompson,  459  F.2d  919,  921  (5th Cir.  1972).  The  fact  that  injunc-
tive  relief was  originally  requested  means  that a  three-judge court  should  have  heard
the  case  in the  first instance,  but the abandonment of the  request  for injunctive  relief
made  the court  of  appeals'  exercise  of jurisdiction  proper.  94  S.  Ct.  at  1214-15  n.7.
306 94 S.  Ct. at 1215  (quoting Younger v. Harris,  401  U.S. 37,  42 (1971)).
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ion's arrest  confirmed,  and  it was  not  necessary  that he  "first
expose  himself  to  actual  arrest  or  prosecution  to  be  entitled
to  challenge  a  statute  that  he  claims  deters  the  exercise  of
his  constitutional  rights. ' 3 0 7  The  only  question  was  whether
the  controversy  continued  until  the  present,  given  the  lessen-
ing  of  American  involvement  in  Vietnam,308  a  question  the
Court directed the district court to resolve  on remand.
The  Court  then  proceeded  to  ask  whether  declaratory
relief  should  have  been  precluded  because  the  petitioner's
attack was  levelled  at  a  state  criminal  statute. The lower courts
had  found  relief  inappropriate  on  grounds  that  Younger  v.
Harris "made  it  clear  beyond  peradventure  that  irreparable
injury  must  be  measured  by  bad  faith  harassment, ' 3 0 9  that
bad  faith  could  not be  found  here,  and  that though Younger's
holding  was  limited  in  terms  to  situations  in  which  a  state
prosecution  was  pending,  its  reasoning  applied  equally  to
threatened  state  proceedings.  Likewise,  the  courts  reasoned,
Samuels v.  Mackell3 10-holding  that  in  situations  where  Younger
made  injunctive  relief  unavailable  because  of  an  absence  of
irreparable  harm,  declaratory  relief should  be  equally  unavail-
able-should apply equally .to threatened  criminal proceedings.
The  Supreme  Court's  reversal  was  on  the  theory  that
"[n]either Younger nor Samuels .. .decided  the question wheth-
er  federal  intervention  might  be  permissible  in  the  absence
of  a  pending  state  prosecution,' 311  and  that  those  decisions
should  not apply  when criminal  proceedings  were  not pending
because in that situation
federal  intervention  does  not  result  in  duplicative
legal  proceedings  or  disruption  of  the  state  criminal
justice  system;  nor  can  federal  intervention,  in  that
circumstance,  be  interpreted  as  reflecting  negatively
upon  the  state  courts'  ability  to  enforce  constitutional
principles.  In  addition,  while  a  pending  state  prose-
cution  provides  the  federal  plaintiff  with  a  concrete
opportunity  to  vindicate  his  constitutional  rights,  a
refusal  on  the  part of the  federal  courts  to  intervene
when  no  state  proceeding  is  pending  may  place  the
307Id.  at 1216.
308 Cf  Golden  v.  Zwickler, 394 U.S.  103 (1969).
309  Becker v. Thompson,  459 F.2d 919, 922 (5th Cir.  1972).
310  401  U.S.  66  (1971).
31"  94 S.  Ct. at 1217.
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hapless  plaintiff  between  the  Scylla  of  intentionally
flouting state law  and the Charybdis of foregoing what
he  believes  to  be  constitutionally  protected  activity
in  order  to  avoid  becoming  enmeshed  in  a  criminal
proceeding.
312
Therefore,  the  Court  concluded,  when  no  state  criminal  pro-
ceeding  is  pending  at  the  time  federal  intervention  is  sought,
at  least  declaratory  relief  is  not  precluded,  for  it  does  not
require  the  irreparable  injury  traditionally  prerequisite  to
injunctive  relief.313  The  Court  left  open  the  question  whether
injunctive  relief would be precluded  on the facts of this case,314
since  the  petitioner  had  abandoned  an  earlier  request  for
that remedy.
315
While  the  Court's  result  is  clearly  proper,  its  reasoning
is  problematic.  A  plain  implication  is  that  central  to  the
result  is  a  difference  between  the  equitable  requirement  of
irreparable  injury  and  the  requirements  for  declaratory  re-
lief. It cannot be simply  a difference  between  the requirements
for  equitable  and  declaratory  relief  that  explains  which  cases
a federal  court  will  hear, however, for  in  suits  involving  pend-
ing  state  prosecutions,  requests  for  declaratory  and  injunctive
relief are  equally barred. 3 1 6  More  fundamentally,  Pullman and
other cases  subjected  solely  to Pullman analysis  involved  injunc-
tive  relief and yet  were deemed  to have  satisfied  the  equitable
requirement  of irreparable  harm  without  a  showing  that  state
criminal  processes  could  not  adequately  adjudicate  the  con-
troversy.  If,  as  the  Court  said,  it recognized  as an  open  ques-
tion  whether  injunctive  relief  might be  proper  on the  facts  of
Steffel,  prdsumably  without a  showing of bad  faith on  the  part
of  law  enforcement  officials,  that  is  because  it  is  not  solely  a
difference  between  declaratory  and  injunctive  requirements
that  explains  the  exercise  of federal jurisdiction  in  Steffel.  An
injunction  might  be  permissible  in  the  circumstances  of  that
case  on  either  of two  theories:  First,  the  less  stringent  test  of
irreparable  injury,  not  requiring  a  showing  of  inadequacy
in the  state  forum  but  instead  presuming  in  favor  of the  fed-
312 Id.
3,'  See id. at  1218-22.
314 Id. at 1217. See also Allee v. Medrano, 94 S.  Ct. 2191,  2203 n.15  (1974). 315 See note 305 supra.
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eral forum, might be applicable  and the case not be within "the
Dombrowski-Younger  category"  at  all.  Alternatively,  special  cir-
cumstances  might  be required  to justify  the  exercise  of federal
jurisdiction  in the case without the test of special circumstances
being  as  stringent  as  when  state  proceedings  are  pending. 3 17
For  example,  the  bad  faith  requirement  usually  prerequisite
to  the  exercise  of federal jurisdiction  when  a state  prosecution
is  pending318  might not be deemed  essential  if the  prosecution
were  not  pending.  This  alternative  would  mean  that  Steffel,
though  not within  a  Younger  category  of cases  (those involving
pending  criminal  proceedings)  was  within  the  Dombrowski one
(imminent  state  proceedings,  still  requiring  showing  of special
circumstances  for  exercise  of federal  jurisdiction)  and  not  in
a  category,  like  cases  properly  subjected  only  to Pullman anal-
ysis,  where the presumption is in favor of federal jurisdiction.
On  the facts  of Steffel  the first of these  alternatives  should
be adopted and the case  should not be subjected  to Dombrowski-
Younger analysis  at  all.319  For the  petitioner  in  Steffel  was  seek-
ing to enjoin a statute that would be applied to him  only in the
event  that  he  engaged  again  in  handbilling;  the  threats  to
prosecute  were  not for  past  conduct but  for  conduct the  peti-
tioner had yet to  engage  in.  In that situation, to defer in favor
of state  criminal proceedings  would  require  persons  to subject
themselves  to  criminal  liability  as  a  condition  of attacking  the
constitutionality  of the state  criminal  statute, a  plainly  undesir-
able  result if, in the absence  of criminal  liability, there  is  none-
theless  an  extant  case  or  controversy.32 0  Since  no  deference
should  be  paid state  criminal proceedings  in  a situation  where
the  conduct  to  be  charged  has  not  yet  occurred,  a  constitu-
tional attack on the criminal statute brought  at that time should
proceed  in  federal  court,  unless  Pullman  requirements  for
abstention are satisfied.
The  Court's  analysis  in Steffel  does  not,  however,  proceed
along  such  lines. In addition  to  whether declaratory  or injunc-
tive relief is sought,  a factor discussed  above,  the Court implies
that  the  differentiating  factor  between  cases  in  which  federal
jurisdiction  is  exercised  and  those  in which  it is  not is  whether
317 See note 280 supra.
318 Id.
319 See also note 292 supra.
320See note 287 supra & accompanying  text.
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state  criminal  proceedings  are  pending  or  merely  threatened
at the  time  the  federal  suit  is  commenced.  While  that  distinc-
tion  may  be  operative  in  some  cases,32'  it  does  not explain  the
difference  in  treatment between  cases  like Dombrowski and Pull-
man.  The  Court  has  failed  to  differentiate  between  two  kinds
of threatened  state  proceedings:  those  threatened  for  conduct
that  has  already  occurred  and  those  threatened  for  conduct
yet  to  be  engaged  in.  If  in Steffel  the  threat  was  to  prosecute
the petitioner  for handbilling he had already  done and, though
state  proceedings  had  not  commenced  when  the  federal  suit
was  filed,  state  officials  were  in  the  course  of  preparing  to
prosecute,  the  case  would  resemble  Dombrowski;  under  that
holding  more  deference  to  state  criminal  proceedings  would
seem appropriate than in the case as it arose.
3 22
Another  case323  containing  errors similar to Steffel is Speight
321 See note 280 supra.
322  It  has  not been  clear  whether  the  special  circumstances  required  to justify  the
exercise  of  federal  jurisdiction  in  that  instance  would  be  the  same  as  in  a  Younger
(pending  state  prosecution)  situation  or  not.  See  notes  266  &  280 supra. The  Steffel
holding  purports  to  answer  that question,  saying  at  least  as  respects  declaratory  re-
lief,  a  different  and  more  lenient  standard  applies  when  the  federal  plaintiff  wins
the  race  to  the  courthouse.  No  doubt  Steffel  will  be  taken  so  to  settle  the  question.
See  Allee  v.  Medrano,  94  S.  Ct.  2191,  2201  2203  (1974).  Query  whether  the  Court
would  have  so  held,  however,  if  it  had  been  presented  with  a  case  properly  within
the  Dombrowski-Younger  category-if,  for  example,  Steffel  had  been  threatened  with
prosecution  for  acts  already  engaged  in.  Since  the  issue  is  the  standard  of  special
circumstances  in  that  type  of  case,  and Steffel  is  not  that  type  of case,  it  should  not
be  deemed  dispositive  of  the  issue  despite  the  fact that the  Court  apparently  thought
it was  involved there.
323 A  third  1973  Term  case  contains  errors  similar  to Steffel.  In Allee  v.  Medrano,
94  S.  Ct.  2191  (1974),  the  plaintiffs, farmworkers,  sought to  enjoin as  unconstitutional
the  enforcement  of  several  Texas  statutes,  TEXAS  PEN.  CODE  ANN.  art.  474  (1948)
(breach  of  the  peace)  (since  repealed);  id.  art. 482  (1948)  (abusive  language)  (since
repealed);  id.  art.  439  (1948)  (unlawful  assembly)  (since  repealed);  TEX.  REV.  Civ.
STAT.  ANN.  arts.  5154(d)  &  5154(f)  (1971)  ("picketing"  &  secondary  picketing),  and
sought  also  to  enjoin  certain  Texas  law  enforcement  officials  from  interfering  with
their  constitutional  rights.  They  prevailed  in  the  district  court,  and  the  Supreme
Court affirmed, Justice Douglas writing  for the  five-man majority.
Justice  Douglas  first  explained  that  a  "case  or  controversy"  was  present,  94
S.  Ct.  at  2197-98,  then  took  up  the  subject  of  the  decree  enjoining  state  officials.
After  "not[ing]  that  this  portion  of the  decree  creates  no  interference  with  prosecu-
tions  pending  in  the  state  courts,  so  that  the  special  considerations  relevant  to
cases like  Younger  v. Harris  . . . do  not apply here," id. at 2199-2200, Justice  Douglas
said,  "Nonetheless  there  remains  the  necessity  of  showing  irreparable  injury,  'the
traditional  prerequisite  to  obtaining  an  injunction'  in  any  case."  Id.  at  2200  (citing
Younger  v.  Harris,  401  U.S.  37,  46 (1971).  He  went  on  to say  that  irreparable  injury
was  apparent  from  the  "persistent  pattern  of  police  misconduct"  that  the  case  in-
volved. 94  S.  Ct. at 2200.
From  the  language  quoted  thus  far,  it  is  apparent  that  Allee  v.  Medrano,  like
Steffel,  assumes  that  for  purposes  of the  exercise  of  federal  jurisdiction  there  areABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES
v.  Slaton  .
324  There  the  three-judge  district court  had  declined
to  exercise  its  jurisdiction  because  of  a  pending  state  civil
enforcement  proceeding.  The  Supreme  Court  avoided  reach-
ing  the  question  whether  Younger  applied  to  civil  as  well  as
criminal  enforcement  proceedings, 3 2 5  for  subsequent  to  the
district  court's  decision,  the  Georgia  Supreme  Court  had  de-
clared  unconstitutional  the  state  statute  under  which  the  en-
forcement  proceedings  had been brought. The Supreme  Court
reasoned that
two  categories  of  cases-those  involving  pending  state  criminal  prosecutions  and
others-without  regard  to  any  distinction  between  cases  like  Dombrowski  involving
imminent  state  prosecutions  and  cases  properly  subject  only  to  Pullman  analysis
where  state  prosecutions  are  neither  imminent  nor  pending.  The  Court's  failure  to
make  the  latter distinction  is  apparent  in  its comment  that irreparable  injury  is invari-
ably  requisite  to  injunctive  relief.  It  is  unclear  whether  Justice  Douglas  is  applying
that requirement  in  the  Pullman or  the  Dombrowski sense  when  he  says  the  showing
of  persistent  police  misconduct  satisfies  it.  It  should  be  sufficient  for  the  plaintiffs
in  Medrano  to  satisfy  the  less  stringent  test of irreparable  harm  applied  in Pullman,
since  Medrano's injunction  against  Texas  officials,  which  "[o]n  its  face  . . . [did]  not
more  than  require  the  police  to  abide  by  constitutional  requirements,"  id.  at  2199,
did  not  involve  pending  or  threatened  prosecutions  at  all.  The  Court's  citation  to
Dombrowski in  making its  irreparable  harm  argument,  id. at  2200,  however,  may  indi-
cate it viewed  the requirement  it was imposing as equivalent to the one in that case.
In  the  final  part  of  his  opinion, Justice  Douglas  addresses  the  propriety  of the
injunction  against  the  Texas  statutes.  Since  there  was  some  confusion  in  the  record
concerning  whether  there  were  pending prosecutions,  Douglas  remanded  for  a  find-
ing on  this question,  saying  Younger and Samuels apply only  when  pending  state  prose-
cutions  are  present  (citing  Steffel).  A  confusing  factor  in  Justice  Douglas'  discussion
of the  issue  is  his  reference  to  whether  "there  were  pending  prosecutions  at the  time
of the  District  Court decision,"  id. at 2201,  or whether  there are pending prosecutions
at  the  time  of  the  remand,  id.  at  2202,  whereas  earlier  cases  dealing  with  pending
prosecutions  clearly  have  been  concerned,  for  Dombrowski-Younger  purposes,  with
their  pendency  at  the  time  the  federal  suit  was  filed,  e.g.,  Steffel  v.  Thompson,  94
S.  Ct.  1209,  1217 (1974);  Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.  479, 484 n.2 (1965).
Another  indication  of a  departure  from  settled  practice  in  the  Medrano opinion
is  contained  in  Douglas'  statement,  "because  we  cannot  determine  with  certainty
whether  there  are  pending  prosecutions,  or even  whether the  District Court intended  to
enjoin them  if there were,  the  proper  disposition  is  to  remand  the  case  to  the  District
Court  for further  findings."  94  S.  Ct.  at 2202  (emphasis  added).  The implication  that
the  result  may  differ  according  to  whether  the  decree  speaks  in  terms  of enjoining
a  criminal  prosecution or, instead,  enjoining the  criminal  statute under which  a prose-
cution  pending  against  the  federal  plaintiff is  brought  is  inconsistent  with  prior  case
law.  See  note  281  supra  &  accompanying  text;  Roe  v.  Wade,  410  U.S.  113,  126
(1973).  No  such  distinction  according  to  the  wording  of an  injunction  should  be  ac-
cepted,  since  once  a  state  criminal  statute  is  declared  unconstitutional  and  its  enforce-
ment  enjoined,  any  criminal  prosecution  proceeding  under  it  is  effectively  interfered
with.
A  final point of interest in Allee v.  Medrano is that while  two of the  statutes sought
to  be  enjoined  were  civil  statutes,  the  Court's  opinion  proceeds  exactly  as  if all  the
challenged  enactments were criminal. Cf  notes 256 & 278 supra.
324  94 S.  Ct.  1098 (1974)  (unanimous per curiam decided after oral argument).
325 See note 278 supra.
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appellants  could  obtain  full  relief  in  the  state  court
proceeding  merely  by  moving  to  dismiss  the  state  ac-
tion,  in accord  with  state procedural  rules,  in light  of
.. . [the  Georgia  Supreme  Court's  recent  decision].  If
that  is  the  case,  appellants  could  not  now  make  any
showing  of irreparable  injury  by  reason  of the  state
court  proceeding,  and  such  a  showing  is  of course  re-
quired  before the  federal court could grant the equita-
ble  relief,  apart  from  any  special  considerations  in-
volved in Younger v.  Harris ....  326
The  difficulty  with  this  reasoning  is  that  its  correctness  de-
pends upon  whether  civil  enforcement  proceedings  are  within
the Dombrowski-Younger category  at  all-the  question  the Court
purported  not to  decide.  For if the case  is  wholly  without  the
Dombrowski-Younger category,  it  is  erroneous  to apply  as  a  pre-
requisite  to  injunctive  relief  an  irreparable  harm  requirement
that looks to the adequacy of state  proceedings.32"
Despite  Steffel  v.  Thompson  and  Speight  v.  Slaton,  there  is
a  difference  in  treatment  between  cases  like  Dombrowski  and
those  properly  subjected  only  to  Pullman  analysis,  though
distinctions  may  also  be  drawn  within  the Dombrowski-Younger
category  between  suits  involving  imminent  and pending  prose-
cutions.  Whether  a  case  is  placed  in  the  Dombrowski-Younger
category  or  the  Pullman  category  may  well  determinatively
affect  the  exercise  of state  or federal jurisdiction.  It  is  there-
fore  both  surprising  and  disturbing  that Supreme  Court  opin-
ions  often  seem  oblivious  to  the  fact  that  any  two  such  cate-
gories exist;  consequently, they neither address the demarcation
of  these  categories  nor  reveal  any  clear  pattern  of where  the
line  is  drawn.  If,  as  seems  likely  despite  Steffel  v.  Thompson,
it is  pending and imminent state  criminal  proceedings  in which
the  Court  will  presume  in favor  of the  state  forum,  the Court
should  explicitly  recognize  its  shift of presumption  from  other
cases  within  federal jurisdiction and  should  attempt  to  explain
why  the  shift  is  allowable  in  the  face of congressional jurisdic-
tional  statutes.  In  any  event,  enunciation  of  an  explicit  line
326  94 S.  Ct. at 1099.
327 The  Court's  result  might  be  permissible  anyway  under  the  discretionary  rule
that  when  an  ongoing  state  proceeding  involves  an  issue  presented  to  the  federal
court,  the  federal  tribunal  may  in  its  discretion  await  the  state  outcome  without  re-
gard  to usual abstention principles.  See note 256 supra.1974]  ABSTENTION  IN  CONSTITUTIONAL  CASES  1187
would  provide  the  parties  and  the  lower  courts  with  more
guidance  than  does  the  current  amalgam  of  holdings,  thus
avoiding  much  of  the  wastefulness  that  currently  occurs  in
determining  whether  the  federal  or  the  state  forum  should
proceed  with  a  controversy. 328  Little  can  be  said  for  retain-
ing a category  of cases  of such uncertain  scope  and rationale-
a criticism  applicable  to  the Thibodaux and  administrative  cate-
gories  of abstention, as  well as to this Dombrowski-Younger one.
328 Perhaps  also,  depending  upon  what  definition  of  "imminence"  prevails,  an
explicit  line  drawn  at  imminent  and  pending  state  proceedings  would  often  enable
a  state's  attorney  general  to  take  advantage  of the  Dombrowski-Younger  presumption
by claiming an intent promptly to institute state criminal  proceedings.